VARIETIES OF WORLDLY WISDOM

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THE English and American ways of life have more than a little in common. Except however when "Rhodes Scholars in reverse," Englishmen do not "major." Instead, they "specialize"—a very, very few in International Relations. Some of these do it in London. This article is on what that means.

In cricket—a staple, incidentally, of the English way of life—there are broadly two techniques for bringing a ball to "turn from the off." One, the less usual, is the "googly." Fifty years ago it was a rarity indeed. Yet the writer knew in those days a fellow-schoolboy who, bowling googlies, was unaware that not everybody did. To him, they seemed the natural way to have a ball "turn from the off."

In recent years, the writer has been reminded of that lad. He himself has for quite a while now been assuming to teach International Relations, in what had seemed to him the "natural" way. But it appears that others may do it differently. This opportunity to report upon the "London Syllabus" is, in effect, the occasion for a demonstration of his googly.

In effect, but not specifically. For the Syllabus is in fact the blueprint for the examination of the University, and not the program of the teaching given in a college. To claim, for example, that the Syllabus was worthy of its subject would not be to imply that the teaching, anywhere, was necessarily worthy of the Syllabus.[1]

What then says this London formula[2] to one who, in seeking admission, discloses a desire to have International Relations as his specialization—his "special" subject—in trying for a first degree? The relevant degree, it tells him, is known as the B.Sc.(Econ.). In the scheme for this there is a choice of "special subjects"; and his will be No. 12. Following this course, he will normally, after two years, "take" Part I, and, after a further year, Part II. In Part I, in common with all other candidates, he will be given papers in six "compulsory" and two "alternative" subjects; and in Part II he will, in his "special" subject, be given three compulsory and two optional papers. In practice he

[1] And, conversely, a student who having based his preparation on the teaching given him found himself, at the examination, unready for questions based on the Syllabus would have no cause to complain, except of course against his teachers, who, like him, should have read the "book of words."

[2] For the wording of the Syllabus, see the Regulations for this Degree published by the University of London.

will be bound to take, whether as alternative in Part I or as optional in Part II, International Law. In practice also he will be required to take, as one of his two alternatives in Part I, The Structure of International Society. This will leave him freedom in the choice either of one alternative and one optional, or of two optional subjects. Thus there are nine papers altogether which he technically, and eleven which, in college practice, he virtually, cannot escape. These eleven are Economics, Applied Economics, Political History, Economic History, Government, The History of Political Ideas, and The Structure of International Society (all, thus far, in Part I), International Law (in either Part), and, in Part II, International History Since 1860, International Relations, and International Institutions. On his examination as a whole he may either fail, or simply pass, or be awarded lower second, or upper second, or first class honors.

There are two perspectives from which these conditions may be looked at. From without, it is a degree in Economics, having a "core" curriculum, supported by a fringe of peripherals, International Relations being one. From within, or from the candidate's-eye view, it is a course in the social sciences, focusing on International Relations as the damsel to be desired, wooed, and won, but with an entourage of prospective bridesmaids, in whose society, for the period at least of the wooing, it is prudent to find such pleasure as he can.

It is of course not necessarily safe to expect of any particular program of study that it will be found to reflect some unifying idea. Where, however, the possibilities open to a candidate are circumscribed, the thought of discovering in the pattern an informing logic may be rather confidently entertained. And in London this is as a rule the case. To inquire, therefore, into the rationale of the B.Sc. formula is not an idle undertaking. In some countries the student's choice might perhaps be less restricted. He might be free to pick his courses as from a cafeteria counter. In England, the land of liberty, he is not so free as that. Least of all has he freedom to decide for himself what International Relations proper, the subject of his choosing, shall prove to be about. If he wants the lady, he must have her for what she is. So, if on acquaintance he finds her not all that he had expected—too possessive perhaps, or too complicated, or too down-to-earth—or if he has got her muddled up with one of her maidenly entourage, or with her Oxford namesake,[8] let him call it off, like a man, while yet there is time. Not that he could have had much excuse for mistaking her

[8] "International Relations," a "further" subject in the scheme for the Final Honour School of Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

identity. Her sponsors for the marriage market never made any mystery of that. The "thing" denoted, the "referent" for International Relations with capital I and R, was, they clearly indicated, a branch of study, the study of relationships which, *qua* international, were themselves as decisively identifiable as are, say, interurban jealousies or intercontinental flights. And with a subject matter thus unequivocally pinpointed, the nature and method of the study and the form of the Syllabus could in their turn scarcely be other than a question of common sense.

It might seem, for example, to have been but the merest common sense that remarked the difference between the subject proper and what one might come to think of as the more or less essential "underpinners." For an understanding, that is, of international relationships, attention to them alone might not be enough. And again there was the distinction between a forthright study of the subject taken holistically, concretely, and in the round, and the semi-specialized examination, by appropriate methods, of particular aspects inviting treatment in that way. At any rate, were anything in the Syllabus to be called in question, it is to common sense and nothing more compelling that appeal for its vindication would have to be made.

To take International Relations in London is not therefore to sample a chance assortment of meats. The subject is single and distinct in itself, and its subject matter a unitary whole: the nexus, or complex, or tangle, or intertwining, of relationships between sovereign states and, as by the same token, the institutional environment within which these occur. The relation between Shylock and Antonio is a function partly of the characters of the men, but partly also of the context of their encounter. Similarly the relation between Jordan and Israel, in the circumstances of our day. International Relations becomes thus a study of the global setting within which those quasi-personalities, the members of the international family, exist, and co-exist; a study also of the situations, the types of situation, and the patterns of behavior that occur therein. In theory, a someone—France, let us say—is up to something. In reality, there is on foot a process, which curiosity may dissect, but the upshot of which, in diplomatic usage, is construed as the comportment of France.

The key distinction in this business of analyzing is doubtless that between the official and the fundamentally factual interpretation of what goes on. What in diplomatic theory we are given is the behavior of states. What in reality we get is the doings of men, influenced very deeply of course by mythological thinking on the behavior of states.

Such thinking may be partly differentiated into what is uncritically current among the generality and what conventional among the few. The folklore of the international society will be seen to include both.

There is a point in Professor Quincy Wright's recent remarkable study[4] at which he might almost be understood as heralding an imminent parting of the ways: either, a study of international relations to the ignoring of a nascent world society, or, recognition of the world society, with international relations left aside. "It may be," he says, "that . . . disciplines based, not on *international relations*, but on a *world society* are required" (p. 42). In London, no such dilemma is acknowledged. International relations and world society are, as it were, interchangeable notions. Respect must be paid, in any pertinent analysis, to both. They are, so to say, two sides of the same coin.

Is this unduly subtle? Or is it the "natural" view?

"From time to time," reports Professor Wright, students at Chicago had complained that, "while the courses recommended usually had more or less relevance to what might be called international relations, they were not quite sure what that subject was. It seemed to branch out in various directions and the ends of the branches often seemed quite unrelated to one another. Furthermore, the courses seemed, sometimes, to rest upon different assumptions and to reach divergent conclusions, leaving the student in confusion" (p. vii).

It seems that in these circumstances the trouble was felt to lie, in part at any rate, in the formlessness of a subject still in process of being born. Could it as yet be considered a discipline at all? "Some say a discipline only exists in so far as a body of data has been systematized by a distinctive analytical method" (p. 23). Political science "was . . . less integrated at its start than was economics. . . . International relations in this respect resembles political science rather than economics." This discipline of International Relations has developed "synthetically." "In international relations . . . an effort is being made to synthesize numerous older disciplines, each with a specialized point of view, into a unity." "At least eight disciplines" have contributed to its development (pp. 32-33, *passim*).

It is with near-veneration that a mere aspirant-practitioner with the googly reads this more elaborate recipe for getting a ball to turn. To him, it nonetheless is somewhat, though of course not exactly, as if all the corpus of man's knowledge and experience were to be assembled

[4] *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955), the source for everything here ascribed to Professor Quincy Wright.

in a heap, there then being extruded from it only such exceptional elements as could not by the boldest abuse of artistic license be colored with an international tint, the bulk being then scheduled for transmutation into the substance of a single science—by the stratagem of a new conceptual frame—pending which, International Relations must, even by its sponsors, be held inferior to, say, Economics, whether as the matter for a textbook or as a line of country for research. This is by no means precisely how Professor Quincy Wright has put it. But anyway, if his principle is alone correct, it might appear that what his London confreres have heretofore been furnishing, in fancied fulfillment of the conditions of their employment, must be attested as pathetically malapropos. Yet have they in fact so greatly erred—in conceiving their discipline, so simplemindedly, as merely the indulgence, in a not so desultory manner, of a common curiosity as to how it is "out there," in that mentally projected milieu, that "other world," in which certain mentally pictured personalities do commerce with their kind?

A "common" curiosity? Fairly common, surely. In wartime, we are all of us students of war, a phase of international relationships particularly difficult, when we are in it, to dismiss. Between wars, though possibly with less concern, we are likewise, not a few of us, students of the contrasted phase, wishfully denominated peace, but better described as tension. Others before us have remarked, and pondered, these things; and some of their impressions are ours to share. To engage in such remarking, and pondering, is to study a certain subject; though how methodologically happy is one's approach is a matter of degree. Some go at it with more sagacity, and pertinacity, than the rest.

And some, under academic auspices, more methodically than aforetime, premising the distinction between a foundation-level treatment—the "Structure" subject in Part I—and a less elementary presentation which follows in Part II; where, the nature of the interstate society, as the setting, being assumed as now sufficiently known, the focus shifts to the unfolding of the drama, the motions of the players on the stage. From the World of World Politics it is Over to the Politics of the World.

And all this, confessedly, without the initial synthesizing of even the fewest of constituent disciplines. Nay, even without acknowledged feelings of special frustration in face of the multiformity of facts. And, should this conception be declared unsound, what are we henceforth to think of the mother, entertaining her daughter on the nature of marriage, without herself having made the grade in any, it may be,

of the divers disciplines, from economics to trigonometry, which bear, in their respective ways, upon her single theme? And what of the anthropologist, financed to make a field study of some recognized cultural group? Is he to warn us that his result must be at best a synthesis, and more probably a miscellany of unblendable notes? Will he admit that there is nothing unitary in what he is charged to explore? Or will he not, on the contrary, approach the life-in-community of his French Canadians, or his Tibetans, as a single reality, to be holistically apprehended if it is duly to be understood? And, once having decided that the ordinary cultural group may indeed so constitute an intelligible unit for study, need we doubt that this could be equally true of what is also in effect, if not literally, a cultural group—the plurality of states, co-existing as they do in a society so distinctively theirs? The habitat, the folklore, the mores, the very givenness of this group: all these are points for reflective investigation, as facets of a single theme.

Nor are the findings of Professor Quincy Wright wholly barren of tacit endorsement for those who in London, with tools of homelier type, have for so long been academically active in terms of so simple a conception of what they will have been brought there to do. His admonition that International Relations is difficult to teach; his implied denial that it need necessarily be catered for as if part of political science; his insistence that every discipline has both a philosophical and a scientific aspect; his perception that the turning-out of well-qualified professionals is less important than the development of citizens and leaders with a broad grasp of International Relations; and, not least, his announcement that the most recent tendency has been to analyze the relations between states by locating them in a multi-dimensional field—all these points are sufficiently in line with the logic of the London effort. A multi-dimensional field: that, for London, is what the social cosmos always was; and it is in terms of such a cosmos, glimpsed, like a panorama, as a whole, that the Structure initiate is there enjoined to think. And this not just provisionally, as pending some fuller development of his power for the use of the tools for some such process of analytical vivisection as should serve finally to open up for observation the inner heart of things. This all-in visualizing of the social given would be like the intuiting, as everybody does it, of the individuality of a friend. Only through an immediate acquaintance with the living person in his living wholeness does the mutual bearing declare itself of his particular traits. Even though mentally dwelling upon one stratum only of his personality at a time, we hold in mind our image of the multi-dimensional essence of his being. He

exists, for us, in the continuing singular, however inconsequent and unaccountable the succession of his manifestations and his moods.

If this now trite distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by mere description is unreal, or if the Gestalt principle is delusion, then the entire conception of the Structure subject may be discarded as pedagogically inept. But if there is indeed a difference between the synoptic and the synthetic modes of becoming aware; if there is point in savoring someone as a person rather than merely knowing all about him; if there is in fact any advantage, before mapping a bit of country with its minuter ins and outs, in getting of it a bird's-eye view; if there is indeed this suggested distinction between the organic totality of a subject matter and the aggregation of its parts, the juxtaposing of its aspects—then the argument for Structure does at least seem to require consideration. It was in an ancient fable that the blind men, from their experience—one of the tusk, one of the trunk, one of the tail—reasoned to the nature of the elephant per se. For the elephant, read the social cosmos; and, for the blind observers, the tourist, the caricaturist, the purist-jurist, and others nearer home. *Was* the elephant "rather like a rope"? No. He was rather like an elephant. There, in six words, we have the case for Structure.

Meanwhile, the mapping of the ins and outs is not to be avoided, and may involve a variety of techniques. Which ones, in particular, should emerge from a review of the "options" in Part II? Most of these fall squarely within the ambit of the subject itself, positing a more pushing analysis of things there already to be seen. The problem of peace and security, the geographical and strategic aspects, the philosophical and psychological, the interplay of politics at their domestic and international levels, and, by no means the least revelatory, the sociology of international law—each of these heads of inquiry, though the agendum of an option, is also the common business of all. The candidate who gives his mind to some only of these matters should at least be aware of what it is that he has left alone. At least he should know that these opportunities were there. That in itself will be something.

The role, for instance, of the strategic component in the reckonings of a statesman may by some be overstressed, just as was perhaps in another context the role of sex by Freud. But in any case it is pretty continuously present, and its presumptive influence, if only beneath the level of conscious thought, had better be allowed for all the time. The ubiquity, again, of electoral considerations—the public relations aspect, as one might call it—in the calculations of politicians in power:

a horseman whose prime concern it is to remain in the saddle may have little attention left for the bottles between which, if he is to stay in the competition, his mount must make its way. And there are so many such bottles, so awkwardly placed, in the diplomatic riding track. To grasp the flow of world events one needs an immediate insight into how the several countries come to act, or to miss their cues for acting, as and when they do. The heart of man may doubtless not be knowable, but the state of his mind is, as budding lawyers are advised to assume, a fact; and our guesses at it may be better, or less well, informed. There is, in a given situation, an inherent logic whereto the student, in judging any course of action, should give some conscious thought, whatever the decision-makers themselves will have done. For this requires awareness as well of the intangibles—the institutional elements, morals, law, and organization—as of the more readily quantifiable data, of demography, geography, technology, and the like.

Actually there is little, in the Structure Syllabus, about particular organizational elements in international affairs. What does indeed occur is a reference to the nature, in general, of international institutions, pointing, as it were, to bricks and mortar, and to sites, rather than to the layout of individual buildings, even of so imposing a construction as the United Nations itself. How, in such a society, are such institutions possible? Whose is the pertinent behavior, whose are the relevant thoughts? In Part II, however, with an entire paper allotted to the institutions, there is that much more concession made to such as think to hear in Committee resolutions the heartbeat of mankind. Along with—if not in place of—their predispositional moralizing, these true believers should by this stage have learned to employ a complementary, sociological approach in their valuing of the various goings-on. And, provided the jurists are not suffered altogether to steal the show, this kind of case study of *homo ludens* in his glory can become, in John Austin's pleasant phrase, "pre-eminently pregnant with instruction."[5] The proviso, however, is a big one.

Reviewing recently a volume on the running of great cities,[6] Professor Asa Briggs noted as fundamental a paucity of reference to the work already accomplished by sociologists in this domain. One wonders whether a like complaint might not lie against some who in writings on the *civitas maxima*—greatest "city" of them all—may have presented

[5] Cf. my comment in W. Ivor Jennings, ed., *Modern Theories of Law*, London, 1933, p. 185.

[6] Review of W. A. Robson, *Great Cities of the World*, in *Journal of Sociology*, VI, No. 4 (December 1955).

a similarly lopsided point of view. With the reception of Structure and the standpoint it seeks to instill, Sociology should perhaps be assured of a growing influence in these matters. And not Sociology only. The problem of co-existence, a hardy perennial with the Structure addicts, would scarcely have appeared to them as offering no issues on which the insights of philosophers could be of decisive avail. It would seem however that UNESCO, in its current project for a multi-disciplinary onslaught on this problem,[7] has reserved no particular place for them. Co-existence, social cooperation, the domesticating of mutual mistrust—the challenge of our epoch. If it is not tomorrow to be all hands to the pumps, it had better today be all heads to the problems of navigation. They are urgent, and their solution is not in sight.

All heads: this means the anthropologists also. What these will know is that social cooperation is encountered in numerous forms, some of them fairly odd-looking in foreign eyes. Whatever field of corporate activity we consider, individual habituation to the relevant milieu is a matter of degree. This is as true where life is real and earnest as it is in the following of games; and we all know how swift and illuminating, at a new turn in a game, its appreciation by a high-power connoisseur—of that particular game—can be. Not least does this hold of the greater games—of war, and war's avoidance. When, in June 1914, Lord Kitchener heard of Serajevo, what he is said to have said is "This means war." And, upon being borne out by the event, he was exceptional in his certainty that the struggle would be long. Genius! said some. But why? Was it anything more than his knowledge of a milieu, the fact of his not being "a stranger in these parts"? In parochial co-existence there is a common sense, a worldly wisdom, for the want of which a man may "miss the bus." And likewise, in the affairs of states, it is *prima facie* the older hand who should at a given moment be the better able to sense what lines are still left open, and what are the risks involved in a choice of this or that. Who, then, would misprise the man of modesty and gumption if, at times, like the psalmist, he were to affect a radical unconcern with "matters which are too high for me"?

It may be that the training for medical practice, or for generalship in the field, is not properly to be termed a "discipline"; but, if so, this is but a verbal point, and International Relations—in the London, as distinct from the Chicago, sense—need not then be a "discipline"

[7] As mentioned, in particular, at the Third Congress of IPSA at Stockholm, August 1955.

either. Only in the same way as do the doctor's, and the soldier's, does a systematic training for the appreciation of international issues involve a distinctive, arduous, and sustained attuning of the mind.

The nature—as our Syllabus supposes it—of International Relations as an autonomous branch of study may by now have been sufficiently shown. Just as, for one who would make intelligent sense of American affairs, there is need for a familiarity with "the American way of life," so, for following with insight the flow of world events, there is required a connoisseurship of the folkways of the international family. International Relations as an academic subject examines this international way of life.

It is thus not simply history. It is not merely the course of events. It is not just the problems—even the foreign policy problems—of particular countries, or of countries in general, or the comparative study of the problems of some. As, when things go less than well in a domestic setting, the claims of Criminology (as a branch of Sociology) tend to win wider recognition, so, in a period of international malaise, might attention be expected to turn to International Relations (as the quasi-sociology of the quasi-society of states). As Criminology is neither criminal history, nor criminal law, nor current crime, but postulates in its students an interest in these, so does International Relations look to International History and International Law—even to "current events"—as subjects propitiously to be pursued, concurrently, by those for whom International Relations proper is their main concern.

For the make-up, then, of International Relations as Special Subject 12, the reader has but to consult the list of papers prescribed for those with this as their specialization. They include International History and International Law, as obvious underpinners; Social and Political Theory and an "approved" modern language, as underpinners less obviously such; and, as intrinsic to the subject proper, International Relations and International Institutions, along with five of the six remaining "options." The sixth—"a special problem, period or episode in international history" (the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 being presently specified)—has footings at once in the Relations, the Institutions, the History, and the Law.

For the make-up, on the other hand, of International Relations proper, as the study distinct in itself, and in that special sense independent—albeit dependent enough, in another sense, upon the underpinners—the inquirer should look at the Syllabus for Structure, in Part I; and at those for the two main papers (Relations and Institutions) and for five of the options, in Part II. These five he will recognize

as constituting intensifications rather than extensions of the studies called for by the subject as such.

Those who would look askance at such a specialism, from doubts of what will in practice be accomplished at it in a brief three years, may rather miss the point. The subject is not there to be finally "learned" when a man is young and "remembered" till he die. Rather is it a habit of thought and inquiry, a propensity for self-education, to be cultivated throughout life, having been formed when the mind was still a sapling. And so, in a sense, it is never too soon to begin. For, while it is well, when seeing Paris for the first time, to have arrived there with a command of French, it is conversely an advantage, when embarking on French, to have been on a visit to Paris. There is nothing so apt to inseminate in a student an avid respect for history and economics, for language and philosophy and law, as his discovery, as a specializer, of what it costs to be deficient in these.

But the earlier the beginning, the more skilled the assistance needed for the opening steps. The teaching of Structure to the fresh-from-school is bound to be a tricky undertaking, for which a special training might with advantage be required. It is not the born researcher who will necessarily find it easy. Nor is it, on the other hand, the "Jack" of all the academic trades. What is wanted is the master of a single trade—the teaching of Structure. And one thing that master will know. However inadequate a young man's vocabulary, his mind, at the start, is not a blank. Nor is it merely naïve, or conventional, or allergic to distinctions. But, good or poor, it is uniquely his. And the teacher, if he is to ring a bell in it, must speak to its condition. Which accordingly he must have it in him to divine. "Put out your tongue," the doctor used to say. "Trot out your presuppositions, your dogmatisms, and your quirks," the academic therapist comes close to saying. His function is not everyone's affair. His like are few, and precious. The Syllabus rather assumes their presence in good supply. Would they be very hard to train? There lies the crux.

But this takes also for granted the social acceptability of the teaching. "A valid science of international relations," writes Professor Quincy Wright, "might cause as much agitation among advocates of some current values, as did the physical sciences of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes among the advocates of certain values of their period" (p. 508).

Such a "valid science" was, however, as we saw, to be something rather for the future, and having little intrinsically to do with the mere teaching medium that is being considered here. As a science in its own

right it will have its own system of concepts, its bag of analytical tricks, hardly less esoteric perhaps than those of the physicist for his field of specialized investigation; whereas the Structure subject could never think to set itself up as rigorously and consistently scientific. Its concepts, thought inquiringly employed, are largely those of the ordinary official and of the common herd. Issues may moreover be of concern to man as man, without being the business of science as science; and these the subject does not on principle neglect. It straddles without embarrassment the distinction between the strictly, and the meta-, scientific; it is the *un*-scientific that it would seek to eschew. For its humanistic venturings into the realm of the philosophical it offers no excuses. For none, it feels, are needed. Nor has it, thus far, been vocally reproached on their account.

Probably, however, it is a trifle early to be considering with what quantum of trust, or lack of trust, the Structure subject is regarded. More prevalent than either is a chilling unconcern, interspersed with areas of unawareness of the subject's very conceivability. Yet, even if having heard of it, there might seem to be few who are sympathetically alert to its specific pretensions. A reviewer, for instance, of the Goodwin booklet was resistant to the thought of having students try to see things as they must present themselves "to the experienced statesman's eye."[8] Had there indeed been, as he implied, a proposal for producing "little statesmen," he would doubtless have been right. There is, for a girl, but one way of attaining motherhood. No military manual can give a soldier his baptism of fire. But a good one might prepare him to endure it. The daughter, listen she never so raptly to a mother's conversation, does not so become a little mother. Yet some things, even so, she may begin to see as through a mother's eye. What history teacher would wish to suppress in his pupils an ambition to experience the problems of an earlier age as they will have looked to the men of the time? Only let the men in question have been long enough dead, and that is all right. But why in the name of Thucydides should an exercise so propitious when practiced, in imagination, at the Rubicons of the past become impoverishing, if not impious, if applied at the Yalus of the here and now? It was an admired historian who, in the writer's recollection, applied the adjective "impoverishing" to "the study of the present." Not that International Relations could ever be solely that.

The case, in short, for a less hesitant accommodating of Structure hangs not merely upon the perils, great though they are, of political

[8] Unsigned review of G. L. Goodwin, *The University Teaching of International Relations*, in *Times Educational Supplement*, February 15, 1952.

illiteracy. It is the case, not just for citizenship, but for education. Its assumption regarding education is, however, that, though not a political grooming, it is indeed a preparation for life. A life, however, in freedom: in vigilance, therefore, and in deliverance from the crafty assaults of the brainwasher and the player upon unexamined doubts.

Whereas in present circumstances the subject might, one fears, all too easily come to suffer at the guileless hands of those with little sense of what their voting was basically about. For what the skeptic would be objecting to might well be little better than a private mental construct of his own. By one—an academic historian who might have been expected to know better—the concept of the structure of international society was, by implication, accounted for as presumably a development of historical determinism. Almost it was as if the Tory underdog were to declare against capital punishment from a feeling that capital had by this time been punished enough.

Hardly less sinister, and just as fallacious, is the doctrine that because a subject is difficult to begin on in one's dotage, or even in middle life, it must be still more difficult to embark upon when one is young. Whoever would think to accept such an argument as against, say, the teaching of the fiddle to the under-tens? Yet, because some man who, not having himself had Structure, finds research in international problems, at the graduate level, too full, for him, of traps, that very teaching which, if given with skill and insight, might, betimes, have forewarned him of the traps may well be written off as evidently at best a vain attempt to lay upon an infant a burden too heavy for a man. Most subjects have their more advanced forms; by the test of these alone, they cannot but seem advanced. Some subjects have also their A.B.C. International Relations is one of these; and its A.B.C. is Structure.

There may thus on the whole be occasion for thankfulness in the very presence of the subject in Part I. How did it get there at all? Someday Clio might be curious to know. Will she be told that that is "classified" information? This looks quite a question. The fact is, of course, that, placed in these pages, this article is perhaps a little out of place. In a journal so named as this one, it is with the politics of a wider world that contributors will ordinarily deal—not with those of the university world. There is presumably no "world" but has its politics, its connoisseurs, its types of "worldly" wisdom. And, were there presently to be established, on the *World Politics* model, a brand-new *University World Politics*, it should have plenty to consider. However, the absence of such a journal is perhaps itself referable to the politics of the uni-

versity world. Don, shall we say, don't eat don. The following story, however, is scarcely of the non-releasable kind. The truth simply is that, in 1949, when the "new (revised)" regulations, under which the B.Sc. would, in place of "Intermediate" and "Finals," come to consist of Parts I and II, were already in an advanced stage of incubation, International Relations was still only envisaged as a possibility for Part II. Since however it was now being proposed normally to allow, for the candidates' Part II preparation, no more than a twelvemonth—a period which, ample as it might be for dotting the i's of a three years' course in, say, Economics, was manifestly insufficient for a study "from scratch" of anything so exuberant as International Relations—the necessity was conceded of admitting the latter into Part I, in some suitable form. It is a familiar pattern: architectural alterations—displaced person—alternative accommodation—last state of that man not necessarily worse than the first. And credit, if any, where credit is due.

A salutary new departure, let us say, whether a generous inspiration or not. For not only would the specializers henceforth have their subject, however unobtrusively, upon their agenda for their full three years, compared with two under the old order of things; but, for some at least of those with prospective specialisms other than No. 12, the chance would now be open of embracing at an impressionable stage this not obviously unwholesome ancillary[9]—to serve, one might hope, as a factor for the interrelating of their other assignments, and a site for their establishing, in a possible tomorrow, a well-found edifice of pluri-ocular expertise.

One thinks, for example, of the specializers in Government. There has in recent years been a spreading recognition of the interconnectedness of Government alias Public Administration alias Politics alias Political Science, on the one hand, and International Politics alias International Relations, on the other. There are some indeed who would say, for students of either, the inclusion of the other, as an underpinner, was a "must." To this position the London Syllabus does not at present subscribe. Government being in any case obligatory for all and sundry, the question of its differential imposition upon a particular group of candidates could hardly arise. For specializers in Government, on the other hand, The Structure of International Society is there for them to take who choose to. Some do not. Some do. And it is not here in-

[9] A question of interpretation presented by results in a recent summer was whether it was the better candidates who had tended to take Structure, or whether those taking Structure had tended to do well.

tended to imply that there is necessarily a "correct"[10] solution to the questions involved.

Some do not. And some probably do not even know the point of it. Would we, but for certain pioneers, have seen so soon the point of Economics? Even the layman may feel beholden to those who first put Economics, as a possibility, on the map. The revisionists of 1949 may yet be recognized as having builded better than they knew. Meanwhile it is remarkable with what competence in related fields a man may still join an ignorance, if not of the very possibility, at least of the applications, of Structure. Lately, for example, at a Congress, a British scholar was understood to advise that, in a colloquy on great and small states, terms like "sovereignty" and "independence" should be avoided as unsuited to the position of our day. And what would you propose, inquired a Pakistani dryly, to do with "statehood"? Not for the first time had the well-intentioned de-mythologizer overlooked the relation between the bathwater and the babe.

International understanding, a prerequisite of peace; understanding of matters international, a prerequisite of international understanding; schooling to the business, as the road thereto; and esteem for them who saw to seek the road—such was apparently the logic of those, the leaders of Rotary International District 13 (London), who in 1955 instituted their Golden Anniversary Prize. In notifying their membership of this decision, they said: "The 'Structure' subject . . . is, it is claimed, the beginning of what may presently prove an important new development in the educational field. For it seeks to provide a workable answer to the widely acknowledged need for some corrective to the latter day tendency to over-specialisation and to the 'fragmentation of knowledge,' from which, one would hope, the new generation must, if there by any way of ensuring this, be spared." The Prize would be awarded annually to the candidate who achieved the best performance in the B.Sc., having included among his subjects The Structure of International Society.[11]

The disabilities borne by anyone to whom an early appreciation of the fundamentals of the world-wide social setup has in effect been denied may be likened to those of an urchin sent on errands through busy streets with bandaged eyes. It is as himself having worn such a bandage that the writer feels strongly on the point. He is puzzled by the nonchalance with which the relatively elderly will, in effect, bar discussion of the modes of modern warfare in their bearing upon the upbringing

[10] Cf. UNESCO, *Teaching of Social Sciences: Political Science*, Paris, 1954, pp. 61-66.
[11] *Greater London Radius*, February 23, 1955, p. 361.

of the young. Could a profounder understanding by these latter of the planetary political process mean nothing to their prospect of averting the ultimate form of such warfare in their day? And, the atom apart, what of the psychological and sociological forms? Why leave the future so defenseless in face of these? *Après nous le déluge*? One does not gladly impute a lack of social responsibility to one's colleagues, especially in universities other than one's own; but the quality is not endemic in the species, and there is nothing in the nature of the academic ladder to guarantee its preponderance in such as reach the top. And the fact rather probably is that those, if any, who in particular universities might have power to put over a reform of their curriculum are relatively eminent, relatively elderly, and relatively few.

All this without reference, so far, to Britain's responsibilities as a pillar of the peace. Any failure on her part in the furnishing of weapons or the raising of men would be learned about with shame. But when, by contrast, it comes to forearming people's minds, by modernizing their intellectual defenses in the light of the new strategies of attack, the fate foreseeable for any such idea is itself a success—for others—in the psychological war.

The army whose commander relies rather upon hunch than good intelligence will not do the best with his troops, brave fellows though they be. A democracy is like an army whose decisions to fight are made on a vote of the rank and file. If, in the 1930's, half a hundred Englishmen had had as true a feeling for how things happen in the game of diplomatics as had half a hundred thousand for what can occur at cricket, public judgment at certain moments might not have fallen down. For, whereas in almost any company there will be knowledgeable comment on the national game, anent the national interest the same cannot equally be said.

What in part saved Britain—and Western freedom with her—in the early 1940's was her possession of two elements of self-defense: for detecting hostile aircraft, a radar system, and for interpreting its intimations, a personnel. So Britain was like an insect, with antennae, and with the instinct for responding to what they said. Today, when the cry is for more technology to exploit the new techniques, less is heard of the need of social diagnostics, for want of which the next generation may nevertheless be at the mercy of the quacks.

There'll always be an England: of this the English will usually declare themselves assured. But deprive a species of its antennae, and see what happens then. It may be best therefore not to pitch too high

the claims of the London Syllabus to be precluding a repetition of what happened before. The electorate are still rather largely in the position of those lads who in World War I were let out on reconnaissance with only a casual introduction to the compass and the map.