

## CHAPTER XIV

### WHERE, FROM HERE?

#### *The Hazards of a Game*

Man, the inventor of games—games, in the course of some of which he is apt to get hurt. Man, the inventor also of machines, in serving which, supposedly in service to himself, he is apt, as Marx and others have noticed, to become, in effect, a slave. And in a sense the whole of his modern civilisation is his creation, his invention, his machine.

Physical machinery. Social machinery. What else, but this latter, is the state? And what else the family of states? The question is, asked a famous character, Who is master?

Of ordinary, recreational games it is a merit that, ordinarily at any rate, one is not obliged to play them. One is not obliged to run the risk of hurting, and getting hurt. But given that triumph of man's inventiveness, that machine to dwarf all other machines, the system of sovereign states, and given the nature of the game in which it involves willy-nilly its inventor, what escape has he from the risk of getting hurt, and in our day very severely? For it is in the very logic of the game of let's-play-states that occasions must from time to time occur when the risk of which we have been thinking grows great indeed.

Man, like the grass of the field, does not long endure. But the states? Some do: some don't. Enough that they may, as may their neighbour states. Old friends, sometimes, those neighbours: sometimes not. And it is to the image, the conventional image, of conflict as occurring between those social machines, those mere hypostatized abstractions, the states, that we are constrained to attribute a major apparent impediment to the coming of peace among men. Tomorrow's generation, yet unborn, are, we may fear, foredoomed to find themselves, as we have been, grouped together in our various



camps, each with its possible dossier of old scores to work off against another. And this, it would seem, simply because the bygone encounters of men with men, now all of them dead, were notionally the clashings with each other of states which still are just as much alive, or just as little dead, as ever, and one another's distrustful neighbours still. Though this prospect may seem grotesque, it is hard to know how it might be conjured away. The game of let's-play-states is still in progress. As a going concern, it is as insistent a factor as anything in our socio-cultural environment. Yet this, as we know, does not serve to put the big protagonists, the sovereign states, whose given-ness the process presupposes, out of the realm of the merely notional into that of the sensibly real. It is in the order of the intelligibles, apprehensible to the imagination and not the eye, that the states maintain their influential presence. And pursue their dangerous play. Intelligibles? What exactly is it that we so imagine? What, *qua* 'sovereign', are these sovereign states?

#### *Why 'Sovereign'?*

Why 'sovereign'? Is this an inquiry into the uses of a word, or, is it an investigation into the nature of social reality, of social arrangements in the social universe in its contemporary condition? The latter, not the former, surely.

It is in the nature of any social organisation to reveal upon inspection a theoretical 'structure', its 'constitution' as this may be called. And it is thanks to its kind of constitution that a state is technically classable as a sovereign state. For the 'person' of international society is typically a sovereign state, and this by the nature of its constitution.

An island's accessibility from a nearby continent may so improve that we may tend to forget that it is any longer an island. Reaching it by subway, or by rail across a bridge, we may mistake it for a part of the mainland. But its technical insularity will remain unimpaired, not being a matter of relative practical inaccessibility. Though linked with the mainland by a bridge, an island it still will be.

If by definition war were a relation conceivable only between islands, the end of insularity would presumably mean the end of war. And in the same way, admittedly, were there no

more sovereign states, there would be no more wars between sovereign states. But, as it is, what we still have is a world of sovereign states. And still, alas, the possibility—however 'un-thinkable'—of war.

#### *Avenues of Escape?*

Such then is the formal nature of the social cosmos as we see it in mid-century. Not always was it so. And it is scarcely conceivable that it will never again be otherwise. But what also is hard to conceive is just how in practice a radical change in it could ever come about. What would in theory be the possible ways? One may think of several. First, world war. But who would opt for that, particularly since, as Mr. Neville Chamberlain perceived in 1938, none can ever today foresee the state of the world on the morrow of tomorrow's war. Federation? True again. That, in theory, is likewise an obvious possibility. And there must have been many, among them able men, who, though without the Archimedean point from which to operate, will have exhausted themselves in strivings to bring world federation into sight. Given the need of effort for the advancement of other less utopian aims, this was perhaps a misemployment of resources. Next suggestion: the 'erosion' of sovereignty, bit by bit. When scrutinised, however, this idea seems to mean nothing more than the accepting by sovereign states of so many further formal limitations upon what remains of their formal freedom. Such limitations are numerous already, even with things as they are. There simply would come to be more of them. That is no proposal for changing fundamentally the existing order, but merely for making it different in its detail. It might well be the better for that. No one need quarrel with that, as an idea.

But now, another suggestion, not always very precisely put: the 'strengthening' of international law. With this one need have no quarrel either, or not until somebody has first explained what it is expected to entail. Here again, so far from representing an essential change, all that would appear to be envisaged is a reaffirming of that sovereignty with which the legal order is all of a piece. What is essentially a system of law *for* sovereigns, being premised upon their very sovereignty, does not, by the fact of being strengthened, put in jeopardy the



sovereignties which are the dogmatic basis for its very existence. Not, at any rate, in logic. For a consolidating of the law, and so of the sovereign statehoods which the law assumes, is in no sense logically a threat to the system of relationships which they sustain.

If therefore sovereignty is ever to be dispensed with, this will hardly be accomplished through a 'strengthening' of international law. And yet, how else?

#### *A Sinister System?*

It might in these circumstances be germane to consider whether the sovereignty system, since we see as yet no obvious end to it, has, after all, been wholly a misfortune. What without it would the position in Europe have been? What in the world as a whole?

A theorist, reflecting on Europe's chequered past, was heard to deplore two causes, as he deemed them, of untold human misery. One was the power of religion, responsible, no doubt, for the religious wars. The other, the dissolution of the early Empire into so many potentially warring states. He was entitled to his feelings. And yet, one asks: How except by a multiplicity of independent entities within an established Christian tradition could our present framework have been created for even the beginnings of an orderly co-existence? Had not Christendom fallen asunder into separate polities, how could it ever have been required to develop its basis for the doing of business between the resulting units, that basis which in our day serves the needs of politics in every part of the planet? The world-wide system of the present is the European system of the past, bequeathed by a never too brotherly company of fellow-Christian princes to their variegated successors, their not even human successors, indeed, since it is those abstractions, the 'countries' members of the 'international family', that are now with at least an affectation of punctilio observing the time-honoured western form of the family way of life. And had those princes loved each other better, who knows but what they might never have required such a paraphernalia of procedures, whose very artificiality we now may value as perhaps its principal merit. Except in the terms of such artificial diplomacy, it might in cold-war conditions have been

difficult to do effective business at all. On the other hand, but for their commitment to their ostensible belief in a human brotherhood under God, how could the princes ever have been led so readily to acknowledge any theoretical limitations at all upon their formal freedom to act in just whatever way they chose?

Modern man might indeed be more grateful than he commonly shows himself for the structure of international society as established by his forebears. It is odd how nearly we take it all for granted, as if a very part of the natural order. It is odd how little we perceive what it means. For what more dependable causeway could we have been given for a relatively sure-footed eventual advance into what might yet be an endurable future? It is perhaps fortunate after all that, though states may come and states may go, the system remains.

#### *Could not Anything be Worse?*

Meanwhile the states, it is true, may go. Men have supposed that the species of animate nature were created *de novo* and immutable. Evolution has shattered that conception. Men may likewise have believed that the states were incapable of change. Yet, as H. G. Wells, of the nations, hyperbolically remarked: 'They come and go like the shapes of clouds.' The question however is not: Could even the structure of international society also some day disappear? Rather might we ask: Have we sufficient reason for desiring that it do so, seeing we have no assurance of what would take its place? What such assurance could we hope for? And incidentally, what revolution, after having run its course, has left things as its sponsors would have hoped to see them?

We had better perhaps return now to the existing set-up, which we may not always have sufficiently understood. For instance, are the nations, in particular, all that at the social level we need consider?

#### *One Solidarity Among Others*

Without its moral solidarity—a relative and unstable factor even, if not especially, in times of strain—the nation would be effectively nothing. What makes of nationalism a social force is the fact that people feel it, and are moved by it to do things.



The point is that, as working through the heart, it operates in competition with solidarity-principles of every other kind—relative, and fluctuating, as their manifestations likewise are. An assessment of the state of things political requires a weighing of the several sorts of solidarity in play and a judgment as to which of these will prevail over which. Of this, there was an instance in 1914 when to Lenin's disillusionment the German Social Democrat deputies gave support to the Kaiser's war. Which solidarities other than the nationalisms command acknowledgment in the world today? Old-style Chinese anti-foreignism? Probably yes. Free trade-unionism? Not very effectively. Arab anti-Zionism? Obviously. Africanism? Potentially. Pan-Islam? Doubtfully. Anti-colonialism? Emphatically.

All these serve in their varying degrees to complicate in one context or another the picture of a world merely of rival national sovereign states. And these are examples only of the most positive, militant, aggressive solidarities. There are also some that come to their fullest self-awareness only in the presence of a real or suspected threat.

At the diplomatic, sovereign-states level, the social cosmos, mercifully for those who require to take their bearings in it, is as simple, almost, as the chessboard. But at the social level its complexity baffles description. Ultimately all behaving—like all thinking, feeling and willing—is that of individuals; but, effectively, as we have been seeing, much of the most important part of it is that of political movements, professional organisations, and other social wholes. Once a given sub-public feels its identity as the holder of a standpoint peculiar to itself, the several sorts of status which we identified in Chapter VIII become available to whatever opinion this may prescribe. And here again, even though the given opinion is not institutionalised, as happens in an organised group, yet, when once it has become communal and not merely prevalent among the sub-public in question, it seems to become relatively proof against appeals to the broader interest of the community as a whole.

A social cosmology which was inattentive to the social as distinct from the diplomatic level of human experience would thus be unworthy of its name. For we meet at the social level with

so many more historically important solidarities than have their expression through the mouths of sovereign states. *Quot homines tot sententiae*, they say. One might modify this into something on the relation of solidarities to the mentalities that they respectively encourage and display. Public opinion, madam? To which public would you like to listen?

### *A Choice of Keys to History*

It was because solidarities were of so many sorts that Karl Marx could be charged with oversimplification. It was, he affected to think, as if nothing very much had fundamentally mattered in history beyond the struggle of class with class. This implied not only that individuals, and collectivities other than class, were relatively insignificant, but that the diplomatic, as opposed to the social, level of the cosmos could also be safely understressed. For the deeper explanation of what had happened diplomatically was to be found in what had happened in the struggle of class with class. This was an ideologically distorted reading of facts of which the social cosmologist is unlikely to take so simplified a view. For economic interest is not the only key to history. And if men's ruling aspirations are recognised as orientated to more than to economic interests only, then it is in their culture that the key may more truly lie. The distinctive elements in a culture are beliefs, which need have no rational basis. It is the myths rather than the realistic calculations that are the core of any culture. And before beginning to speak of a need to clear our minds of myth, we might do well to look more closely at the role which myth has perennially played in the affairs of men. Whence, in particular, does a modern community derive its basic beliefs?

Reality, as primitive man took his knowledge of it, is said to have seemed, so to say, all of a piece. To many of the distinctions now commonplace with us he was not at first alive: those, for instance, between the natural and the supernatural, between the material and the spiritual, between the religious and the secular, between knowledge and belief. Modern man, when puzzled, is not easily put off with less than a scientific explanation. Primitive man, not having articulated his distinctions between the sorts of explanation, or that between wishful and critical thought, was rather more receptive than



we moderns may suppose ourselves to be, of myth. As authority is nothing unless it is deferred to, so myth is very little unless it is believed. Primitive man was more prone to believe the unproven than we are. Or so we are prone to believe.

Now on spiritual reality, as we think of it, science, as we understand it, can have little to say. In giving expression to his sense of the spiritual, man has always had recourse to myth. And, where politics and religion are as yet interfused, the belief system wherewith man puts meaning into both his religious observances and his political forms, is a single system, the boundary between these two orders of experience having not yet been consciously drawn.

#### *Maturity and the Myth*

But life moves on. There comes the age of reason, the Enlightenment, the 'dawn'. The mists of superstition are dispelled. The bond between politics and religion is dissolved. Heir, as he now finds himself, no longer just to one belief system but to two, man rejoices, in his modern *hubris*, to set religious myth aside. Henceforth no longer will he think as a child. No longer will man, the sceptic, believe where he has not proved. The statistician's tables, the historian's footnotes, the logician's reasoning, the engineer's exactness—these only will he serve. If he is in any sense to remain a man of faith, his faith will be a faith in the rejection of faith.

All this, however, is somewhat of an exaggeration. For we were after all thinking only of modern man's rejection of religion. What has become of his other beliefs? Has he equally dispensed with them? Is he now, as *The Times* has described poor Camus, 'the man who walked alone', who never 'committed himself to a creed either religious or political'? Watch him, and judge whether he has lost his political concern, his political convictions, his political creed. How is he to square a continued attachment to his cherished ideals with his pose as the believer in nothing that is not proved? At what point does he claim, modern-minded though he be, to have dispensed with myth for the validating of a political line?

We may speculate about whether, and how, life would any longer be possible, were men in general to have outgrown their addiction to myth, their disposition to allow their 'ought'

to do duty for an 'is', to assimilate their 'I feel certain' to a 'We are certain'. But of political life in such conditions we have had no experience as yet. It is perhaps, theoretically, not impossible that social co-existence might continue on the basis of mere universally accepted conventions, everyone in effect being pledged to behave *as if* believing in certain suitable sets of words. Then indeed would social co-existence be in the nature of a game—in somewhat the same sense as diplomatic co-existence will always have to be, if to be lastingly feasible at all. As things are, however, the student of actual societies needs still to inquire into the beliefs by which men live, the values which, being for them values indeed, are cherished as if values objectively and *per se*.

#### *Except . . . as Little Children*

Religious dogma is not in principle open to rational validation. It need not seem surprising therefore if the holders of one set of religious beliefs find the tenets of some other religion absurd. That this is so with religious beliefs will presumably be accepted. But of political dogmas it somehow looks less true. Men commonly seem less disposed to accept as inevitable the incompatibility of different political belief-systems. On the one hand they tend to suppose that their own positions are grounded in reason and the real: and they are on the other hand inclined to be scornful of views which they themselves do not happen to share. It is almost expected of others that they be sensible, not just sentimental, in matters political. In a scientific era, so it is implied, men should no longer be as children, believing in Father Christmas, or in the superiority of the Aryans, or in the supremacy of the general will. But why not, you ask, the general will? That surely is still an 'absolute'? Surely it still is all right about that? Yet, what is the status of the general will, nay, its very existence, except as matter of dogma? Is it merely as a methodological expedient, a conventional gimmick, that men in a throbbing democracy subscribe to the enthronement of the general will? Have men, in democracies, no longer any faith, not even in the all-rightness, and therefore in the rightness, of democracy?

As experienced at all events up to now, political systems have certainly not dispensed with myth. Where they vary is in



the measure in which their myths can be left to themselves. There is a process known as the building of a nation. The nation, if it is to stand in stormy weather, requires a frame of steel or other such stable component. This need the myths supply. If deeply enough entrenched in the groundwork of the collective soul they may demand little attention. (The inevitability of the monarchy is with some Englishmen still a bit like that.) But when, by contrast, a nation is as yet in the nursery, it may still be the better for a hearing of nursery tales. For this is the stage when the national self-image is not yet fully established in the public mind. (The young American may still need reminding to salute the Stars and Stripes, and to name with bated breath the Monroe Doctrine.) It is the stage when with the advent of fascism there had to be opened in Milan a school—not, one hopes, a Sunday school—of ‘fascist mysticism’. How easy, in a land whose last ‘revolution’ was in 1688 and then perhaps not strictly that at all, to smile at the puerilities of the inventors-to-order of national emblems, symbols, origins, traits. The point is that, without political order, men might still be existing as in the jungle; that political order depends upon the prevalent presupposing of what cannot be proved; and that the unprovables fundamental to one system need not look very sensible to the fledglings of another—or those of any of them to the social cosmologist as such. For political man is not merely man the sceptic: he is essentially still, as in his beginnings, the mystic. It is by their mythologies, their bodies of folklore, their cultural infrastructure, their inherited creeds, that societies spiritually live, and it is by them that they are most typically marked off from one another. The social cosmos is a multi-cultural world, a mosaic of belief systems, a jungle, after all—of luxuriant myths.

#### *Lines of Cultural Cleavage*

No thoroughgoing agnostic can expect fully to understand a war between rival faiths. Of religious feeling, while some people have more, some have less, and some, it might seem, have none. And what thus is true of religious values is true also of those that we relate to culture. Let Welshmen tell us, since they alone can know, what Welshness means to them, and

how much to them it really matters whether they are or are not permitted to pass it on unsterilised to their young, meaning here such a nexus of feelings, beliefs and valuations as gives its essence to what is called a way of life. Would Welshmen fight for their way of life? One suspects that they might. Would the ex-Austrians of the South Tyrol? Surely, had they the chance. Would the settler element in Algeria? Presumably. Or the Turkish element in Cyprus? Or the French Canadians? The key to domestic peace, the basis for co-existence, in the situations here referred to is commonly the rendering of respect, if not of understanding, to prejudices, preconceptions, predilections, the reasons for which are rather of the heart than of the head. As there are those who simply cannot comprehend religion, there may be many who have little sense of what, to others, their culture, its preservation unimpaired, and its perpetuation by transmission to the young can mean. And lines of cultural cleavage are not invariably those on the political map. Nor are they necessarily geographical lines at all. Two cultures may be intermingled in a single habitat, as in Palestine for instance, at least until partition, were those of Arab and Jew. And the habitat may of course have the function of a melting pot. But not necessarily. In London alone there may co-exist many cultural systems, each vitally and sensitively self-aware, but none a serious menace to another or frustrated by the political framework within which together they thrive.

What renders the factor of cultural self-concern so apt to be under-rated, or overlooked, is the frequency with which it can figure in what, in appearance, is a racial guise. Whether Hindus and Muslims may be said to differ significantly in point of race may matter little. Or, in colour either. In culture they remain apart. And the world knows what—including blood—has flowed from that.

Where, however, there are distinctive physical traits, concern for cultural survival may look, and become, like the prejudice of race. Those policies for example in South Africa wherein is presently reflected the collective self-concern of the Afrikaner people are apt to be referred to abroad as if specifically ‘racial’. Yet it was not, after all, a colour-difference that set them against the ‘invading’ Uitlanders in 1899. Then, as



today, they were unwilling to have their distinctive group-personality crushed by the weight of a culture not their own. What the fathers then fought to preserve their sons hold precious now. There is not necessarily very much rational basis for such a stand.

#### *Varieties of One-ness*

In their analysing of the familiar forms of social organisation, sociologists have made a distinction, fundamental in its nature, between solidarities, such as the tribal, which can be thought of as primordial and so in a sense natural, being directly derivative from the socially gregarious, or gregariously social, nature of man, and those, on the other hand, such as the 'body corporate', which, being based upon agreement, are by contrast artificial, conventional, non-natural, contrived. If to the former there be given their German name of *Gemeinschaft*, the latter may, in contradistinction, be termed *Gesellschaft*. This needs no elaborating here. What brings it however into this discussion is a suggestion that international society be seen in similar terms. What in practice this has meant is that, international society at the present time being so palpably *not* a *Gemeinschaft*, a *Gesellschaft* it therefore is taken to be. And the goal to be envisaged by rightminded men in their constructive thinking on the problems of human advancement is prefigured as the gradual transmutation of the global *Gesellschaft* of today into the global *Gemeinschaft* of an eventual tomorrow.

The idea is intriguing, and few seem to have voiced about it any theoretical doubt. Yet challenged it can be: especially if looked at in the context of the social cosmos as we have been trying to see it. The body corporate is typically an institution of domestic law. It is an artificial drawing together of persons all having already in common a relationship to the over-arching constitutional order. As members of a national society they are already in principle a *Gemeinschaft*: for their national community is not due to a contractual coming together. And it is within, and as between members of, the pre-existing national *Gemeinschaft* that the contractual arrangement, the contrived *Gesellschaft*, is brought into being.

The international society, by contrast, was never the body corporate. And yet, very true, it is not the *Gemeinschaft* either.

However, and here is the crux, it *corresponds* in the field of multi-sovereign-state co-existence, to the 'family', the *Gemeinschaft*, as we meet it in the ordinary experience of fleshly men.

#### *Community and Community*

If now the international society is more validly to be thought of not as a *Gesellschaft*, and not as a *Gemeinschaft* either—but as a *tertium quid*, namely a quasi-*Gemeinschaft*: what are we to desire? Should it be our aim to see our mere quasi-*Gemeinschaft* (for that surely is what it is) transmuted into the true *Gemeinschaft*, the veritable community, of sovereign states, of an imagined better tomorrow? Submittedly not; for the international society is indeed strictly and in its essence a quasi-, and not a true, *Gemeinschaft*; and this not by reason of any rudimentariness in its current state of development, but simply because it has its very existence in what is not a true, but a quasi-, kind of world. It exists, does it not, in a notional world, peopled by notional personalities: and out of such material what more could there be built than a notional community, a quasi-community at the most? And that, it has just been contended, is what we already have today.

No. If anything is to supersede the sovereign states system and, perhaps, to serve us better, it is unlikely to be formed of just those selfsame states: rather will it develop out of something which, along with them, already is present upon the historical scene. Within, beneath, alongside, behind and transcending, the notional society of states, there exists, and for some purposes fairly effectively, the nascent society of all mankind. That it is not yet very effectively a community may be conceded: but that potentially it is in very truth a community should be apparent as well.

#### *The Social and the Constitutional Levels*

As, in Switzerland, along with the political society of men, there flourishes the national community of men and of women as well, so globally, along with the diplomatic quasi-community of states there is emerging the true, social, community, the living world-tribe of human flesh and blood. As, when the Swiss women concert their efforts, they do it, so to say, in an extra-constitutional medium, so, when for a thousand different



purposes men get together on a world-wide scale, this too is an extra-constitutional manifestation.

It is their sense of solidarity, and not the requirements of the political order, that brings the Swiss women together. With the dawning of a similar sense, among, say, the athletes, or the writers, or the Rotarians of the world, there is given a further living sinew in the body social of humanity-as-one.

Even assuming then that at the notional level the states, as states, must at best remain a mere quasi-community to the last, there yet is in principle nothing to preclude the emergence, at the *de facto* social level, of a true, strongly-grounded, exuberant community of mankind. This of course could hardly be caused to come about by any mere stroke of a pen. But that is not to say that nothing relevant to its emergence is being currently done. In what way relevant? Of those who desiderate a 'strengthening' of international law, some may in fact be essentially thinking merely of that detailed elaborating of the law's provisions which is going on all the time. By and by, when the dream of a true community has found fulfilment on the level of global social co-existence, it may be possible in retrospect to honour that part which the jurists—'on tap', but never 'on top'—will have played in bringing it down to earth. In his recent *The Common Law of Mankind*, C. W. Jenks has looked to an impending 'transformation', of the international law which has traditionally been that between the states, into the 'common law' of a world community. He certainly already can point to an array of dispositions congenial to his line of thought. When once it is effectively in existence, the true world community will doubtless have indeed its common law. And the corpus of that law may well retain in point of content much that is reminiscent of our international law of today. In principle however it will *not* be merely a modified form of that traditional system; rather will a new-fangled system have emerged to take that system's place. The new-fangled system will be the law of a single world society; not that of a single quasi-society composed of sovereign states.

What is at issue is not a question of substantive content—but of technical status. In point of status the law that we have is still the law, not of a community, of men, but, as for cen-

turies past, of a quasi-community, of states. Whereas, if the evidence for the existence of a true world-community had suitably to be looked for in the content, not the status, of its law, then indeed might we be proclaiming that community as either already in being or on the verge of coming to be. But so long as the law remains, as hitherto, the law, technically and therefore basically, of the traditional quasi-community of sovereign states, its content, however forwardlookingly inspired, is simply neither here nor there. That content, influenced in its development by men of vision, may certainly play its important part, in reflecting, and so assisting, the progress of world society towards its goal. But it is in the realm of social reality that the movement must proceed and the goal be achieved: it can not be accomplished, it can at most be reflected, in the world of law.

### *Existential Unification*

Some day there thus may yet be seen the true *Gemeinschaft* of all the human race. The sign of its advent will be not merely the fact that somebody somewhere is affecting to say things in its name. Rather will it be that when, on some matter of universal moment, some single opinion has in fact become prevalent on a universal scale, there will, as if instinctively, be allowed to such opinion that peculiar, semi-mystical, prestige which belongs to what is not merely prevalent but communal as well. Doubtless there are not many matters as yet on which mankind is anywhere near to having found such a communal view. But it is too soon to conclude that even for those already living it must necessarily for ever remain a dream. A child, a singer—or even, dare one whisper it, a charismatic leader—emitting on a world-wide TV hook-up the appropriate sounds, with congenial gestures, at the critical moment, might even tomorrow voice a judgment, with an air of inevitability, as on man's collective behalf—and not be figuratively shouted down. And what once had so happened, might happen again. Then, the possibility of all humanity sharing a 'mind', and of expression being found for it, having, like the possibility it now seems of space-travel, become an item in the image by which men live, things could never again seem quite the same. The lilies, as artificial-looking and as ornamental as always,



would still be each rooted in its original pond: but the flood of human fellowship would all the while be imperilling the separate identities of the ponds. True, the flood might momentarily subside, but it would hardly be forgotten, even by the lilies. The forces which had brought the first one might bring another flood, more lasting, by and by.

If the women of Switzerland can feel and speak together, why not the women of the world? No need here for new constitutional forms. Community is not something to be deduced from words on paper. Its roots are in sentiment, not convention, and its seat is in the psyche of those whose moods become the public tone. It is to the science of social psychology that we might logically look for light on how all this might come to pass. What, one wonders, within its customary horizons, would this science presently find itself able to say? Not perhaps, within its heretofore customary horizons, very much, as yet.

#### *The Wanted Image*

The sign of the coming of world community would not be mysterious: merely, the spread of a conviction that it indeed had come—a conviction at first prevalently, but eventually also communally, entertained. And as footing so to say for the myth—or as conceptual bone for the emotional body—there would be that symbolic image which Kenneth Boulding would ask for, as something that could ‘unite us all’. The rise of community whether global or national is a development at the level of the unconscious—and not as yet very well understood.

But all this of course concerns the future, and not the world we know. Meanwhile some fair examples, even today, of what may be accomplished by the provision of new symbols, for the fostering of new feelings, are becoming available, under the ‘sign’, as they say, of ‘supra-nationalism’ in the less-than-universal context of Western Europe.

Today, in a changing world, the peoples of France and of Western Germany are finding in terms of partnership possibilities which a generation ago were at best but a utopian vision. Enduring and reasonably endurable co-existence has not as its condition the radical elimination of tensions, for of that,

this side the grave, men in society can have but little hope. What it does require is an appropriate approach, between states and peoples, in their dealings with one another. On the one hand, a kind of formal correctitude, a degree of mutual self-restraint, a growth of gentle manners. On the other, a measure of understanding, born of an appreciation of individuality, each seeing the other as significantly unique.

The world of many sovereignties, each equally tolerant, equally heedful, of the cultural idiosyncrasies of every other, is a ‘possible’ world—‘possible’ here being used in the philosophers’ sense, as of something which in principle *could* exist, whether or not it does—a conceivable world, in short. One must at least not abandon hope that events might yet give us such a world. It would be a world in which standards of moderation and self-restraint had become accepted, as by common consent, in the uses made by states not of their power only but of their influence also. Only in certain conditions, however, could it conceivably be achieved: one of these being presumably that the peoples had ceased to have cause to suspect one another of working for one another’s destruction. And it is not of course on other governments only that the influence of governments is employed.