CHAPTER TWO

THE MOTIVATIONAL BASIS OF TECHNICAL AID

THE first idea, that this volume should begin with a contribution on the social and political 'objectives' of technical aid, was undeniably apt. An alternative suggestion, that the article should rather have a wider scope, to include not the formalized objectives merely but more generally the motivations propellant in the framing and following out of the policies involved, was acceded to, editorially, without overt dismay. How undocile a creature it was so being undertaken to bestride, must presently appear. The rider, *qua* the writer, has never been other than aware that, essentially, his theme was one for guarded speculation and for nothing further. His hope must be that as, so to say, a foil to all the authenticities to follow, the fruits of a moderate deviation from the highroad of the potentially verifiable need do no one any harm.

If only for the abatement of imprecision, the term 'technical assistance' or 'technical aid' will be used here with a restricted application. It will not be so understood as to comprehend, though presumably it could do, a physician's instruction of his patient in the uses of a plaster, or even the imparting to an infant by its mother of the know-how on the handling of a spoon. It will not be permitted to cover examples of expertise attracted by a go-ahead government without recourse to the good offices of any other government or of any international body—so that the part played by American technicians in, say, the building of the Dnieper dam cannot count as a case in point. Nor will there be any yielding to the temptation to appreciate, as even remotely apropos, the assumptions and the aims of the great scholarship scheme of Cecil Rhodes. For the purposes of this particular article technical assistance is taken to be a service arranged for by governments or groups of governments or by some international set-up, at the request of the government of some area where it is deemed in short supply. And it figures avowedly as an instance of the 'new age' phenomenon known to bureaucratic cerebration and designated in official print as Technical Aid—or, for short, TA. *Of course* there was bridge-construction in India under the British Raj. Of course there is the Gezireh irrigation system. Of course the English countryside is crossed by Roman roads. Of course the record of colonial rule, whatever the flag, will always have

been, in part, a tale of technical aid. But hardly with a capital T and a capital A.

Not that technical assistance, even in this non-inclusive sense, is wholly novel. Before the establishment of the UN system there had been UNRRA, whose activities and personality the larger organization was presently to absorb. And before that, in the days between the wars, there had been—why not mention it?—the League of Nations, an agency through which technical assistance was, in one form or another, supplied to a number of states. For there had been Article 23 of the Covenant. And, before that, the memorandum of General Smuts. If there exists any essential difference between what goes as technical assistance to-day and what so went between the wars, it lies perhaps as much as anywhere in the fact that nowadays the term has come to connote a kind of big-umbrella principle having a sort of symbolic precedence in the sympathies of the men of goodwill in every land. Between the wars, as a routine international responsibility, technical assistance was real enough, but as a verbal formula it was not yet becoming quite the thing to conjure with that it seemingly is to-day. The League, with its several technical organizations and discerningly assembled staff, from whose stored experience the later vintage of international civil servants may or may not have cared to profit, is not much remembered now; but a one-time cog in that quiet apparatus may perhaps be forgiven for insinuating here his note of tribute to some of the major wheels. The Salters and the Rajchmans—to recall only two of those redoubtable pioneers—such men, even on the shoestring which was about all they had to draw on, would never be short of assignments in the Europe of those days, or in the Asia either. But the main memorial to the League's achievement in the technical fields is doubtless to be seen in the San Francisco Charter, with its entire passages devoted to those non-political functions of which, with the League in liquidation, the UN was universally expected to become the legatee.

An Unsordid Act

Some questions no doubt there are which admit of a plain categorical reply. What is the destination of a certain train? Or of some passenger inside it? There may even be a single simple answer to why this particular passenger is bound for that particular place. Sometimes, when several are seen simultaneously in action, the behaviour of them all may be explicable in terms of a single 'big idea'. They are the members, possibly, of a team, joining their several endeavours for the attempted winning of a game. The hoped-for victory and the process of achieving it, these, in their case, represent the big idea. But it is not always so.

What one has undertaken in this prefatory essay is, in effect, to take a look, not as from the angle of the pundit with esoteric in-

sights to disclose, but of the ruminating layman, at the phenomenon of TA in general, and to offer some personal impressions as to what it would appear to be all about.

"The most unsordid act in history." That, if memory serves, is what he called it—'it' being America's launching of the process of Lend-Lease and 'he' being, as then he was, Mr. Churchill. It may be worth while to pause here a moment, to classify his remark. To what did it relate? Was it about the intrinsic quality of things done? Or the disposition of the doers? Or was it not rather a full-hearted avowal of how he, the Prime Minister, had personally felt and how he would assume that the people would be found to feel, about those things. Essentially, a judgement of value. And that without prejudice to any metaphysical battle over how far any sorts of value judgement are expressive of anything more than the way those emitting them just happen to feel. Now, had Mr. Churchill, though employing his accustomed care in his choice of adjectives, opted not for 'unsordid', but for 'unselfish', few need have been found to disagree. But it seems just as well, perhaps, that he did not. For had he done so, this might gratuitously have reopened the ever-inconclusive debate on the distinction between selfish and unselfish ways of acting, and whether it is at all possible, and, if possible, whether it can ever be right, for statesmen, serving, so to say, as trustees for the future of their children, to do specifically unselfish things. Egoism and altruism: possible alternatives perhaps in the actions of individuals. But in the policies of states? Hardly, some would say. But 'unsordid': oh, yes. For that is how, to the impartial observer, or even to the beneficiaries themselves, such policies may appear. And this, it seems, quite irrespective of what may in fact have been the promptings in obedience to which they were pursued. 'Unsordid', on this view, they remain, in much the same way as a clever remark may remain a clever remark, even if not really very cleverly made.

This point, if validly taken, should have similar application to some things one might say of technical aid. This, too, might be commended as unsordid, by one whom it just happened to strike in that way: but somehow, to call it unselfish would seem to be going rather further, and saying something about the spirit behind it. And if what one is exploring is the motivations of the policy and not just the feelings it induces in oneself, one may need to go more deeply than did Mr. Churchill into the way such developments can come about. In which case one may well become aware of a crux, which, since one can scarcely resolve it, one had better be prepared cavalierly to brush aside. How, the academic inquirer will ask himself, is one to talk at all responsibly about the 'motivations' of a 'policy', seeing that the policy is the policy of a government, that as a rule a government is a person only in idea, and that it is only to persons in actuality that motivations can realistically be ascribed?

Is it into the motivations of individual statesmen, officials, politicians, members of particular groups, that it will become appropriate to inquire? As between contenting ourselves with a description of the impact which the policy has had upon us, and, at the other extreme, probing into the moral posture of men and women, or types of men and women, with whose concurrence the policy is being pursued, is there no third, intermediate approach to the forming of a view? Can there ultimately be no sense at all in asking whether a policy is unselfish or not? Can we not at least remark that some policies are more selfish than some others? And what could be our test? Does it really make no sense at all to try to think of state behaviour as presupposing conducive dispositions? Granted that in a given community there may be many whose attitudes must go for virtually nothing in the determination of policy, this surely will not be true of all. How about the dispositions of a ruling stratum, or junta? May we not identify certain sorts of attitudes as typical in the members of a class that politically matters and try to appreciate the bearing of these upon the question of what cannot and can be done? Or at least on the question of the guise most propitiously to be given to what it is being proposed to do?

One would want, of course, to have made up one's mind, and not just from a formal point of view, on the identity and limits of the class considered effectively in control. Where, for instance, there is said to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, is one to suppose that the proletariat, as such, can be holding any views, that matter, of its own? But, having formed an opinion on this issue, as well as on the question of typical dispositions, one is at least on the road towards an interpretation of the way things come to happen and of the way the wily politician puts things when he wants to put them over.

National characteristics are a tricky subject, and anything said on them is pretty sure to draw protest from somewhere: but, if there does exist an American ruling class—albeit coextensive, on a possible view, with the nation as a whole—and if there is such a thing as an American type, with definable traits, then two of those traits must surely be these: on the one hand your American is generous to a fault; and he has, on the other hand, a holy horror of being had for—what shall we say?—a person of little experience. So he has the habit of looking, in his mind, at both sides of his ten-dollar bill; but is not for that reason any less likely to give it away in the end. It was all very well, therefore, for Mr. Churchill to celebrate Lend-Lease as unsordid. To the American public, it had, in form, been presented and put over as a measure of self-defence. And similarly it may be that, if he is to be summoned to take up, as it were, the 'white man's burden', it had perhaps better be put to him as the dictate of enlightened self-interest—a business proposition—lest there be overmuch dissent. This is not necessarily a matter of representing bad business as good, but rather of laying suitable stress on

those aspects of the policy which make it the good business it is. It becomes a question, that is, of underlining such truths as, to those that are being appealed to, may be expected to appeal.

But are we therefore to say that enlightened self-interest is, with the Americans, the only fruitful form of appeal? Some observers there are who may be depended on to say just about that. A contributor, for instance, to the *Daily Worker*[1]: "It is this which Britain has been doing for 200 years. What is new is that with the Point Four programme America is hellbent on a gigantic new colonial investment drive to take over the colonies of British, French and Belgian imperialism for the profit and greater glory of Wall Street. . . . The talk of raising living standards is the eye-wash to conceal huge American investments for the return of super-profit. It is the programme of the hijacker forcing the older robbers to share the loot."

Are we to deny that there can be any warrant whatever for such imputations? On the morrow of Mr. Truman's inaugural speech, the *Christian Science Monitor* made the comment: "Even when the United States has eschewed the old forms of imperialism, dollar diplomacy has too often spoiled the picture. Talk of America's 'manifest destiny' has too often been more flamboyantly jingoistic than humanely helpful." So, to translate Mr. Truman's vision into action would require "prayer and care". Reactionaries would attack the project as a "plan to make Uncle Sam into Santa Claus and extend Truman's new welfare state to the world". But actually it was "a tremendous idea, not only humanitarian but practicable". Indeed, it had the look of being "almost inevitable as the next stage in American development". For the truth of course is that, as is commonly the case, here was a policy having many aspects, aspects to suit a broad range of tastes, and to acknowledge one or other of these aspects was by no means to question the rest. "Giving assistance to backward people may deter them from turning desperately to Communism. But that is not the main reason for lending a hand, and should not be any kind of reason for refusing to help. Let Christian compassion be the motive and political effects will fall into their proper place." But does one first resolve upon a policy, and then go on to endow it with a motive? One can, of course, choose which of several motives publicly to avow. Could the newspaper really ask for anything more than that Christian compassion should be adopted as the 'ostensible' motive? Even so, the advice, however morally unexceptionable, might still not be politically apropos. That would depend upon what body of potential acquiescence it was being sought to gather in. Those 'reactionaries', for example: was there not some fly to which even they might be prevailed upon to rise? Or did the paper mean to imply *non tali*

[1] June 22nd, 1950.

auxilio? Why not have it both ways, particularly if there may be no other way of having it either way? "I don't think," declared the judicious Mr. Acheson, "we need be embarrassed to admit of disinterested idealism. But there is a hard-headed self-interest in this programme, and other nations will co-operate with us with more confidence if we say bluntly why we are in it." With which might be compared words used in the House of Commons by Mr. Oliver Stanley in moving an increase in the Colonial Development Fund: "Finally, there is the question of economic advantage. . . . There is no reason why something that is good for the colonies should not be good for us too, but surely we are not going to the absurd length of saying we will refuse to do things which are good for the colonies because they might also be of advantage to us." That, he maintained, would be a *reductio ad absurdum*.

There are, to tell the truth, some oddly Kipling-like overtones in some of the language wherewith American leaders have acknowledged the challenge presented by the poverty and hunger which are so rife in the world to-day. To Englishmen, the note of service-not-self-yet-self-not-nowhere must be far from unfamiliar. Nor should there, on the other hand, be anything new for English ears in the tone of Russian comment on the reasons officially given by American statesmen in recommending their 'bold new program' to their people. Stale stuff, the Englishman feels. Has he not heard it before, anent the efforts of his kinsmen overseas, and heard it not from Kremlin-fed sources only? He knows that human motivation is a complex, many-stranded affair, and that the attributing of base dispositions is the cheapest and easiest method of doing implied homage to what one does not choose openly to admire. Any simple explanation of human behaviour is liable to be over-simple, and any simple explanation of collective human behaviour is almost certain to be. Let historians pronounce categorically on the reasons why in past times men acted as they did. But let not social psychologists or even sociologists be expected to record with anything approaching a comparable certitude why nations are now doing what they do. For the appreciation of motive is not a matter for simple observation—"Man looketh upon the *outward* appearance"—not merely for interrogation—"Answer yes, no, or don't know"—but rather for judicial inference—"The Devil himself *knoweth* not the thought of man"—and it belongs therefore to a realm in which the better answers are given not to so many decimal places but with reservations suited to the circumstances, never simple, of the case. And meanwhile let us continue to recognize an unsordid act when we see one.

United Nations accepts its Opportunity

In its inception and in its original form the Point Four programme had been a unilaterally national enterprise. If only, however, though not by any means only, in view of the Moscow line of

criticism, it was well that the United Nations could so early be brought into the picture. For " the danger ", wrote Susan Strange, " is that the United States . . . if it ever makes up its mind to pursue energetically the target of Point Four, will slip into the trap and acquire a new kind of economic empire, with most of the faults and even more of the hypocrisy of others before it. . . ." The main American objectives could best be achieved " through an international organization which is not suspected of imperialist ambitions ". And in June 1950 there could be reported the rallying at Lake Success, in an unprecedented meeting, of " fifty-four lands in a joint effort on behalf of the world's under-privileged masses, believing firmly that a world one-third prosperous and two-thirds impoverished cannot long remain free ". Which suggests reopening our problems of motivations in a further, yet more complex, phase. Fifty-four times as complex? Not necessarily. Or perhaps the multiplier might need to be more than 54.

Purportedly, the purpose, in so many words, of the UN ' expanded programme ' was " to help under-developed countries to strengthen their national economy through the development of their industries and agriculture with a view to promoting their economic and political independence in the spirit of the Charter and to ensure the attainment of higher levels of economic and social welfare for their entire populations ". So, if for the key to motives one had only to examine avowed objectives, there might be little more to say. A single formula: *ergo*, a single mind? Which, however, has *not* been demonstrated. As always, what must interest the social psychologist or the student of international relations, is not what the ostensible reasons may have been, but how in actuality a given development has come about, and, in so far as it may have been a willed result, what motivations had entered in. We know in these days well enough, where our own personal behaviour is concerned, that, even were we capable of reporting with precision on our real reasons for doing what we do, our oh-so-sophisticated colleagues would discount it as some sort of an after-thought, developed for the comfort it could give to us rather than for any illumination it might supply to them. And we may well be conscious of a temptation, in ourselves, to make similar corrections for the component of self-deceit which we suspect of having an influence in what they, for their part, tell us of the motives that animate them. And do we not also well know how little relation may exist between the forces from whose interplay some committee decision may be born, and the logically adequate, but psychologically improbable, profession of sentiment which prefaces the ' agreed ' resolution at the end? We surely are too old to suppose that, since a coalition cabinet may have acted, it therefore has succeeded in thinking and feeling, as one. And as for the functioning of an international body, this we know is simply the construed resultant of things done by an indefinite plurality of persons proceeding in the light of some formula of association. So that, though on the surface of affairs the preambles may be open for all to digest, the academic inquirer, whose mind is on realities, may hardly have time to read them through. As always, he will be fain to speculate where others may be content to swallow. He will look less for objects announced to have been aimed at than at considerations likely to have been borne in mind. And all the sorts of these—the political, the humanitarian, the diplomatic, the sentimental, the strategic, the economic, the frankly electoral, the narrowly national, the purely personal, the rashly romantic, the severely prudential—may be eligible for representation on his chart. The picture cannot, of course, ever be complete. But neither will it want to be. For what the inquirer is after is not a perfect knowledge but a deepened understanding. And the most that he accordingly will strive for is a sharpened sense of the limits somewhere within which the ultimate truth, if ever discoverable, would presumably be found to lie.

In the specific instance of the sponsoring by the United Nations of the expanded programme of technical aid (beyond, that is, what in this field it had already been doing from its inception), a first approximation to such an understanding may not be hard to come by. Not, that is, if one is willing to be party to a bold over-simplification of the problem. In the functioning of international organizations, with whatever punctilio they may protect, in their formal procedures, the principle of the equality of states, it is not to be supposed that a particular lead will be equally echoed no matter from whence it may have come. And experience goes to show that, provided it emanate from a country of sufficient power and importance, then, for most other countries, the line of least diplomatic resistance is apt to be that of falling, with formal alacrity, into line. *Inertie courtoise*: that is what some have dubbed it—this herdlike propensity for doing what ' all the best people ' are by way of beginning to do. When once the Truman Administration had propounded Point Four, and revealed at the United Nations a readiness to bear so heavy a slice of the burden, it was unlikely that many others—at least in the free world—would disclose an unwillingness to join in. This technical aid was one of those subjects, exceptional as yet, on which it was apparently open to the United Nations to move ahead and add cautiously to its rather modest score. That in itself was a consideration likely to have weight in a good many minds. For, among the manifold pattern of not always compatible purposes which any given government is constrained to keep continually in view, the bit-by-bit building up of the authority and prestige of the United Nations can be assumed to enjoy a fairly high priority with many, and some sort of a place with almost all.

It is, however, not merely a mistake to expect, to the question of the purpose of technical assistance in general, a clear and single

answer. It is a mistake to imagine that to such a question any clear and single answer need exist. An old-time Aristotelian might, it is true, be prone to contend that the 'nature', and by the same token the 'purpose', of so presumably familiar a datum must surely be patent of definition. But they of tougher, or more modern, mind will start rather with the phrase, along with the concept in connotes, and ask themselves whether this concept need necessarily admit of being put into focus on a screen or pinned like a butterfly on a board. It is the phrase that has stood unaltered hitherto. The content of the concept, what fixity can we expect in that? The notion may vary in content from mind to mind and, even for particular minds, from day to day. The programme may undergo modification from year to year. And those who with one set of purposes were its parents in the past may with rather different purposes persevere with it in the future. Such indeed is wont to be the way with these large, self-developing international ventures.

Had there been posed a similar question with respect to Britain's war effort in, say, 1942, the answer might well have varied with the politics of the person addressed. For some, the sufficiently big idea was simply the survival of Britain. For some, the destruction of 'fascism'. For some, possibly, loyalty to a Moscow line. What one sees is a confluence of energies, of moral drives, and, if the essence of an enterprise may be held to reside in its primary purpose, then, in that case, it might almost be better to speak of an effort such as Britain's in the war as so many enterprises woven into one. And, comparably, one might think of the phenomenon of technical assistance as the unified expression of several independent ideas, supported each by its own preoccupation. So that it may, in a sense, be no more than a matter of personal predilection whether one speaks of technical assistance as essentially a humanitarian, an economic, or a strategic undertaking, or as three or more sorts combined.

One thing the academic student, we may hope, will ask himself instinctively, even indeed in absorbing what appears in such a volume as this, and *a fortiori* in appreciating public dicta on a topic like technical aid. Of any given affirmation he will ask himself whether it issues from someone as anxious as he himself to perceive and present things precisely as they are. And, if not, then he will wish to form some provisional judgement as to whose axe, or the axe of what body, a writer is seeking to grind, whose trumpet is being, ever so subtly, blown, whose line is being plugged, or, if you like, whose line has been ingurgitated, with hook and sinker. He will seek, dare we say, to read between the lines.

The Presentation of Point Four

It could have been a cynic who first said of speech that it was given us for the concealing of our thoughts. We remember, of course,

that there is also another, contrasting, purpose to which it may be put. But we further know that, on the lips at least of statesmen, words have not infrequently a function strictly identical with neither of these. Commonly, from the very nature of his job, the statesman is at once an apologist and a salesman—the salesman of a policy and the apologist for those whose responsibility it is. In presenting Point Four to the public Mr. Truman and his colleagues may have been rather less concerned to discover to the world what they themselves might think of it, than to suggest to all, or parts, of the public those feelings in regard to it which it will have been judged both possible and useful to have them entertain. For the salesman is ultimately less concerned to show you that his article gives pleasure to him than to have you believe that, were you to take it, it ought to give pleasure to you.

The politician, the world over, is in practice pretty constantly on the job of selling something in the moral market. As a type, he is not unlike 'little Jack Horner'. Whatever his field of endeavour, he makes a corner of it, and there he sits. But into his corner he has brought with him his pie, from which from time to time he pulls out for himself a plum. And what then does he do? Making, you may say, a virtue of rapacity, he identifies his own with the interests of mankind, and exclaims "What a good boy am I!"

More than in Britain, though probably not more than in France, foreign policy in America tends to become a species of war on two fronts. When Marshall spoke in May 1947, and Truman in January 1949, they were hardly so much addressing the outside world in the name of the American people as appealing to the American people on behalf of the outside world. Severally, America's friends and allies are represented in Washington by their respective envoys. But they also, in effect, are represented, collectively, by the White House and the Department of State. And what makes the Administration's manoeuvring in the domestic theatre of operations so distinctively an art is the fact that *vis-à-vis* the American people the White House has not, even in reserve, the American big stick.

Let us therefore return now to Point Four, to notice some of the things officially said about it from time to time, as well as things journalistically said about it on the basis of things said about it officially. It should at least help us to orientate our judgement, even though we shall not expect it to tell us what we would really like to know.

"We are here," said the President, "embarking on a venture that extends far into the future. We are at the beginning of a rising curve of activity, private, governmental, and international, that will continue for many years to come." "The underlying doctrine of

Point Four," wrote a commentator in the *New York Times*,[2] " is that we can have, ultimately, a world of plenty, and therefore [*sic*] of peace, if we pass along to the potentially rich but backward regions of the earth the magic key to prosperity. This is simply the technical know-how that in a hundred and fifty years has changed the U.S. from a wilderness to the richest power in world history." " These activities," declared Mr. Dean Acheson, " are but the first steps in a process that can change and is changing the whole aspect of life in these areas. The process has profound social and political effects, and that is what makes it an important part of our foreign policy to-day. The chain-reaction of economic development, once it has started, goes far beyond the immediate range of Point Four work." " A constructive foreign economic policy," observed the *New York Herald Tribune*,[3] " is as indispensable as any function which this nation must perform. The keynote of the Point Four program is its constructive character. . . . The leading role would be played by private capital." " American private investors," declared the *New York Herald Tribune*,[4] " would miss a great opportunity and fail in a great social responsibility if they sat back and waited for perfect conditions to develop."

" To understand what lies behind the Truman policy," wrote the *Winnipeg Free Press*,[5] " it is necessary to realize the gigantic change which has occurred in the United States economy since the beginning of World War Two. In this period the United States has roughly doubled its capacity to produce. For such a giant the existing world market obviously is inadequate. The market must be built up to fit the needs of an economy which is still growing and to-morrow may need more outlets and more imports than it needs to-day. The United States in fact rejects the theory that its economy is now ' mature ' and cannot expand further. But this expansion requires the general expansion of the world and the rising standard of living of all peoples. . . . The reservoirs of private capital which could pour into such areas, if conditions were attractive, is . . . ' very great indeed '." Point Four, it was stated in the *New York Times*,[6] " is in purpose a systematic attack on the vicious circle that keeps two-thirds of the world's population too poor, too enfeebled, and too backward, to produce adequately, and too unproductive to overcome without help the poverty, sickness, and ignorance that hold them down. To these people the crude propaganda and drastic techniques of the Communists must come with the shock of religious revelation." For Communist propaganda held, in Mr. Truman's words, " that the free nations are incapable of providing a decent standard of living for the millions of people in

[2] April 1st, 1951.
[3] March 28th, 1950.
[4] July 5th, 1949.
[5] April 9th, 1949.
[6] April 1st, 1951.

the under-developed areas of the earth ". The contrary had now to be shown.

Not that the Point Four programme was, in Mr. Acheson's official eyes, " primarily something to beat down the Soviet menace ". The Soviet threat was indeed very real and dangerous, and the successful operation of the programme did help to meet it. " But this is a by-product, and the programme has a much more enduring and fundamental purpose than that. And we should be carrying it forward even if there were no Soviet threat." Point Four, it seemed to him, was " a fundamental philosophical and political idea ". It grew " out of our whole approach to the problem set by Nature to civilization. Not for us the fatalism which accepts natural catastrophe as the will of God. Indeed, our society faces the forces of nature with a cheerful, perhaps even a cocky confidence, bolstered no doubt by the experience of our forefathers. . . . In our society we organize ourselves to support men confronted with the vicissitudes of nature."

" The best way," wrote Stewart Alsop from Washington to the *New York Herald Tribune*,[7] " to put the ' bold new program ' in its proper perspective is to consider the way in which the inaugural address was written and the way Point Four came to be included in it." The idea of " some sort of plan to benefit both the industrial and backward areas of the world by raising living standards and increasing purchasing power in the under-developed areas " had long been current. But he adduced some not implausible evidence to suggest that Point Four had come " to be included in the inaugural address in part simply because the occasion seemed to require something new and striking ". It was, he incidentally added, " entirely possible that Point Four will peter out into nothing and be forgotten ". He did not, however, say he thought it would.

But also rather remarkable is the testimony of Neal Stanford, in the *Christian Science Monitor*,[8] that there had been " no cabinet discussion of the proposal " before the President " unveiled it in his inaugural address ". There had been " no official analysis of just what might be involved in what the President envisaged."

The policy will, however, have taken on its full importance not simply because the President had put it forward but because it came to have so strong an endorsement from the American people. Howbeit, not so strong as some might be tempted to think. For there was room enough for misgivings and doubts. Would Point Four, however formally successful, necessarily serve to check the advance of Communism? Would it even contribute to the consolidation of peace? Would it at all result in the desired outflow of private American capital? In whose power would it lie to ensure that it should? Would it, in relation to the processes of social change, have

[7] January 30th, 1949.
[8] January 25th, 1949.

the effect of hastening such developments as the American people should wish to see? Would the help it offered reach the men and women it was intended to benefit? Would they welcome it if it did? Would the world be led by Point Four to value the United States more highly than before? Why should America undertake so indefinite a new commitment in addition to those she had already assumed? It is possible here to touch only on some of the salient points in these debates.

It was Senator Robert Taft who, in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, seriously questioned whether technical improvements in backward countries really had much to do one way or another with preserving peace. "Germany, before it began the First and Second World Wars, had risen to a tremendous height of economic and social progress. That progress did not contribute to peace." It was the London *Times*[9] that voiced very early the feeling that it would be "imprudent to think that Communism can be countered merely by industrialization with its creation of an industrial proletariat". Nor was there any certainty that American private capital would respond to the call. "Even a world government, however ruthless," wrote Susan Strange, might find it beyond its power to "create again a full tide of foreign investment on such a scale as to set trade turning again as it turned before 1914." As it was, national governments could not force savings at that rate out of their people. All they could do—if they would—was to create conditions where the foreign investment would appear of its own accord. That was "the challenge of Point Four."

The Two-way Nature of the Process

In an important sense it was a challenge to the under-developed countries themselves. The group of these, it was reported after an EcoSoc debate in 1949, "had the difficult task of endeavouring to reconcile the interests of the business communities and national sentiment in their own countries with the need to create confidence and provide conditions and facilities attractive to foreign capital. This produced a certain understandable ambivalence. Doubts in the mind of the foreign investor as to whether and to what extent he would be permitted to control the enterprise he is being asked to finance; as to whether he will be able to remit his profits and withdraw his capital if he desires; as to whether he will be adequately compensated in the event of the enterprise being nationalized—these and similar doubts have to be overcome before the desired capital can be expected to flow. On the other hand the governments of the under-developed countries are intensely jealous of their national independence and will make no concessions which seem to place it in jeopardy, nor can they grant conditions which

[9] January 27th, 1949.

appear to give preferential treatment to foreign capital as against that of their own investing publics."

Was there in these circumstances very much that Washington could do? True, the President had spoken of negotiating treaties to protect the investor from unwarranted or discriminating treatment under the laws of the country in which the investment was made. "In negotiating treaties . . . we do not, of course, ask privileges for American capital greater than those granted to other investors in under-developed areas, or greater than we ourselves grant in this country."

From United Nations circles in Geneva in July 1950 serious discussion and study were reported of a "possible means of saving vast areas of the world from Communist imperialism". It had become "clear to most of those concerned . . . that the notion of giving aid to a country governed as South Korea has been is quite unrealistic unless the conditions attached to that aid involve far more political control than has hitherto been contemplated. . . . It would not be easy to impose conditions on those highly nationalistic governments as if they were still in a colonial stage." The only answer to the difficulty seemed to be "that it would be a lot easier for the U.N. to do it than for any one Government such as the U.S.". The question is of course whether that was really any answer at all.

"The present danger," declared a Public Affairs Institute pamphlet, "is that the whole pattern of attitudes and emotions relating to the colonialists of the past will be transferred to us. The U.S. has already done much in the last five years to bring this about through identification with the Colonial powers . . . even while at the same time it has tried half-heartedly to support nationalism in the colonies. The result has been a great loss of faith in American sincerity and purpose. We have . . . fixed ourselves in the minds of millions of people as supporters of the social *status quo*, as opponents of change, as people also whose fear of Russia and communism is so great that we blindly throw our support behind crumbling reactionary regimes. . . . Remember that the poor never love the rich." A dilemma, indeed.

In the *New York Times*[10] there was reported from Washington a meeting of the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development, at which Associate Justice W. O. Douglas of the United States Supreme Court had "called for a 'Point Five Program' that would 'extend the American revolution of social justice' to those under-developed areas by providing representative democracy in which all would vote as they chose and land reform by which everyone could cultivate his own soil". The idea apparently was "to promote 'peasants' revolutions' . . . to end economic serfdom under Point Four technical assistance programs",

[10] April 8th, 1952.

for "without some method of turning over the government and resources to the people of these recipient areas" these programmes were "only underwriting the *status quo*", and perpetuating "the conditions in which Communism grew". There were areas, he said, before going into which, "the U.S. must decide 'Who are you for, the peasants or the landowners?'". As he understood the American spirit, it meant "freedom and justice, dignity of the individual and equal opportunity for all, not just for the British, the French or the Dutch, but for all the little peoples, the goat herders and the tenders of the rice-paddies". And Dr. Malik, of the Lebanon, declared in similar vein that "no area should be aided except those in which Governments showed 'a real concern' for the people."

But Mr. Harriman was also present, and told the Conference that it would be fatal to stipulate conditions with which recipient governments had to comply in order to receive economic or technical aid. He called this a "tell 'em policy" that said, in effect, "unless you do this, we won't help you". "To me this is fatal. . . . If we cannot hold fast to our idealism we are lost."

Where, then, did the Government's sympathies lie?

"The underlying point of Point Four," explained Mr. Acheson to a C.I.O. Conference, "is the use of material means for non-material ends. What we are really concerned with is what happens to people as individuals." But the dilemma remains. For in the moral and emotional make-up of a community, as in that of many an individual, there may coexist in perennial tension the concern for progress and the fear of change. The question at a particular epoch, with respect to a particular country, is which one of these two tendencies is on the top. Is your national hero an Atatürk or a Gandhi? Is he a Peter the Great, with his interest rather in the omelette than the eggs, or a Paul Kruger, who would leave his country's gold where nature put it lest an inflow of materialism corrupt a cherished way of life? The would-be purveyor of technical assistance may in the latter event be tempted to speculate on a change of dispensation, which as a man of progress he may work for, or as a man of principle he may patiently abide, withholding what the modernizing Russian would have wanted until it is no longer so abhorrent to the Bible-minded Boer. Robbing Peter, if you like, to pay his due to Paul!

And Paul may in fact have the heart of his people with him. "The popular remedy," wrote Mr. F. L. Brayne in the *Manchester Guardian*,[11] "for the troubles of these less fortunate countries is 'capital investment' and 'technicians'. But is it as simple as that? The loudest complaint of every reformer, whether missionary or administrator, is the obstinate resistance of the intended beneficiaries to even the most obviously profitable schemes. The people are

[11] April 2nd, 1951.

quite happy as they are. . . . The new plans will mean . . . a complete break with every custom that militates against progress." Professor Northrop has taught us something of how that problem is to be conceived.

Anyhow, it is only with the countries as such, with their sovereign independence and their equal membership in the United Nations, that the Point Four formula envisages immediate dealings. Yet, the free world—the world of freedom—do we ourselves conceive it as a world of free individuals, or merely as a world of independent states? Is it people that we hope to benefit, or peoples, or is it existing regimes? (And what, incidentally, could we take to be the criterion of communal betterment—more cars in the capital or more canals in the countryside?) Every regime must perforce profess that 'real concern for the people' which Dr. Malik desiderated. Such professions may signify much, or little. The betrayer Judas, it may be recalled, once professed a like concern, but . . . "this he said, not that he cared for the poor."

No government, let us in fairness admit, can ever care solely for the poor. And seldom can they even rank as preoccupation number one. Even the claims of public self-esteem may sometimes be given precedence. "With the break-up of the colonial system—the progressive dissolution of the British, Dutch and French empires," wrote Robert Bendiner, "many of the countries that sorely need technical and material assistance are ultra-sensitive, in the spirit of a newly won independence. It is perfectly understandable that they should look with jaundiced eye on Greeks bearing gifts, especially when the Greeks in question are identified in their minds with imperialism. The Communists spare no effort in keeping that identification alive." "With national pride at a peak," he went on, "the people of Asia, in particular, are touchy at the slightest suggestion that they are being bought." And he proceeded to commend the President for having presented Point Four, not mainly as a weapon in "the continuing battle of ideologies" but as "a successor to the old colonialism idea, the exploiting idea". "The more we talk of Point Four as a weapon in that battle, the more we blunt its point. The President himself was on safer ground." As between the *fortissimos* favoured by the preponderance of sympathies at home, and the soft-pedallings suggested by susceptibilities abroad, one can see with what finesse the presentation of the Point Four programme will have had to be planned. As so often in the propaganda process, what might have been one public's meat was duly avoided as apt to prove another one's poison.

And conversely there was also, of course, a problem of susceptibilities at home. It was all very well for *The Times*[12] to hail Point Four as the Marshall Plan's "logical successor". But the Marshall

[12] January 24th, 1949.

Plan had involved provision of more than mere technical know-how. And there was the American taxpayer to consider. "It is easy," remarked Joseph Harsh in the *Christian Science Monitor*,[13] "to see the various paths down which the idea could come to grief." If, in particular, "the idea were to become in effect a dole, then the costly unproductiveness of the project sooner or later would alienate the American taxpayer. To succeed it must be kept productive, rather than defensive, and co-operative rather than merely a time-buying hand-out." There could thus at first be no question of grants-in-aid.

But there remained a problem. What if the flow of private investments to the under-developed territories could be hoped for only if grants of money had first been made? As Professor Arthur Lewis was to argue in *The Observer*,[14] there was "a bottle-neck". The only way to break it was "to make grants to poor countries to enable them to expand their public services. These grants are not a substitute for loans or private investment. On the contrary they will prime the pump." As early as the EcoSoc debate in 1949 there had been considerable concern over the question of how to meet the costs of "the low-yielding, slow-yielding 'social overheads' which are basic to all other forms of development". "In a country like the U.S.," continued Professor Lewis, "giving away money can be supported only on moral grounds, or by fear of Communism." Whereas "for Britain, dependent on an inflow of food and materials from abroad", it was a "condition of our own existence". In the aforesaid debate Mr. Corley Smith had implied that the case for the giving of financial aid to certain countries might in practice come to be decided not so much on economic or strategic as on moral, or politico-moral, grounds. He spoke of "the enormous disparity existing between rich and poor in the under-developed countries". That gap should, he said, be narrowed if the workers in the industrialized countries were to be asked "to accept a lowering of their standard of living for the sake of the under-developed countries". This, the reader will note, would be a sufficiently pertinent point if the only principle underlying Point Four were the neighbourly duty of charity. But it is a little less easy to square with Mr. Acheson's insistence on "the hard-headed self-interest" in the Truman programme. "It is not philanthropy that motivates us." To hold otherwise was one of "several mistaken notions."

A report from Paris, to the *New York Times*,[15] on the discussion and rejection, at the United Nations, of certain ideas on grants-in-aid, included the following passage: "What the U.S. disagrees with is the setting up of an international fund to which there is only one visible contributor—the U.S. The U.S. also feels, but cannot say

[13] January 27th, 1949. [14] July 1st, 1951.
[15] December 8th, 1951.

in these debates, that so long as the countries proposing such projects allow native capital to be salted away in foreign banks, impose income taxes on their rich that are only a fraction of those imposed by the U.S. and show no signs of taking strenuous measures to mobilize their resources for the common good, their case is both morally and practically weak." Again a politico-moral point. On June 1st, 1952, however, under the headline "Point Four Grows Sprouts", the *New York Herald Tribune* was able to report 'officials' as admitting frankly "that the aforementioned program is not Point Four in the original sense". In particular, "some countries" were "special cases. . . . In India and Pakistan . . . American capital investment" was "necessary to supplement the basic development plans agreed upon in the British Commonwealth Colombo Plan". And "under last year's mutual security act", it had become possible to view each country as an "economic whole" and take the kind of measures necessary in that country regardless of the old definitions of different kinds of aid. Philanthropy? No. Mutual aid!

Earlier on, at any rate, there had been some disappointment in Britain over the apparent deafness in Washington to those overtures to American financial strategy which were implicit in the Colombo Plan. "The real trouble," wrote the *Manchester Guardian*,[16] "about the Colombo meeting, was that, though America was represented and Mr. Acheson has politely backed the scheme, America has as yet given no signs of how much money it is willing to put behind it. Until it does so all is in the air." And again, a day or two later: "It begins to look as if the new horizon was a mirage. . . . What . . . happened was that Mr. Acheson had announced that, while the plan had his blessing, the U.S. could not back it financially. This was unexpected. When the plan was debated last autumn, Americans gave the impression that they thought it was just what South Asia needed. While the U.S. had been willing in principle to invest money in South Asia, it could not do so until it was presented with a plan, drawn up and sifted by experts. Colombo seemed to supply what they wanted. What has caused the American change of mind? . . . The U.S. has tried to soften its blow by making it known that it will go ahead with its own 'point four programme', which can be dovetailed with the Colombo Plan. . . . But the effort will be less well planned if there are Commonwealth and American schemes running side by side. There will be overlaps and waste. The temptation of the borrowers to play off the lenders against one another will be irresistible." It was not, the paper continued on March 12th, "American charity" that was being asked for. As a "counter-stroke to Communism" the Colombo Plan, if energetically pursued, "might be as important as,

[16] February 23rd, 1951.

or more important than, the Marshall Plan". But of course almost any plan could be expected to become important if made, by American money-power, an object of the pertinent kind of energetic pursuit! And one can imagine, though of course one does not know, that the American taxpayer, judged reluctant to comb his pockets much further, even for specifically national crusades, might well have gone on strike if pressed by Washington in the interests of something presumably first conceived in London. It may be remembered that it was apparently at American bidding that the far from unpromising Middle East Supply Centre had with the day of victory been required to close down. Suspect, it was said to have been, as subserving over-zealously the interests of British trade. And there will always be those who assume that what benefits A is bound not to benefit B and C. At any rate one's impression is that, anxious as the Administration may have been for the full success of the Colombo Plan, it will have done wisely to await the better moment before presuming in this matter on the public spirit of the people. When, in the following July, there went into operation what the *Christian Science Monitor* saw as "a giant plan for a giant area", "let us hope", the paper said, "that ways will be found in which participation by the U.S. may be extended far beyond its present membership in the Consultative Committee". As we know, the plan had, after all, been framed in the immediate wake of the Point Four programme and as a contribution to the self-same crusade: which that paper had greeted as "a program to win the world from war"; and able, "if guided by wisdom and inspired by love", not only to lift two-thirds of humanity to higher levels of thinking and living, but utterly to balk the hate and tyranny which fed on ignorance and hunger.

For, say what those its cautious sponsors might, the programme did have, in every sense, the look of being a 'good' thing; and the idealism would keep breaking through. Its authors—who could tell?—might prove to have been building better than they knew. "We like," confessed the then TA Administrator, Stanley Andrews, in October 1952, "to think that in the minds of many Americans Point Four represents one of the most constructive efforts and one of the best opportunities to build fundamental and lasting relationships between free peoples. . . . We are proud to be a partner and a part of their accomplishments." They were not "running around the world trying to thrust technicians or money or American ideas on people or countries". Neither were they "trying to Americanize or introduce American standards" into the countries in which they were working. "I want to emphasize that Point Four goes only where it is specifically invited and stays only where it is welcomed." And again: "We must begin where people are . . . and move on from there, rather than trying to impose something revolutionary." Paul gets the verdict, and let the cold war wait!

But whether thrust in, or spontaneously summoned, and whether or not by dint of trying, the technicians, in their scores and in their tens of scores, were arriving all right, and bearing their American standards with them. Wake up, England! "President Truman's Point Four programme," Raymond Blackburn, M.P., had written in the *Evening Standard*,[17] "spells deadly danger for British industry. . . . Hundreds of American experts and technicians will be provided free by the American Government to advise governments and local administrations in Asia, the Near East, Africa and South America. . . . Unless we are associated with the programme they will necessarily create vast export markets for American industry to the exclusion of our own. . . . Here is a great challenge to Britain. . . . We must double the output of technicians and scientists. We cannot afford to play second fiddle to America."

International Relations Aspects

Like every other problem within the international-relations cosmos, this has been a study in the ways of social man. Superficial, no doubt: but it was felt to be worth attempting, however ineffectually. To push it further would involve fuller inquiry, on the one hand into the aggregate pattern of preoccupations of this government and that, and on the other hand into the total contemporary situational setting in relation to which any particular policy-decision by any particular government was come to at any particular time. And it would also involve seeking the technical assistance of experts in a diversity of special domains, indeed from almost every other social science. And this not merely because the discipline of international relations is as yet an under-developed academic area, with most of its 'social overheads' still to be furnished, and with little to put in the window for the enticement of those investors whose idealism is so shy of breaking through. It is rather that international relations is essentially one of that growing category of subjects whose teachers have systematically to practise the inter-disciplinary approach. Its presentation is a single 'project', the know-how for which is nevertheless best provided by a team. The measures so far taken in this region of vast potential riches are "only the first steps". We are, we must hope, "at the beginning of a rising curve of activity . . . that will continue for many years to come". ". . . investors . . . will miss a great opportunity if they sit back and wait for perfect conditions to develop."

One word more, not of apology but of explanation. The reader may at times have wondered whether, as coming from a mentor of the immature, this essay may not have been a wee bit lacking in the element of priming for the spiritual pump, a shade, let us say, too *désabusé*. But one has not been merely asked to play the official

[17] May 11th, 1950.

line on the policies of the friends of freedom. If innocence on the one hand and cynicism on the other are really thought to be the only alternatives for them of riper years, then cynics, by all means and at every risk, let them of still ripening years make it their purpose to become. But some folks will surely know that cynicism is an ailment much more socially alarming than any mere disposition to look the facts of men's global coexistence squarely in the eye. It is this last, at all events, that recruits to the study of international relations are counselled to cultivate: and it does not seem, in the writer's experience, to have made them into cynics up to now.

C. A. W. MANNING.