

Channing
Peaceful Change

Reason
insufficient
re German
Colonies
return

8. SOME SUGGESTED CONCLUSIONS

By C. A. W. MANNING

SOME time back the School Dramatic Society presented, in English translation, a pre-war Russian play called *The Sabine Women*. The real subject of the play was not in point of fact the women, but the Sabine men, with their naïve belief in the compelling power of Reason. The not conspicuously moral moral was that for the Sabines merely to demonstrate, by argument, that since they, the Sabines, happened to have had the better title to the women, the Romans ought to give the women back—was not enough. Any exclusively rational presentation of the case whether for the return or indeed for the non-return of Germany's former colonies is apt to remind me of that play.

What a pity, you may have felt, reflecting upon the lectures we have listened to, that the whole question cannot be disposed of in this manner, namely, by an indefinite extension of the course. One Monday we might have heard some eminent ambassador on the natural right of, say, Lithuania to expand. A week later we might have had some Dominion statesman on the standpoint of the native inhabitants of the territories under mandate. How wise and fair-minded a jury you might have made. To whom could be more safely entrusted the assessment of the relative, and of the absolute, case, if any, for the acquisition of colonies, in terms of probable enhancement, or other-

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wise, of real income? But suppose, after all, the true motivations operative in support of revisionism, or of its counterpart, anti-revisionism, be not, for example, economic at all, but strategic? What if at a given moment the leaders of some dynamic community should judge it psychologically salutary that their people be supplied with a concrete grievance? Suppose there to occur somewhere such a situation as Professor Mannheim portrayed, where, a nation getting weary of circuses, it becomes expedient for war to be begun as an instrument of domestic policy? Fully to appreciate the bases of the "Arcadian" demand for colonies one would need to know rather well from the inside the process by which there gets established what conventionally goes as "the attitude of 'Arcadia'." The "mind" thus to be studied is not, you know, simply "a million times" the mind of an individual "Arcadian."

Some of those who heard from Dr. Lauterpacht his definition of the problem of peaceful change may have found themselves wondering why, in a series advertisedly devoted to that problem, certain of the earlier lectures should have been included at all—lectures, in effect, on the particular demands of particular countries for particular changes at a particular time. The explanation resides in the circumstances in which the 1935 International Studies Conference, on "Collective Security," came in the first place to resolve upon an investigation of the problem of Peaceful Change, *alias* "the peaceful settlement of certain international disputes"—with "special reference" to questions of colonies, population, markets and raw materials; these last, no doubt, being so to say regarded as *individual* problems of "peaceful change." The ambiguity, or

lack of precision, in that formula reflected, it was said, a compromise between some who had favoured a treatment of population problems, as such, and others who wanted what Dr. Lauterpacht would more readily have recognised as a study of the peaceful change problem in general. That ambiguity or lack of precision has been implicit in the programme, and illustrated in the substance, of the lectures we have heard. Transient—some of these questions, Dr. Lauterpacht considers, beside the essential issue.

At that Studies Conference speakers had aired the idea of a system of peaceful change as a necessary condition for the establishment of collective security. Sir Arthur Salter, more recently, has put it thus: "As the world and its conditions change it is perfectly clear that no system for the collective restraint of aggression can possibly stand the strain to which it will be subjected unless there is going on all the time a process by which the resulting strains can be eased by modifications of the *status quo*."¹

Change was the law of human existence. Hence the pages of history. The world would never stand still. The problem was, not to ensure that change should no longer happen—that was inconceivable—but to see that it should henceforth no longer happen except by peaceful means.

Notice that our subject is "*the*" problem, not "*our*" problem. The difference has its importance. Lecturing here last week, Professor Condliffe was concerned to insist that if a curb was in practice to be put upon the fury of economic nationalism the thing must be done by the governments of the existing nation-states.

¹ The quotations in this lecture are taken from "The Future of the League of Nations," the record of a discussion at Chatham House.

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Government, as such, was not for him an evil—albeit the misuse of governmental powers might well form a subject of blame. It is an aid to clear thinking, and a check to undue optimism, that, in viewing any problem in the field of international policy, we remember how, for anything to be accomplished in the matter, it must be done by the Governments of the existing sovereign States. You know, of course, their names; one hardly need enumerate them. And their natures you likewise know. Essentially, it is *their* problem, not yours or mine. "What is this WE?" asked Mr. H. G. Wells, in a similarly academic discussion; "cut out the WE."

Remember the way Dr. Mair concluded. After appraising, with peculiar authority, the interest of the African natives in the question of a possible return to Germany of her former colonies, she did not go on to tell us whether or no, in her personal judgment, those interests should rank as paramount. She simply pointed to the fact that this moral issue was among those which statesmanship would have to face. So much current, that is to say political, consideration of these questions rightly concerns itself with explicitly moral issues. Is a given attitude right? Is this objection reasonable? Is that alleged need legitimate? Were this a political forum, not a school of social science, it is on points such as these that a lecturer might properly seek endorsement of his subjective valuations. True: there is a sense of justice in the world. The appeal to righteousness *does* influence mankind. But, to the academic observer—the sociologist, if you please—the importance of an ethical argument will essentially lie, not in its validity for him, but in the effect it is likely to have, as a social factor,

very
like Carr!
sociologist =
academic

in the determination of policy; and, when we say "policy," we mean the policies of the existing sovereign States. You know their names.

It will not have been in any spirit of cynicism that Professor Webster dismissed from his attention as unthinkable any possible practice of self-abnegation on the part of what are nowadays known as the "haves."

In the matter of Professor Webster's lecture let me also recall what he said concerning the *purpose* of peaceful change. One's approach to the main problem might vary, he showed, according as one conceived the prime objective as: peaceful change in the interests simply of peace; peaceful change in the interests of justice; or, more broadly, peaceful change in the interest of betterment all round, some such new arrangement resulting as should, while meeting the need of the discontented, involve no great incidental detriment to other states. One might like—but would one be entitled?—to remark, And yet they are not three problems, but one problem.

No one, it seems, has yet come out for peaceful change simply in the interests of change—as some take the car for a run with no specific destination in mind. Mr. Leonard Woolf has observed how unsound would be the assumption that all changes demanded by the strong, or with sufficient strength, must be good or desirable. "It is probably true that, as things are, most changes of the international *status quo* would do no imaginable good to anyone, and a good deal of harm to everyone."

Indeed, change *per se* is neither good nor bad. Moreover, a given change, though absolutely bad, may in given circumstances be relatively good. The case

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for selling out to-day is not necessarily that one will realise a profit. The Anglo-Saxons, paying Danegeld, did not do it for the satisfaction of the thing. In the sense in which peaceful change is suggesting itself to some as urgently needed to-day, the case for it surely is that it is to serve as alternative to an otherwise anticipated warlike change. The problem seems therefore to be, peaceful change in the interests essentially of peace.

Aristotle, though perhaps the first, will not have been the last to perceive that government, law and order, have it as their primary function to give society the possibility of life; though, no doubt, when once established, government would properly be further availed of to make possible the living of the good life. A fashion, or a mechanism, of peaceful change might, one hopes, be exploited for many worthy purposes beyond the mere avoidance of war. This last, nevertheless, would seem to be *par excellence* the purpose for which it is initially needed.

To imply, in the manner of some, that peaceful change is necessarily change for the better, change in the interests of justice, and change accepted freely, is, I submit, to obscure rather than to clarify the question. If candid in our thinking we must surely concede that a change might be definitely unjust, assented to under protest, and intrinsically a change for the worse, yet, because not the outcome of actual hostilities, technically entitled to rank as peaceful change. Note that I am not expressly advocating this kind of change: I am merely classing it.

Another premise which I take it would scarcely be sound, is the assumption that in any given case an adequate procedure of peaceful change will lead forth-

with, and of necessity, to a definitive "solution" of the problem. You put in your penny, you turn the handle, and out comes your settlement! In life, however, as opposed possibly to chess, or mathematics, the most you can do very often is, not to solve a problem, but to treat it. Your doctor says: 'That appendix has got to come out—but not now. Go away for a holiday in the sun and think of other things. We'll look at it again by-and-by.' And this thought, of putting situations into "cold storage" (!), suggests the supplementary point that, in order to rank as peaceful change, a process has not necessarily to involve recourse to what is a little oddly termed "third-party" judgment; meaning the judgment of a presumably more or less disinterested mind. Even had we in Geneva the most perfect machine for vocalising at a moment's notice the collective conscience of humanity, there would be nothing definitely indecent in the idea of a couple of neighbours treating their mutual difficulties as, so to say, a matter of "domestic" concern.

No bets are offered; but, you'll surely agree that, if all that some of its apologists hope from it comes true, the non-aggression pact of January, 1934, between Germany and Poland, will have been an example—not of how things ought not to be done—but of what may indeed be done to the advantage, even the edification, of all concerned. A respite—nothing more. A chance for the atmosphere to become less embittered, for Nature and Time to make their contribution. Then eventually, perhaps, some arrangement, less than fully satisfactory to either side, but marking an improvement, on the whole, upon the *status quo*, and such as could hardly have happened with temperatures where

Good procedure not really to good outcome

depreciates role of 3rd parties and Lot

11?

G-Pol pact = PD?!

a breather, rest period

Cooling off period

PA valuable as an alternative to war - peace is the goal

11/5 dom state

PA more than avoidance of war but that's the key

and unjust, coerced, PD is still peace maintained

again Cor!

at one time they had been. Still—we won't have any bets.

So, too, one needs to take a balanced view as to the advantages of open diplomacy. Though used in several senses this term does seem to imply to some minds negotiations, as it were, in the broadcasting station. I am not one of those who deny that, so understood, open diplomacy can have any merits at all; but it is a different matter to look on it as the only respectable method. Provided an appeal to public judgment remains an effective possibility in reserve, direct negotiations, conversations *à deux*—even as between the unequally matched—are not necessarily a thing to be deplored. Here is Mr. Gathorne Hardy: "When negotiations are carried on privately, by diplomacy instead of through the League, it does not matter that the parties to the dispute, for bargaining purposes, put forward their maximum claims as a minimum. But, where they are public, with public opinion excited behind the parties, they feel that they cannot give way anywhere. The fact of making everything public increases the tension over the whole affair."

But, innocuous, even beneficial, as bilateralism may in some matters continue to prove, and congenial as it may remain to a certain type of mind, the interest in collectivism seems not yet entirely dead even among persons of influence in international public life. From now on, therefore, let us consider the subject of third-party judgment, its possibilities as a factor in peaceful change. And, for simplicity's and comfort's sake, let us avert our gaze from the confusion of the world we know, to recapture, in imagination, something of the spirit of that "glad confident

morning" when Geneva seemed the symbol of tomorrow.

Everyone will have enjoyed Dr. Lauterpacht's lecture: I am eager to insist that, with perhaps trivial reservations, I find myself in agreement with him. Yet, unless I am to omit altogether any discussion of the matter, sincerity requires me to tell you exactly what those reservations are.

Professor Robbins, you will remember, wound up on the note that, failing the creation of some such world political structure as should preclude the return to restrictionism, the field of international commercial policy seemed to him likely to remain the scene of what was essentially a war of all against all. Dr. Lauterpacht was still more specific. With him, it was all or nothing. Peaceful change—"institutional" peaceful change, as he was concerned to call it—in its proper scientific connotation, meant, and could only mean, overriding international legislation. With his courage and erudition in his hands he went, as it were, all out for the World State; and, upon my word, for one moment I really began to think he was going to get it! Remember his position. 'There is now a popular demand for peaceful change. Peaceful change means international legislation. International legislation means a World State. Therefore—there is now a popular demand for a World State.' Rather similarly, last year, some people were, perhaps unfairly, accused of saying, or implying, 'The public are pro-sanctions. Sanctions may mean war. Therefore the public are pro-war, or, at least, pro-the-risk-of-war.' Being unschooled in formal logic, I do not know if there is technically a fallacy here. It does, however, seem to me possible, for, let us say, Mussolini, and others less

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ie multilateral

clear-headed than he, to be pro-peaceful change without being seriously in favour of all that we are told it implies.

It was in reference to world organisation—and I resemble Dr. Lauterpacht in approaching the main peaceful change problem as one of international organisation, though I would hardly call it an “issue of international law”—it was *à propos* of world organisation that Mr. Leonard Woolf, no reactionary, you’ll admit, lately expressed himself thus: “The world is at present composed politically of what are called sovereign independent States. You have got to start from that fact, no matter how much Mr. Wells or anyone else may deplore it. I deplore it myself, but I propose to face it. You will not abolish the sovereign State, and all the delusions with which it is encrusted, in the next ten or fifteen years. That is the first period of time which confronts us, and that is the period of time in which I am interested. . . . Your problem is so to organise those units as to prevent war or make it extremely improbable. . . . It may be an impossible problem, given your sovereign independent States, though I can see no *a priori* or *a posteriori* reason at present for believing this. If that is true, then European civilisation is doomed irretrievably, for twenty years is much too short a time in which to abolish or effectually federalise the existing great sovereign independent States.”

Like Professor Webster, Mr. Woolf, for present purposes at any rate, would reject the idea of a World State.

One wonders, however, if Dr. Lauterpacht in this matter is altogether fair to himself. What in detail he evidently cares for is an international organ with overriding legislative competence—not, that is, or not

specifically, a formal federal link. Some expert on these things might tell us whether the Sugar Convention of thirty-five years ago did not, for a limited purpose and in a limited domain, establish an international organ with overriding legislative power. The outcome was not on that account saluted, or stigmatised, as a World State. Why does Dr. Lauterpacht want to give his sufficiently unprepossessing dog such a bad name?

If, however, I have a reservation here it is not merely because of the name with which he elects to hang his dog. And the theoretical case for his international legislature is clear enough. But what does it amount to? Of the League Council Dr. Lauterpacht expressly records that in no case has it managed to induce a powerful State to surrender, to abdicate, any of its legal rights. Very well, then, let there be a superior organ, with power to deprive the State of legal rights against its will! He will correct me if I am wrong and, I hope, forgive me if I am right, but this is how his proposition looks to me. It is as though the village parson should go to the local millionaire, and say to him, “I can quite understand the way you have always refused me five pounds when I have wanted it for various purposes connected with the church. But I have a suggestion. How about giving me your authority to draw for myself upon your banking account, for any purpose, to any amount, at any time? Then I’ll promise not to pester you any further.” That tactic, for all I know, might do the miracle in the case of the millionaire. But—with a sovereign State?

Still, I can go fully half-way to meet Dr. Lauterpacht, by admitting that, if institutional peaceful

Miscellaneous
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Quotes
Woolf on
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change is not to postulate a supreme international legislature, it may well mean a working substitute for one. What else, after all, was the Concert of Europe—except that it did not always “work”? For an efficient organ of institutional peaceful change its practice was not sufficiently regularised, institutionalised, “organ-ised”. (Or democratised either, one might add, but that no doubt is mere personal prejudice.) Though myself little given to what Professor Toynbee called *Zukunftsmusik*, I must try to make my meaning clear. Organs, then, for bringing about changes in the law; on the analogy of what, in this country, is done by the King in Parliament. This was among the questions discussed by the, then, Lord Robert Cecil, in his often-quoted speech delivered on the morrow of the Armistice.

One advantage in dwelling on the domestic analogy is that it should help to put the movement for an Equity Tribunal in a realistic light. The decisive case against any equity tribunal is not, I submit, that you cannot trust independent individuals, be they “old gentlemen” or not, to do authentic equity. The case, I believe, is that equity is not always exactly what you want. The case, conversely, if there is one, in favour of the equity tribunal is that you could perhaps contrive that the ostensibly independent gentlemen, suitably advised, might, in the name of equity, in fact deliver something rather different.

Consider any parliamentary régime. On what principle does it move in effecting peaceful changes in the law? Not equity, as such. The criterion accepted, and exalted—the principle enthroned—by parliamentarism is not simply equity. Rather—it is numerical superiority—the Divine Right, as some have called

it, of majorities. A realistic study of the process should state itself in terms not so much of rights and remedies, as of pressure-groups and social forces. The national constitution which affords too little scope for the operation of living social forces may itself present a problem of peaceful change. The difference between the prevention, internationally, of war, and the avoidance, in certain countries, of revolution seems, in truth, to be one of degree rather than of kind.

Concern for justice, remember, is itself an important, sometimes a dominant, social force; but it has to take its chance along with the rest. That a change should be heralded as happening in the name of justice does not in itself exclude the possibility that, in reality, it has been adopted in the interests essentially of peace. The grant to Southern Ireland, of Dominion status in 1922; to the Transvaal of responsible government in 1906; to India of substantial self-government to-day; call them measures of justice if you prefer to; but I submit that it was their virtual inevitability rather than their intrinsic justice which will have rendered their enactment a matter of elementary common sense.

So, unless we can define Equity as Whatsoever shall by Parliament be deemed just and proper, we had better think in relation at least to “domestic” peaceful change, of the play of social forces, as such, rather than of the inherent validity of ethical considerations as such.

Those words—“deemed just and proper”—you will recognise as borrowed from Article 15 of the Covenant, which was so appositely noticed by Dr. Lauterpacht among the existing avenues of approach to peaceful change. Though officially applicable only to cases of

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Domestically
social forces
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acute tension, and productive of nothing that is formally binding on the parties, this article—it seems to me—has the truth of the matter in its soul. In particular, just as parliamentary legislation may be based on the report of a Royal Commission, so may the Council or Assembly in formulating its corporate views avail itself in practice of the assistance of suitably experienced men. If the recommendations of a Lytton Commission are ever in a given case adopted, they will be presented to history not, literally, as being “just” but as being “deemed just and proper.” Let us not overlook the distinction. With more experience of action under Article 15 we might be better able to appreciate its point.

As for the reason why we have not had more such experience presumably Dr. Lauterpacht's words concerning Article 19 will apply equally here. The activist powers have had little inducement to invoke the Covenant. More was to be got by other methods. If regular recourse is to be had to collectivist machinery, this must operate in association with something in the nature of a security system. Even as the institutions of civil society might not function as they do were it not for the unseen power of coercion in the background, so it presumably is in a world where alternative courses promised too little that use would most readily be made of collective methods.

Observe that the converse proposition may also convey an aspect of the truth. The absence of any real possibility of reasonable change, by peaceful methods, of a given *status quo* may make for serious hesitation in the minds of bystander powers when invited to guarantee that situation against changes to be brought about by war. Your scheme of collec-

tive security had better not lay itself open to the charge of tending to make the world safe for the diplomacy of provocation.

What, then, you may be asking, is to be done to ensure acceptance, by the aforesaid method, of specific peaceful changes? Were we not reminded that the recommendations formulated under Article 15 were empty of binding effect? It was with reference to the corresponding difficulty anticipated as liable to impede the attempted operation of Article 19 that Lord Robert Cecil, at Paris, suggested provision for a kind of negative sanction. His idea, as recently re-stated by Sir Arthur Salter, was as follows: “Granting that you could get a recommendation of change, the means of enforcing it would be that a country which then refused to give effect to the League's recommendation for a change in the *status quo* should thereby be deprived of its right to protection under the Covenant against a resulting war.”

Dr. Lauterpacht, while asking that the League's proposals for change be given a formally binding character, recognises also that some method of coercive enforcement might in practice be required. Failing collective steps in this direction—and he does not assume that these are likely to occur—he mentions, you'll remember, a possible return to Lord Cecil's idea.

Sir Arthur Salter goes on to acknowledge that the suggested system will be more useful to the strong power seeking changes against the wishes of a weaker, than in the converse case. But at least, he points out, the small country “would have a chance of having its grievances discussed which it has not got at present” (for his idea is that the League will have evolved

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some settled technique of giving advice under Article 19). The fact, he goes on, that the small State "would lose its present merely formal right to protection in cases where as everyone knows that protection can at best be a broken reed . . . would be offset by the fact that in a case where it is subjected to absolutely unjustifiable aggression it will have a far better chance of securing really effective protection than it has at present."

It is hard, perhaps, to imagine the presently discontented countries getting anything like full satisfaction by such methods as these. Even with Dr. Lauterpacht the League's recommendations, in order to be binding, are to need the votes of an almost unanimous Assembly. And—no doubt fortunately—the States with an interest in making precedents for large-scale peaceful change are still far from forming a majority in that international body. Nevertheless, in the more explosively urgent cases, it may be assumed that the Assembly might bring itself to action, if only on a temperate scale. Besides, in all these schemes, these exercises in *Zukunftsmusik*, I suppose one is rather thinking of the sort of world we had, or imagined we had, in, shall we say, the later "twenties"? It might have taken less to give substantial satisfaction to Germany then than now. So, at least, some savants have surmised. Furthermore it is idle to suppose that by any imaginable series of changes a position would result in which no one any longer would have any colourable cause to complain. Peaceful change for the realisation of all-round contentment may surely be regarded, and therefore disregarded, as an unattainable ideal. On the other hand the accomplishment of even a relatively minor change, as the tangible

result of a new-style institutional procedure, might prove to have a symbolic virtue, in the moral and psychological sphere, out of all proportion to the *de facto* dimensions of the change. Until there has been some experience in the matter no one can speak with assurance of what that effect would be.

As an improvement, possibly, on Sir Arthur Salter's system, it may be suggested that the changes foreseen as the outcome, or sequel, of proceedings under Article 19, might in some instances be thereafter embodied in recommendations formally voted under the earlier clause. This might happen even where, for want of a few marginal votes, an "advice" generally recognised as expedient had failed of technical adoption under Article 19. Something in the nature of a ritual quarrel would possibly need to be picked—for Article 15 is concerned, as we saw, only with disputes described as "likely to lead to a rupture". That, however, should be simple enough. If your adversary flouts a widely endorsed invitation to consider changes in your favour, you will have at least a pretext for seeming annoyed. Nor, I suggest, could his attitude towards such an invitation very hopefully be pleaded as a matter "of domestic jurisdiction". And thus, in case of continued resistance on his part, that situation will occur in which, so far as the Covenant is concerned, you, as the plaintiff power, will be at liberty to use, or to threaten, extreme measures. This process, you will notice, involves no amendment, or new interpretation, of the Covenant. It would appear to be an application of that instrument as it stands.

A complication common to all these enforcement schemes is that the legal position is no longer exactly what it was expected to be at the time when Article 15

now!

unlikely to satisfy these states

all these projections assume a world of the late 1920s

can't satisfy anyone

Small achievement would be psychologically power.

M the incrementalist again

M suggests formal voting of recommendations under 15

make PD article subord. to threat to the peace w/ thy. subject of enforcement

was framed. "Under the Covenant," says Lord Lothian, "in the event of a nation having gone through that procedure and having got no redress it was entitled to go to war unless the other side accepted the report of the Council. The reason for that was that the framers of the Covenant felt that, without that kind of pressure, you would never get any alteration of the *status quo*. You either had to put behind Article 19 the coercive powers which now are behind Article 16, or you had to allow the individual nation to bring these coercive powers to bear. What has happened since is that the hatred of war has grown and has been stimulated by the Kellogg Pact, and resort to war has become the central crime. That is not the Covenant at all. I have always thought that the strength of the Covenant in its original form was that it did permit some pressure whereby changes could be made."

You see, the Kellogg Pact, on the face of it at any rate, would seem to exclude the employment of war even by a State successful in proceedings under Article 15. A possible answer—for what it may be worth, and, frankly, I do not much care for it—is that if, in the Council's, or Assembly's, recommendation, forceful measures, "measures of all kinds", were expressly indicated as proper to be used in the case we have in mind, it could almost be argued, without amounting to "diplomatic sleight of hand", that military measures thereafter initiated would constitute a use of war "as an instrument" not of "national", but of international, policy.

How far any such system—when it worked at all—would work in the interests as well of justice as of peace, would plainly to some extent depend on whether

the generality of States were, or were not, disposed, in a test case, and merely for principle's sake, to stand up to a Mussolini. Nor is there any assurance that where justice only, and not peace, was in issue, a system of this sort would work at all. Are you quite certain that there is such a thing as 'world public opinion,' or 'the conscience of mankind'? The ideally equitable system of international legislation, or quasi-legislation—as of domestic legislation—is probably a long way off. As a universal dictator, with Justice as your theme, where would you begin? Whose wrongs would you first redress? Would they be those of any European nation at all? If injustice, internationally, has occurred in recent times, Europe has had no monopoly of it. After all peaceful change in the interests simply of justice is an independent problem. We must study it—some day.

Ours is an imperfect world: not all past wrongs get righted, even in the "municipal" field. Internationally the first concern perhaps should be to avert the perpetration of too much fresh injustice in the future. Even for this restricted purpose, platonic indignation will not be enough. The friends of righteousness will want to have not the disposition merely, but the means, for influential diplomacy. The measure in which equity, or the needs of the natives, or any other noble cause, might have to be waived, as a modern form of Danegeld, would in part depend on the balance of effective power as between the "collectivist" and, let us call them the "expansionist," States. At one end of the scale of possibilities you may confirm Professor Mowat's dictum: "It is obvious that if most Peoples or States not only desire peace but would rather make substantial concessions than allow the peace to be

doesn't think this system would work - UN?

ingement + order concern

war + war mkg needed by those aiming for noble ends

In a peaceful world worklike state get what they want

No such thing

M vs. Kellogg Pact + why

peaceful process used to have threat of war in resolve what L.O.N. promised this no longer is the case because of Kellogg Pact

because it conflicts w/ use of force under a 15

He doesn't like the idea of Council/Assembly recommending as way for war w/ not national policy

isn't this what Ch. 7 does?

broken, then any nation which is willing to make war will have an enormous advantage over the rest."

Whereas, given, in appropriate places, a big enough instalment of physical, and above all of moral, re-armament, there might in time be reached a point at which, in the administration of institutional peaceful change, the proposals of even the most dynamic "duce" could be treated more truly on their merits.

That "steel framework of law and order" seems still rather far from realisation. The predominance of the "conservative" Powers over the potential exponents of violent change is less patent than it could be—particularly on the moral side. Towards material re-armament steps are now in process of fulfilment. Britain, it is true, is not yet back to margarine, but there is no knowing. Bad butter, someone will surely have said, drives out good.

A modest enough programme this, from the idealistic point of view. Founded on the existing Covenant—with its prejudice in favour of Peace—this institutional technique cannot at the same time be expected to do much, in a positive way, to facilitate the "good life", whether by the systematic righting of ancient wrongs, or by the planned enhancement of general welfare. For rushing through a radical redistribution of the assets of the earth you and I could doubtless devise a more effective world machinery—on paper at all events—than any we have so far considered. The chance of drawing the charter for a real-life league of nations does not, however, very often occur. Moreover, even if the Allies could have their time over again; even were they once more back in 1919, though versed in the lessons of what has happened since; even so, while I fancy their treaty would in some ways

Moral + physical re-armament critical to dealing with the "duce" on his merits

vs. idealism, modesty

Summary of his notion

redrawing the world map + doubts Council could be improved upon

be more propitiously worded, I doubt if, in their covenant, they would get very much nearer to international legislation than they did in Article 19—unless, that is, they should resolve to institute, not a mere "league of nations", but a full-blown federation of the world.

Is it then considered that the outlook for an enduring peace will have been hopeless from the start? We need not put it quite like that. Had the Treaty itself been freer of what Smuts at the time called "pinpricks"; had the bearing of the victors towards the Germany of Weimar been less suggestive of studied discourtesy; had the peace-makers, in planning the map, looked also to the atmosphere of post-war Europe, the sequel surely will in some ways have been different. Too easy, of course, to put down all the trouble to the atmosphere, and leave it at that. Yet may one not with justice maintain that, in the appreciation of international issues, this element is commonly left out of account? A "gadget" for controlling the atmosphere of international politics would simplify, if it did not eliminate, the problem, as a problem, of peaceful change. It is because, in direct negotiations through the diplomatic channel, the atmosphere is sometimes less litigious than in proceedings, even "conciliation" proceedings, at Geneva, that I surmise the bilateral method may occasionally give the better results—in the unfederated world of to-day. At any rate, whether you please or not, it looks like remaining the normal method. The Council and Assembly, let us hope, will be ever in reserve, to take stock, if not control, of the debate in the unhappy event of its becoming effectively "likely to lead to a rupture".

peace not hopeless bec treatment of Weimar could be better + division of nations in Europe also

bilateral > multilateral bec less litigious

w/ LoN "in reserve"

Probably we most of us have our personal mental pictures of an international society in enjoyment of more or less permanent peace. To some, it may be—as to Moltke—the prospect, in any case a dream, will be “not even a beautiful dream”. Of the many, however, who, had they their choice, would favour the obsolescence of war, some, I suspect, have a vision of a parklike vista with hardly any movement at all. Others, while allowing the inevitability of change, believe, I imagine, in the possibility of that perennial process being informed all along by an ideal of abstract justice. My own conception is different. The preponderance of prospective opposition to lawless violence is such that expansionism, where well inspired, proceeds as a matter of preference by “constitutional” paths. At the same time, in the philosophy fashionable with the “sated” powers, the case for change is understood in terms not of abstract justice—or vested rights—but of realism, compromise, and common sense. Lastly, and in relation, partly as cause, partly as effect, to those first conditions, the diplomatic climate of this dreamed-of world is warmed with what in the City it seems is known as Confidence. The Society of States is justifying its alternative appellation as an International Family.

In the less idyllic world that we are living in to-day, the lecturer, as you will have appreciated, knows next to nothing about the future of peaceful change. Our—that is, *the*—problem has yet to be fitted with a key.

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