

SOCIAL COSMOLOGY—ITS PROBLEMS, PROCEDURES AND PLACE

The Non-attainability of the Indispensable

More than once already in the course of this essay reliance has been put upon the metaphor of the thinking-cap. One and the same head may be at home in several sorts of world, thinking in several academic languages and manipulating as many different systems of esoteric ideas—provided there be at its disposal the necessary assortment of caps. Even your law-student may need a change of cap when migrating from a case in the King's Bench to one in the Chancery Division of the High Court. As a metaphor, the cap can be even more convenient than is the bag of tools.

To say then of International Law that its study required a special cap was not to say anything very startling. For such is the way with whatever branch of law one may care to name. All of us are accustomed to encountering, if not to wearing, those legal caps. But what of this other one, the cap required for the study of International Relations? Not quite so familiar, this distinctive piece of headgear. And not quite so typical either, of what your specialiser's cap can be. For, unlike so many another specialisation, International Relations is not the study of an 'aspect'. Its business is, as we saw, with life, life in its concrete complexity, its multi-dimensional variety, and, above all and more particularly, in its many-levelled, imagination-taxing, depth.

The Status-seeker States

In the eyes of formal diplomatic theory what occurs internationally happens as among the members of a 'social' category, the category of the sovereign states. And, for seeing what so happens as happening simply so, a certain sort of

lenses may be worn. In the sight on the other hand of the social analysis which looks behind the formulas in force to the forces in operation, the picture is less clear-cut. And, for seeing just how other than clear-cut, the need is for another sort of lens. Or, to revert to the earlier metaphor, another shape of thinking-cap. With our study of diplomatic theory we cannot think to dispense. For that theory provides the formal framework within which the world-wide play and cross-play and counter-play of social energies works itself out. But, for the sources of those energies, it is necessary to look, and this through different lenses, elsewhere.

Structure and Sub-structure

The difference should thus be appreciated between the thinking-caps respectively of formal-structure study, and of social dynamics proper. In terms of formal-structure study the social universe is essentially a compresence of sovereign states, equal in their sovereignty and, as some would add, sovereign in their equality. But in terms of social dynamics it is indefinitely more complicated than that. There are so many more social organisms in the human universe than are dreamed of in the philosophy of the student merely of formal structure, the student, that is, of the lily-bedecked surfaces of the ponds. In particular, besides the states, there are the peoples, and the people, and the groups, the organisations, and the associations not yet articulated for effective action. All these go to compose a world whose full complexity it would be difficult to reflect in a helpfully simplified chart.

It is not just a partial, or superficial, but a total view that International Relations, as a subject, has to strive for, of the real-life situations that are its *raison d'être*. Because it is real-life situations that have to be assessed, situations as they actually come about—this is why a deliberate training of the mind for their eventual less inadequate appreciation is so desirable and so difficult to provide. Not of course that any man's capacity for this can ever be fully sufficient. Men have to do what they can with the means, and mental equipment, at their disposal. Even were it to be suggested that Sociology could leave psychology to others, it is certain that Strategics—based on the logistics of the mobility of armies—depends in

vital part upon the logistics of the mobility of men. And it is no less certain that Diplomats, a study indeed of state behaviour, involves study of the behaviour, with its manifold motivations and in its varying contexts, of men. Men, groups, nations, organisations, governments—all must be included in the picture—as intrinsic to the study of what is done, that is, deemed to be done, done, that is, notionally, by states. The question is not just whether a special thinking cap is called for, but whether it is producible—and, if produced, whether there will be anyone found worthy to wear it.

What the novice should be interested to develop, and his friends to see him do so, are (a) his familiarity with the milieu in which diplomatic situations occur; (b) his synoptic eye for the essentials of the particular situation, state-behaviour in the face of which it will be his concern to observe and understand; and (c) his capacities as a connoisseur of world-political gamesmanship. Given these as his desiderata, to what sort of a processing should he as a beginner be exposed?

Keeping Up with the Economists

Consider first what Economics is about. 'Out there': a multiplicity of processes and situations classifiable into types, and inviting analysis with a view to the formulating of 'laws' in the light of which that analysis may the more effectively be further prosecuted with a view to the formulating of further such 'laws'. Economics is a bag of intellectual tools, the employment of which has as a by-product the adding from time to time of further tools to the bag.

Consider next what International Politics, as pioneered in some very important centres, is conceived to be about. 'Out there': once again a multiplicity of situations and processes classifiable, presumably, into types, and inviting analysis. International Politics thus similarly aspires to become a bag of tools, in the use of which new tools may from time to time be added to the bag. Of the social utility of such an academic development there should presumably be no question. It would almost be sufficiently attested by the mere readiness of so many gifted scholars to engage in its pursuit.

Not Keeping Up with Anybody

Consider, however, thirdly, the subject with which we here are avowedly by contrast concerned. 'Out there': the social universe, mankind as a whole conceived of as embryonically a single society and recognised as organisationally one already in certain important theoretical aspects, aspects well understood by many—so well indeed that they might find it difficult to find a common language in which to bring knowledge of it to those still radically uninformed: and, on the other hand, the uninformed who might well wish to be better aware of those background conditions against which any stand they may at some time have to make on social, economic, political, or diplomatic, issues will most propitiously be determined.

Maps and Maps

A map showing the London bus routes and the layout of the underground railway system may be of great value, for certain purposes, to someone whose aim it is to become an authority on London; but not for all the purposes with which he will be exploring his field. (No use to tell him that the tube-map will give him all that he need wish to know.) The tube-map is a simplification, and a salutary one, of what could be a most complicated picture. As a substitute for the picture of London as she really is, it does not suffice. And, were the student of international relations to be presented at the outset with the equivalent of the London tube-map, with the assurance that it will be of help to him, he would need equally to accept this with the appropriate reservations. He should equally be unwilling to spare himself a study of his subject-matter as it really is. What the tube-map in effect tells the visitor is that, for certain purposes, it is *as if* London were as it suggests. And for those purposes he does well enough to proceed as if she really were. But he will not suppose that for other purposes he can safely so proceed. And so the student of society can with advantage proceed, for certain purposes, as if the abstract picture that Economics provides were indeed the full truth of things as they concretely are. But, for the full understanding which he desires of things as actually they are, *can* the student of International Relations expect to be supplied with a serviceable

simplification? Is there for him any such short cut to an appreciation of reality as it is?

Rocket-borne Researchers and Pedestrian You and Me.

A great deal of high-grade thinking has nevertheless been in recent years directed towards the development of what for the student of International Relations could serve as the same sort of conceptual outfit, apparatus of ideas, or bag of intellectual tools and techniques as Economic Theory does for the practitioner in Economics. And impressive results have already been so achieved. Impressive, and of value. But, of value to whom? To practitioners, shall we infer, in the International Relations workshop? To researchers in particular, it is claimed. And, if by researchers one may understand persons having the purposes and the qualifications that make this true, well, true then it is. But the beginner has neither the qualifications nor the purposes here in question. His qualifications are in principle minimal, and his immediate purpose must rather be to become familiar, as by acquaintance, with the field in which no doubt he may some day be qualified to do fruitful research. And that field is of course the social universe.

Who, for the purpose of becoming familiar by acquaintance with village, or university, or family, life, would ask merely to be provided with a specialised conceptual outfit, apparatus of ideas, or bag of intellectual tools? Who would not rather demand to be told in words of one syllable, and, better, to be shown at first hand, what it was like to be personally a participant in the life that he was anxious to understand?

Meet the Family!

Malinowski it was who set his fellow-anthropologists the example that so many have since been content to follow. To understand his islanders he elected to reside among them for long enough to appreciate their way of life as a whole; and his resulting report was as much descriptive as analytic of the life he had so observed. Let the student of International Relations think then of the international society as Malinowski did of his Trobrianders, and be content with nothing other than whatever may prove to be the nearest practicable approach to

a personal participation—in the role, as it were, of a sovereign state—in the life of the international family. One can point to many roles which it might be difficult, in imagination, to assume. What for instance would it feel like to be a prima donna, or a witch-doctor, or a space-man, or a fugitive from justice, or a trout in a stream? Yet all these exercises in empathy would be easy as compared with the veritable impossibility of playing, in imagination, the part of a state. The part, that is, of a member of the society of states. Yet this in a sense is what one had better be trying to do. A far far better thing it is, in this connection, to have tried, and inevitably failed, than never to have tried at all.

Of life as lived in the village, the factory, the college, the family, mankind has had ample experience: yet always the tyro must seek it anew. No set of diagrams will give him a 'knowledge by acquaintance' of, for example, village life. No rule of thumb will furnish solutions ready-made for the problems to be tackled. Yet the fact is that in respect of these, as of all other, aspects of life there is always something that, from those of more experience, those of less experience should be able to learn. There was much that, on his return to what we call 'civilization', Malinowski was able to teach, about the Trobrianders, to those who came to sit at his feet. If they could not all be shown at first hand what it was like to live that island life, they could at least be told in words of one syllable something of what had been revealed to him. The recruit who has not yet been near the battlefield may learn much that, when his own moment comes, will make it the less unintelligible, from the veteran in whom are joined a gift of description and a love of truth. Teaching is the art of the communicable. Great teachers are great artists, as rare as are the great ones in any other branch of art. But the ideal for them to aim at may with some confidence be defined. Whether it be Social Anthropology, and the topic life as lived on a given island, or International Relations with its focus on the life of the family of sovereign states, two elements seem indispensable in one who would convey to others that sort of knowledge-by-vicarious-personal-acquaintance which, until himself sent on active service, is all that the young soldier can aspire to. The teacher must have been at pains to win for

himself that kind of appreciation of his subject-matter which is accumulated not rapidly but over the years; and further, he must covet the genius of a Zimmern for making his subject come alive for those still at the gateway into the garden in which he for so long has walked, and watched, and talked and thought. The well-taught beginner is the one who is coming to have that connoisseurship, that 'feel' for his subject, that orientation in his field, which an Alfred Zimmern, or an Ernest Barker, had the power to impart. Great teachers indeed are few. Those who may have in them the makings of great teachers should at least be referred to such examples as these ones from the past. Admittedly neither Barker nor Zimmern had himself been able to sense at first hand the life of ancient Greece. Malinowski had the advantage of them there. Yet, as readers of *The Greek Commonwealth* will testify, it was almost as if Zimmern at any rate had been there himself. And, when Zimmern transferred his interest to the world of his own day, it was in much the same spirit that he furnished himself for his pioneering service in a field whose importance and whose possibilities he was so successfully to show. What fortune for those generations of grateful young men that it seems never to have occurred to him to try to make his subject look like economic theory.

The Disease of Terminological Orthodoxy

The conceptual toolbag of theoretical economics is in principle largely standardised. It is as it were a Queen's English which all aspiring economists must begin by learning to talk, just as all young geometers must acquire the language of triangles and squares. As the virtuoso, for instance a poet, may from time to time enrich mankind by taking idiosyncratic liberties with the language, so will the pioneer economic thinker introduce new concepts into the equipment of the researcher in his field. It is as yet too early to assume that political science, or even sociology, will ever rival economics in the degree of its resemblance to geometry in this regard, even could we take it as selfevidently desirable that it should. And, as for International Relations, the issue here is still as open as the sky. As yet there is nobody whose favourite set of concepts need be accepted as the only 'correct' one. Even when one elects to think about International Relations on the analogy

of a game, one has not thereby committed oneself to a single model, pseudo-chess, or pseudo-cricket, or what have you.

When people speak of the chessboard of diplomacy or the diplomatic poker table, one may see the point of their language without assuming that a thorough knowledge of either game would constitute an all-sufficient clue to the dynamics of international conflict. He who speaks of the chessboard says no more than that diplomatics is in interesting respects like chess: and this is a useful insight to impart. Yet it can at the same time, in other respects, be like horse-trading, like poker, like war. Each of these analogies may have its value.

The Perils of Premature Conceptualisation

Indeed the most illuminating thing about the game-analogy is that there are so many games to which in turn one may with benefit point. Cricket, of course, is always with us. Here, as equally in football, the relevant thinking is performed upon the actual field of play: whereas in chess the players are in a sense above the battlefield. Poker again is another perennial standby, particularly in that here a plurality of participants play each for his own hand instead of being aligned in one or the other of two competing camps.

What is particularly suggestive about chess is that, while treating an opponent's king with respectful forbearance, capturing his supporters one by one, the object is to get him at a hopeless disadvantage and then to claim the victory. It would perhaps be hard to think of a game which exemplifies the kaleidoscopic series of temporary groupings that occur among the participants in diplomacy. Some such game may very well exist, however.

Meanwhile, we may notice that at some points diplomacy is primarily 'additional', as is football, each side from time to time adding something to its score; at others, 'attritional', as in draughts, the object being to erode the opponent's patrimony even though not thereby adding to one's own; at others again, sheerly 'acquisitional', the kind of beggar-my-neighbour process which is officially the communist interpretation of world history; at others it is, as in association football and above all in chess, primarily 'positional', wherein it shows its peculiar affinity also with war. In the present phase of the

game the most revealing model must at least include some sort of a jackpot to represent the uncommitted areas of the world.

Acknowledgment of Debt

There thus is room in the thinking of the enterprising observer for all these and other analogies, as well as for any non-game-like models that the newest recruit to the army of the analysts may propose. No one who has not considered the contributions of Snyder, Deutsch, Kaplan, the Sprouts, and not least of Quincy Wright, to this side of the subject can have any just appreciation of its exhilarating possibilities. We all owe much to them already and may live to owe more. And anyhow, for the still impenitent practitioner and defender of the natural-history, idiographic, descriptive, ostensive, portrait-painting treatment, who else might feel threatened by the numbers and the spectacular feats of the conceptualisers, there is after all a certain safety in the very variety of their masterpieces: for no single one of these can possibly be the right one, if that has to mean that all the others must be wrong. Perhaps it will have been after acquainting himself with the prospects of the international relations discipline that the Chinese dictator coined his celebrated metaphor of the garden wherein so rich a diversity of blooms could be permitted to flourish side by side.

Existentialist Diplomats or Rule of Thumb

Let the free world not think to demonstrate its freedom by emulating the Chinese dictator in his subsequent relapse into the obscurantism of his Kremlin prototype. If there is indeed any single 'correct solution', let that be left to reveal itself under the tests of accumulating experience, as in the natural sciences would surely be the case. And meanwhile let the student keep an open mind, admiring the admirable, availing himself of the useful, and exploring the novel, in all their forms. Let him recollect that no formal listing on the age-height-colour-of-eyes pattern can really do duty for a knowledge-by-acquaintance of a man, and that no conceptual model of the game in question can give the beginner that 'feel' for the distinctive character whether of chess, or bridge, or halma, or poker, which comes to him from the moment of his first involvement in the actual playing of the game. Only the man who

has, as it were, savoured diplomacy as from within can appreciate the full validity of the dictum that, in foreign policy, every move is 'a step in the dark' (and a step, one might add, upon a winding path with a minefield or a precipice upon either hand). The historian and cosy commentator can always tell us on which horse a government ought to have placed its bet, once the race has been run. What practitioners have to do is however to assess, on the past form of each of them individually, the chances of an assortment of probable runners in a race only now about to start. Or, changing the model, to make, however agonisingly, a succession of reappraisals of the outlook in the light always of the momentary passing state of the global game. Intimacy with the basic realities of the world situation in its currently evolving condition: this, rather than familiarity with a diagram, is what the statesman, and those who assume to judge him, pre-eminently require.

Before one can hope to understand, at any moment, the world situation, one must first, within the limits, of course, of one's single lifetime, have striven to understand the world: the human world, that is; in short, the single society of all mankind. One must, shall we say, have gone in for quasi-sociology on a global scale.

No Holds Barred

And if mankind is indeed conceived as a single society, and if Sociology is seen as the study of society as such, then the study of mankind comprehensively, the study, that is, of the human universe, admits just about as readily, perhaps, of being described as global Sociology as in any other way. Hardly less well, for instance, than as Social Cosmology, or as Metadiplomats, or as the Structure of International Society, or as Prolegomena to the Study of World Affairs. Yet each of these designations has something to commend it. More important than our choice of any one such label is our appreciation of the appositeness, in their several ways, of them all. But perhaps Social Cosmology should, after all, be conceded a special 'just-rightness' of its own. For a study of world affairs which was not prepared for by an overall examination of the layout of the social cosmos would be a precarious enterprise. Yet even this assertion could, if preferred, be differently verbalised. A

study, that is, of diplomacy not grounded in Diplomats, or of Diplomats not founded on that 'meta' subject which, to Diplomats, is as to Linguistics is 'meta-linguistics', would be like the study of cloud formations unrelated to any knowledge of the physical composition of clouds.

There thus seem to be labels enough to cater for all the tastes. Even Global Social Dynamics is understood to have its friends. And, for this, incidentally, the abbreviation G.S.D. has a mnemonic advantage: for it can remind us, quite seriously, of how the truth to which Marx pointed could be but a half-truth only, since the reality of social coexistence was so much more than a mere matter of L.S.D.! Even the one-sided social dynamics of Marx was in principle, global enough, in the particular sense that it prefigured a future for the workers of all the world. But global in another sense it could not have claimed to be: namely, as according their full importance to the multifarious factors that in social life, as lived and experienced, condition the doings of men.

It is not however sufficient merely to have perceived that the economic factor, even were it the most important of all, would still be only one among many important factors. For one might still be challenged to offer some alternative interpretation, more plausible than was Marx's, for what Marx had been purporting to explain. Global Social Dynamics, with its interdisciplinary blinkers discarded, is global in our second sense as well, namely, in comprehending what are loosely described as the various 'approaches', studies of the several 'facets' that severally expose themselves to those investigating their subject-matter from the several significant angles. But the 'approaches' metaphor, with the companion image of the 'facets', still does less than justice to the nature of that which is to be approached. For, in its planetary dimension, the collective life of social man is not just diamond-like, a thing with facets. It also is pudding-like, a compound of ingredients; not to say skein-like, a tangle of threads; and weather-like, the resolution of a complex of inter-acting forces; and battle-like, the occasion of a matching of nerves and skills with nerves and skills—with the difference however in this last case that of those engaged, whether as brass-hats or as rank and file, some seem not as yet fully awake even to the very existence of a state of war. Who

knows if it might not be different had at least the livelier among them been more infected with social cosmology in their cadet-school days? For so might they the better have known what might be coming to them and the more correctly have appraised it when it came.

Academic Affinities

Social Cosmology, as here understood, is, however, simply not in a category, either with applied economics or with policy-science politics or with any other species of applied, or policy-, science. In fact it is not, limitatively, a science at all; but a branch, rather, of humanistic-cum-scientific study. In so far of course as it is indeed in principle scientific, it is a form of 'fundamental' science, the analogue of elementary physics. Its most obvious cousin perhaps is cosmology proper (if we may understand this as scientific and philosophical, not theological, in its viewpoint). Ecology and oceanography are other near relations. But these are still none of them quite so closely akin to it as is that sort of Social Anthropology for which we have here been thanking Malinowski. For, as we saw, the social cosmologist has need to focus on the way of life obtaining in a specific milieu; that, namely, in which the units are the sovereign states. In so doing, it is true that he may incidentally discover new reasons why some suggested remedy for some regretted condition might or might not be likely to succeed. Without, that is, formally presenting itself as a policy science, social cosmology may, in passing, animadvert upon the technical adequacy of given nostrums. At the same time, as already indicated, it will not even aspire to be exclusively scientific. The probing of presuppositions, the evaluating of ends, the weighing of issues, the elucidating of concepts—all philosophical rather than restrictively scientific undertakings—will in principle also have their place within it, though so far only as may appear germane to the student's understanding of the cosmos as it is. Within that cosmos, men, groups, organisations, are everlastingly astir, their activity contributing to the universal movement of events, and this all the time in the light of premises and preconceptions failing an appreciation of which their behaviour can be but imperfectly understood. For the student's concern is essentially with life in its

wholeness, and on this science, as such, can have little to say.

Even so, there remains an important difference between the empathy without which the logic of men's behaviour cannot be sensed, and the sympathy which involves the student himself in the situation he is seeking to appraise. Men's behaviour, with their premises and preconceptions, is a part of his subject-matter: his sympathies are privately his. And then he should know to keep under control. The difference, from his insight-seeking standpoint, between the several possibilities, may be suggested by means of the simile of the traveller and the maps. Three would-be tourist-visitors call at some agency abroad. Says the first: What tours in Britain do you recommend? Says the second: Maps, please, of routes to the north. And the third: A good road map, please, of Britain. Which does the student demand? To be told what he should want and work for? To be given the know-how for the promoting of a particular end? Or, to become so apprised of the layout of the country that he may pick out for himself his route to wherever he may choose to make for? So far as space-travel is, for instance, concerned, all that traditional astronomy seems to offer is this last. It neither discusses the relative attractiveness of Venus and of Mars, nor does it say how to get to the Moon. Yet astronomy too has its uses. And so, similarly, has a *wertfrei* Social Cosmology.

Thus, while, where fitting, this subject will seek to be scientific, where appropriate, it will remain frankly philosophical. Linguistic analysis, philosophical anthropology, and, in general, the philosophy of the social sciences—these are all of them lines of intellectual enterprise which the teacher, at least, of Social Cosmology must see as his own. For how without them can he hope to provide the student with the kind of road-map that he requires?

Not by Figures Alone

Will the travel-agency then say nothing whatever about the probable weather? Like the rest of us, the teacher too will have his forebodings and his hopes. But to hope for fine weather is not to foreshadow its coming. In the matter of forecasting, the proof of the product is in the sequel. If, whether in terms

of esoterically meteorological concepts or of the notions of the man in the street, and whether or not with a computer for doing the sums, the deliverances of the weather bureau are often enough borne out by the morrow's conditions, then the place will be earning its keep. If, comparably, business forecasting gives degrees of probability that are worth their price, then more scope, we shall say, to its exponents. But even had those gentlemen more to show than yet they have, it would still be appropriate to keep an open mind on the likelihood of there coming to be developed anything analogous for probing the possible future of international affairs. (An open mind: not, that is, a mind prematurely closed against it.) There are, it is true, games and games. But has anyone successfully employed a computer for his operations in the pools? Those at any rate who see the similarities between Diplomats and, for instance, cricket may need a lot of convincing that the outcome of an impending 'Berlin' showdown ought by scientific methods to be already even only approximately predictable, when the summit season is still only about to begin.

Time for a Break

Some of which may make this new-fangled subject sound not a little alarming—a discipline indeed! And perhaps rather grim. Has then the student to abjure altogether his modicum of reasonable relaxation, to forgo all kindly commerce with those, his friends, whose furrows run in other fields? Not so. A man first, a scientist only incidentally, let him live life at least to the two-thirds full, part humanly social, part, but part only, analytically austere. In situations where, among those otherwise biologically mature, the combustibilities of world politics are being ventilated as in terms of fools and knaves,¹ he may, with good-humoured abandon and mock-irresponsibility, acquiesce, and even share, in the general punt-about, reserving for worthier opportunities such shafts of insight as may have resulted from his broodings on things as they so very much less simply are. His warrant for his so

¹ One recalls the air with which, at such a session, someone by no means a nobody dismissed a state of international tension as due simply to the fact of Mr. John Foster Dulles being 'just an awfully stupid man!'

condescending will be his recognition that some topics are too serious for serious treatment in a not sufficiently serious vein. He cannot be the paragon of sobriety all the time. His poise and personality might be the worse of it if he were. But at the proper moments, in the right company, and on suitable issues, he will be only too prompt to expose his whole socio-cosmological hand. For so may he hope to elicit the reactions of those who, in other caps and from other angles, can shock him into the further thinking that his interpretations require.

Things to be Thinking About

Further thinking, for that after all is what, on the world's great issues, is, as always, needed today. Given that nine out of ten are by commitment to parochial perspectives precluded from even aspiring to the global vision of affairs, it is all the more incumbent on the social cosmologist, pretentious, on his part, though it may seem, to pursue as if on everyone's behalf his explorings of social outer space. And, since in the nature of things he must do this so largely on his own, he had better be fully aware of just what it is that he is at. In particular he should be mindful of how his inquiries may differ from those of many others. Only a bold man would, as from the outside, assume to say what in detail Political Science must presumably be about; and it will not be attempted here. But, if of, say, economics it can with propriety be stated that it focuses on a particular aspect of life among men, then of International Relations it has by contrast to be insisted that its concern is with something more. As we have seen, its business is with the totality, and not with an aspect merely, of life among the states. And thinking about life in its wholeness, whether the life of states or of men, calls for a multi-angular approach not needed for the study of an aspect only, even of the life of men. And the thinking which social cosmology requires is multi-disciplinary too. For it must needs consider, in their respective idioms, questions that variously arise on the several analytically distinguishable aspects of the single subject-matter of its concern. And with respect, moreover, to its different levels.

'I Tell You, It's Only a Game!'

The cosmologist must indeed be conscious of the independence and interdependence of the various levels, and relate his thinking to them all. He will be aware too, even within himself, of the disharmonies that declare themselves between man as moralist, as analyst and as politician; and not ask it of anyone that, in his capacity as politician, he be other than partisan. He will know too that, when acting as a functionary or in a ministerial office, man is not the Kierkegaardian individual: but essentially the rolesman, the wheel in an organisational machine; that that machine, the state, exists to serve a purpose, its own survival: that the conditions of its existence, though dubbed the international 'anarchy', are not those typical of the jungle, but rather of a kind of quasi-game; that the prize this is played for is that very survival for the purpose of which the state exists; and that, even if in theory a player might elect to leave the field, he could not at the same time hope to win; nor, while remaining within the game, can he think to play it save as in subjection to the rules. And he will appreciate that, though many may be in a game together in ostensible obedience to the self-same rules, that need not mean that this must be in the light of the same illusions. Nor will he expect it of others that they abjure their particular illusions merely because they are unable in an argument to convince him of their truth. Meanwhile, what of his own?

'... He Remains an English Man!'

It is neither to be expected nor desired of social cosmology that it dispossess the student of his illusions, or, in particular, of his political 'faith'. Rather may it be hoped that it do not. What however it may well do is reveal to him what sort of thing, when held without humour, a political faith can be. It may, that is, illuminate for him the difference between political, and other kinds of creeds, showing him that, although none of them can in the last analysis be rationally authenticated, politics without their credal foundations would be like a play without a plot. It can help him to adjust his own position to the extent of seeing as itself but a myth the idea that his myths have been anything more than myths. What, for

instance, does anyone take to be the logical status of his 'knowledge' that universal suffrage is a good thing? Myth he will see to have the dual function of rendering more prehensible and of making assimilable, an element of dogma less easily internalised in its primal form. The realisation that myth must often have resulted, intendedly, in illusion should not seriously upset him, since it is so largely by some of their illusions that the drabness of men's lives is sometimes in a measure redeemed. For a people collectively to have a good conceit of itself may for instance be of value, however tenuous the basis for its comforting beliefs.

But to concede that an illusion may be beneficent is not to say that it ought not to be shown up. Before the academic debutant can blossom into a demographer he must have overhauled his early understandings on the habits of the stork. Social cosmology, however, will authorise the student to re-accommodate his mere beliefs even after seeing them for what they are—and this (a) because this is so expedient, and (b) because it is so congenial. For it should reveal to him that myth is of the stuff of life—as indispensable to politics as is water to a shoal of fish. Nevertheless, as necessary to his profounder appreciation of things political, he will have accepted the relative disinflation of his own social image, and the zoological reduction, if one may so put it, of his sacred herd.

Then, however, having so to say domesticated his early vision, let him relapse into living along with what is left of it for such aid as it still may afford him, and with such gusto as he can. For so will he avoid the stultifications of fanaticism on the one hand and of a pale non-alignment on the other. And so incidentally will he vindicate, if only by implication, the virtue, secularly speaking, in an age of evaporating values, of sophisticated realism as an attitude to life.

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