

1936]

"Sanctions—1935"

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ON October 3rd, 1935, Italy, after months of lightly camouflaged preparation for a war, initiated against Ethiopia what she termed "the necessary measures of defence."¹ At the League Council table, on the following Monday, fourteen member States concurred, through their representatives, in a finding that Italy had resorted "to war in disregard of her covenants."² In the Assembly on the Wednesday a further three dozen States associated themselves with this affirmation. On the Assembly's recommendation the member States in general (except the parties) appointed delegates to coordinate measures to be taken in application of Article 16—the 'sanctions' article—of the Covenant.³

One might have liked to entitle this paper "Sanctions in Theory and Practice": but the doings at 'G.H.Q.', if remote from the mere theory of the home front, may also differ widely from the real practice of the battle-line. No description, or estimate, is here attempted of sanctions being applied. It is not in Geneva that that happens. What follows first is an impression, drawn from hearsay (or 'readwrite'), of the coordination proceedings (first stage⁴) in Geneva. What comes afterwards will be something from the armchair nearer home.

The "Coordination Committee" held two sessions, from October 11th to 19th and from October 31st to November 6th, 1935. Undaunted by the spectre of the Disarmament Conference,⁵ it took freely to the creation of subsidiaries

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First and foremost there was the "Committee of Eighteen," which eventually was requested

"to continue in session in order to follow the execution of the proposals already submitted to governments and to put such new proposals as it may think advisable to make before the Coordination Committee or the Governments represented thereon."¹

Then, as offspring of the Committee of Eighteen, there were sub-committees on economic and on financial measures; a sub-committee of military experts; a legal sub-committee; and two successive sub-committees on the organisation of mutual support. The economic sub-committee in due course had a family of its own.² Finally there was constituted a committee of experts

"to study in Geneva the information furnished by Governments concerning the application of the measures proposed by the Committee of Coordination and to furnish the Chairman with such assistance as he may desire, more particularly with regard to any question which may be submitted to him by Governments with regard to the application of these measures."³

Being an organ neither of the Assembly nor of the Council, but in the nature of an independent Conference,⁴ the Coordination Committee was clear from the outset that its task must be limited to submitting 'proposals,'⁵ not, that is, decisions, to the Governments of the sovereign States participating, as their duty was, in sanctions. The acceptance by delegates of the several texts was "contingent upon the approval of the Governments," which "retained the necessary freedom to consider each of the points." This at least seems to have been the inspiration of the grammatically imperfect form of words common to the various proposals:

"With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken forthwith" [or, simply, 'taken']: "The Governments . . . will . . ." and, in conclusion: "Each Government is requested to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the League, within the shortest possible time, of the measures which it has taken in conformity with the above provisions."⁶

Now was it deemed feasible to provide in advance for

absolutely every 'border-line' situation that might arise. The Committee was "making," rather than "interpreting," "the law."⁷

One potential difficulty was brushed aside, with reassuring roughness, at an early stage.² In 1921, it may be remembered, the Assembly had voted four amendments to Article 16, and nineteen resolutions concerning the procedure of its application—in what was then expected soon to be its amended form. The necessary ratifications—of the four amendments—would of necessity take a certain, that is, an uncertain, time. What if some case should meanwhile arise? Rather than have an attempt to apply the text in its condemned original form, the Assembly, not too pedantically, resolved that the 19 resolutions should "constitute rules for guidance, as a provisional measure, . . . in connection with the application of Article 16." Fourteen years having passed, with some of the needed ratifications still outstanding, it will be seen that in 1935 the technical status of the 19 resolutions was a theme on which the Committee, if in the mood, might have debated until the Italian boys came home. This, happily, it was neither disposed, nor obliged, to do. Let the sovereign States reserve their positions on the theoretical point. Whether or no the 1921 speed limit was still in force (if indeed it ever had been), nobody was wishing to exceed it in practice. Next business, please.

Another early step was a resolution calling

"attention to the fact that the members of the League, being bound by the obligations of Article 16 of the Covenant, are under a duty to take the necessary steps to enable them to carry out their obligations with all requisite rapidity."³

In other words, 'if your legal powers don't suffice, get them increased—and quickly—as you ought long ago to have done.'⁴

¹ S.S. 146, p. 49.

² S.S. 145, p. 30.

³ S.S. 145, p. 60.

⁴ "Parliamentary intervention," said M. Ruiz Guinazu, "was particularly necessary because the proposal . . . would place nationals and foreigners on a different footing, which would be a violation of the great and generous principle of equality established in the fundamental law of the Argentine."

Replying in the House of Commons to Sir Herbert Samuel, Mr. Baldwin said: "I am advised that power to take the necessary measures by Order in Council is given by the Treaty . . ."

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1921
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The main achievement, however, of that first session was the adoption of Proposals I to V, relating respectively to the arms embargo,¹ financial measures,² the prohibition of imports of Italian goods,³ the embargo on certain key-materials and means of transport,⁴ and, lastly, mutual support.⁵ On some of these points, thanks to the labours last summer of the sub-committee of the "Committee of Thirteen" on a related problem, there already existed 'semi-manufactured' texts, of which, in the first four proposals, use was made.

Then—the delicate question of the non-member States. Should they be appealed to; invited; merely informed; or—left to deal in their own products? The Chairman was authorised to "transmit" to them the principal recent documents, and "the recommendations." He was "instructed to add that the Governments represented on the Coordination Committee would welcome any communications which any non-member State may deem it proper to make or notification of any action which it may be taking in the circumstances."⁶ In other words 'Civilisation is at stake, and it partly depends on you.'

The primary business of the second session was to examine the replies of the Governments "as to whether they were in conformity with these proposals." It was also possible to settle the date, November 18th,⁷ for the simultaneous putting into force of Proposals III and IV—the two on which action had not at first been invited "forthwith."⁸ For the most part the work was left this time to the Committee of Eighteen: which wrestled with a series of doubtless genuine difficulties which governmental scrutiny of the proposals had revealed.

One topic, Swiss neutrality, "the substance" of which the Committee could not discuss, it "being a matter for some other body of the League of Nations," gave rise nevertheless, if not to a 'discussion,' to a notable series of speeches.⁹ M. Motta, ably, though amid universal dissent, explained his Government's refusal to raise, in relation to

¹ S.S. 145, pp. 14 and 19.

² S.S. 145, p. 20.

³ S.S. 145, p. 25.

⁴ S.S. 146, p. 8.

⁵ "Although there might not be so much harm," said Mr. Eden, "in some kind of time-lag in the putting into force by the various countries of financial measures, it was absolutely imperative in the case of economic measures that they should be carried out together." S.S. 145, p. 54.

² S.S. 145, p. 15.

⁴ S.S. 145, p. 24.

⁶ S.S. 145, p. 27.

⁸ S.S. 146, p. 39.

⁹ S.S. 146, p. 39.

Ethiopia, one side of its arms embargo. In practice it did not much matter this time; but it was not to count as a precedent.¹

It was in the Committee of Eighteen at this session—when the Spanish delegate was reiterating a protest against the inclusion, in the embargo, of iron ore, while iron and steel stood unaffected—that Dr. Riddell secured his place in history by launching his 'Canadian' initiative regarding oil, etc.² The outcome was a new Proposal IV A.³

"In the execution of the mission entrusted to it under the last paragraph of Proposal IV, the Committee of Eighteen submits to the Governments the following proposal:

"It is expedient that the measures of embargo, . . . should be extended to the following articles as soon as the conditions necessary to render this extension effective have been realised: (oil, iron and steel, coal, etc.). If the replies received by the Committee to the present proposal and the information at its disposal warrant it, the Committee of Eighteen will propose to Governments a date for bringing into force the measures mentioned above."

The Committee of Experts which, on December 12th, reported on the state of the game, while recording a very general acceptance and application of the main proposals, made no allusion to Proposal IV A.⁴ As this proposal is often described as having been 'accepted' in principle—whereas, it merely 'proposes' in principle—it is worth noting that the acceptances by that time appear to have included neither Britain nor France (and M. Laval was later to assure the deputies that any decision would rest with them).⁵

To return now to the details. Nothing short of the printed minutes can give at all a complete picture of even the formal proceedings. As the text of the proposals is rather long, and is widely available, it may suffice to set forth here, in ruthlessly abbreviated and paraphrased form, what seems to be their gist.

Proposal I. "Please impose, or maintain, as against Italy only, an embargo on the arms, etc., enumerated in the annexed list."

¹ "The traditional neutrality of Switzerland was no longer," said M. Politis, "what it had been before . . . because one of the fundamental principles of neutrality had been abandoned . . . by which neutral countries had not the right to make distinctions. . . . M. Motta had . . . taken part in the declaration . . . that it was Italy which in the present case had broken the Covenant." (Query if this was the sound point to take.) And see the speech of Sir William Malkin. S.S. 146, pp. 40 and 42.

² S.S. 146, p. 37.

⁴ League of Nations Publication. General, 1935, 10. ⁵ See The Times, December 30th.

³ S.S. 146, p. 46.

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Sarcastic
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Swiss
neutrality
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embargo!

Proposal II. "Please take measures forthwith to render impossible any loans, credits, or the like, to or for Italy. If your legislation permits do this by October 31st. Otherwise please tell us by what date you expect to be able to."

Proposal III. "Please prohibit the importation from Italy of (with certain slight exceptions) all Italian products, not excepting 'current contracts.' As collective and as far as possible simultaneous action is very important, please let us know before 28th October how soon you could act. We shall meet on the 31st to fix a date for bringing these measures into force." Annex: legal sub-committee's opinion on the effect of sanctions on the binding character of private contracts, commercial, and other treaties.

Proposal IV. "Please extend your embargo to the following key materials and means of transport." Date-fixing arrangements and legal opinion as in Proposal III.

Proposal V. "In view of the mutual support provisions of Article 16, please (1) arrange immediately that any advantages enjoyed hitherto by other sanctionist countries in virtue of the most-favoured-nation clause shall not be withdrawn in connection with the measures against Italy; (2) within the limits of your needs, arrange to take, in place of your imports from Italy, similar products from other sanctionist States; (3) be willing, after 'zero' day, to try to help suffering sanctionist countries to sell their goods; (4) if you have suffered no loss in respect of a given commodity refrain from invoking the most-favoured-nation clause in order to share privileges given by way of 'mutual support' to another country. Furthermore, please study the possibility (within the limits of your existing obligations and taking into consideration the annexed legal opinion concerning the most-favoured-nation clause) of increasing your imports from suffering sanctionists; discriminating, within equitable limits, against non-participating member States; promoting contacts between interested business firms; helping in international marketing efforts. Also, in so far as commercial measures do not suffice, please see what 'mutual support' you can afford by financial measures. The Committee of Eighteen will give any needed advice." Annex: legal opinion.

The Annex to the arms embargo proposal represented, in its final form, a rather amplified 'Roosevelt' list. To meet a Swiss scruple,¹ it was expressly recalled, in a footnote, that, though chemicals, etc., were included, their use in warfare was of course, in any event, unlawful.

As will have been foreseen, 'mutual support' was no

¹ "How," asked M. Motta, "could the export of these products be prohibited when the use of them was regarded as a crime against mankind? . . . Was the Committee to give birth to the supposition that one or other of the belligerents might employ products of that kind? To touch on such an idea, even indirectly, was highly dangerous." S.S. 145, p. 63.

easy matter. The vulgarity 'compensation' was early discarded, as foreign to Article 16. Besides, there could be no "integral compensation." Nor could there even be equal distribution of losses. Moreover, until the shoe was being worn, no one could say for certain where the worst pain would be. So, much was left over to the 'application' stage. A Greek suggestion for a mutual-support fund,¹ and a Roumanian idea² that specific measures should become matter of legal rather than merely moral obligation, were not accepted. And how far would sanctions affect adversely those supplies of foreign exchange on which debtor countries depended for meeting the service on their debts? Time would tell.³

If discretion, whether or not justice too, forbade any attempt to deprive non-member States of their profits, the case of the non-participating member States was differently seen. The Committee had no powers of 'punishment.' Nor was it called upon to examine the legal standing of the States concerned.⁴ What M. Titulesco asked was not that Hungary should be punished, but that Roumania should not be punished either.⁵ What Roumanians feared was not hardship, not loss—but injustice. 'Defaulters' should at least share equitably the burden of the losses. Even M. Motta could assent to that, though urging that "full consideration be given, in terms of human and political realities, to the situation of each member State."⁶ Hence the paragraph in Proposal V:

. . . "the taking into consideration of the obligations of mutual support and the advantages which the trade of certain States members of the League of Nations, not participating in the sanctions, would obtain from the application of these sanctions, in order to reduce by every appropriate means and to an equitable degree imports coming from these countries."

Advantages! According to the delegates of Austria and Hungary not merely would those countries be unable materially to help Italy, but, so far from making "profits,"

¹ S.S. 145, p. 128.

² S.S. 145, p. 127.

³ S.S. 145, p. 134.

⁴ S.S. 145, p. 40.

⁵ "There was unfortunately," said M. Titulesco, "an opinion which was gaining more and more ground. . . . It was said that there were countries at Geneva which won a position for themselves by the use of their fists. . . . It was said that the League drew no distinction between sinners and the virtuous. . . . But it was a certainty that no religion could last if it did not offer both a heaven and a hell." . . . "A sense of equity and a sense of moderation." followed M. Motta, "are the greatest of virtues in politics." S.S. 145, pp. 73 and 75.

⁶ S.S. 145, p. 75.

⁷ S.S. 145, p. 26.

Hilarious
summary of
Council decisions
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Austria, for one, was likely to be among the principal sufferers—if not from sanctions, then from “events.”¹

These two were cutting, in the Coordination Committee, a rather curious figure. As everyone knows, they had refused, in the Assembly, to concur in the denunciation of Italy.² Whatever sufficient real reasons they may have had, their only diplomatically valid official reason would seem to have been a professed inability to perceive Italy's alleged violation of the Covenant. That, it is humbling to remember, was in effect the position of certain other States on another occasion. Austria and Hungary, however, dwelt at length in their speeches on their economic plight. Given that they were forbearing to denounce Italy at all, this will have been essentially irrelevant, for *ex hypothesi* they could not fairly be asked to join in sanctions—and needed no special exemption. Still—it is so much easier to talk the truth than to live a consistent ‘story,’ especially if one's heart isn't in it.

That is a digression: the topic was ‘mutual support.’ How, one wondered, would it work? Great Britain, Mr. Hawtrey playfully explained, though probably the chief loser by the financial measures, was unlikely to be looking for compensation.³ South Africa, said Mr. de Water, with a soupçon of affluent magnanimity, would be sufficiently compensated for her material losses by her share in an increased security.⁴ M. Titulesco, too, would set a good example. “Those who imagined that Roumania wished to drive a bargain over the question of mutual support were mistaken. Roumania would vote for sanctions without asking for any guarantee, placing the fullest reliance on the comprehension . . . of all the other members.”⁵ But, the same speaker elsewhere had also let himself say, “the juster the compensation provided, the more strictly would a country like Roumania apply sanctions, and they would thus be rendered more effective in the best interests of

¹ “In the first eight months of 1935, Austria had received from Italy a foreign exchange surplus of 40 million schillings. There was no question therefore of Austria furnishing a foreign exchange surplus to Italy.” S.S. 145, p. 22.

“The Rome Agreement . . . might be called the spinal column of Hungary's commercial policy.” S.S. 145, p. 23.

² “The obligations of Article 16,” the Italian delegate, Signor Schanzer, had said, addressing the Assembly in 1921, “are explicitly imposed by the Covenant. . . . There can be no doubt that a state . . . which in bad faith did not recognise an obvious breach of the Covenant, would be violating its obligations as they are laid down by the Covenant and by international law.” 2nd Assembly, plenary meetings, p. 404.

³ S.S. 145, p. 134.

⁴ S.S. 145, p. 42.

⁵ S.S. 145, p. 127.

peace”¹—which somehow sounds not quite so nice. Meanwhile the Swiss throughout had less compunction in taking a frankly show-me-first-your-penny position. After all, “it was very difficult for the Swiss people to realise that their economic neutrality was at an end.”²

Of the other proposals it was Mr. Eden's imports prohibition which led, ironically enough, to the most discussion: ironically—because he had claimed that, requiring in itself no technical elaboration, it could be adopted without delay. After all, everybody these days was used to shutting out imports. It merely meant reducing Italy's quota on everything to nil.³ Whereas the French ‘favourite,’ namely the embargo on certain key-materials and means of transport, was naturally the occasion of a certain amount of pardonable haggling. Agreed, that the list should include only those things whose production was largely under the control of League States and not capable of being undertaken for herself by Italy. Why concentrate so on raw materials, asked Canada: how about the semi-finished goods?⁴ Much more difficult, administratively, to control: “Le mieux”, she was reminded, was “l'ennemi du bien.”⁵ Machine-tools and transport vehicles again could be disguised and shipped in parts. Aliter transport animals—so in they go, despite a Swiss doubt as to whether the production of mules is wholly controlled by League States.⁶ Yes, M. Cantos, iron ore *does* include pyrites, as you feared.⁷ And as to your grievance about £20,000 worth of iron ore, it would equally apply to the £750,000 worth of British rubber.⁸

One perhaps serious possibility of leakage in the embargo system was through the channel called ‘indirect supply.’ Towards plugging this hole the Committee of Eighteen resolved that, in its opinion, the Governments should take “such measures as are necessary to verify by all means in their power the destination of” such of the “prohibited products” as they might export. The resolution went on to ask that those Governments which did not immediately

¹ S.S. 145, p. 39.

² S.S. 146, p. 58.

³ “What they required,” he added, “was an admittedly very difficult political decision.” S.S. 145, p. 42.

⁴ S.S. 145, p. 80.

⁵ “An embargo,” argued Dr. Riddell, “might be put on a very important raw material, and another country might buy that raw material, make it into tools, and sell them to the country against which the embargo on raw materials had been placed.” A proposal of Dr. Riddell's concerning ‘derivatives’ seems to have been buried—all but entirely—by a sub-committee. One would like to know when, why and how. S.S. 145, p. 94.

⁶ S.S. 145, p. 113.

⁷ S.S. 145, p. 101.

⁸ S.S. 145, p. 82.

M. Scandalised
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to acknowledge
a breach of the
Covenant

But for the
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more
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restrict their exports of these articles should "keep under constant review the volume and direction of such export. In the event of an abnormal increase in this export" they should "take such steps as may be necessary to prevent supplies reaching Italy or Italian possessions by indirect routes."¹ Had the relevant 'sub-sub-committee' been unable to agree on what might be understood and recommended, as "necessary" steps?²

Another bridge, called 'transit,' was left to be crossed—should that become urgently necessary—at some later moment. Austria had been quick to quote Article 284 of the Treaty of St. Germain³; Switzerland had cited the Gothard Convention⁴; Holland the Rhine Navigation Convention. The jurists were to be consulted about the Gothard, but their reply, if they have given one, does not yet appear.

While it was evident that the views of the legal sub-committee would in no way bind the Governments, their reports, as we saw, were annexed to certain of the proposals. The tendency of their argument was on almost all points to clear the sanctionist path of legal obstacles.

Proposal II (financial measures) gave comparatively little trouble. The British, indeed, were 'quizzed' on the working of their payments agreement with Italy. Future sales, it had been agreed, were to be on a cash basis. Surely this continued recognition, by British exporters, of Italian payments into a lire account, would be suggestive rather of credit than of cash? The British, in answer, were willing to accept a proposal that their agreement be suspended, provided all other clearing and similar arrangements were affected alike. So be it, said the Committee, or something to much the same effect.⁵

That for the future. But clearing agreements had also a past. Imports from Italy were to cease. Did this mean that Chile, for example, who, having for several months

¹ S.S. 146, p. 47.

² The French delegate had suggested that "a pledge should, if possible, be obtained from the non-participating countries not to export products to Italy, and . . . in the absence of such a pledge, exports to those countries should be restricted to a quota equal to the annual average of exports to the said countries during the past three years." S.S. 145, p. 111.

³ Austria undertakes to grant freedom of transit . . . to persons, goods, etc., "coming from or going to the territories of any of the Allied and Associated Powers." S.S. 145, p. 22.

⁴ The Convention of 1869 guaranteed freedom of transit through the Gothard. "Switzerland's hands were free as regarded Italy on account of the Covenant. . . . In the case of Germany" (the third signatory) "such a possibility did not exist." S.S. 145, p. 114.

⁵ S.S. 146, p. 48.

been shipping nitrates to Italy, had now been about to begin receiving something in return, must refuse to take delivery?¹ And, what if a credit balance were the outcome not of a clearing agreement but of ordinary commercial exchanges?² Besides, how about Poland, who had partly effected the coal payments due from her for the purchase of the new Atlantic liner almost ready for her in Monfalcone dockyard? Not to take delivery would be, while damaging herself, to present Italy with an up-to-date and first-class extra ship.³ (In Europe, remarked a Spanish delegate, the creditor seemed no less closely fettered to his debtor than was the case in Ethiopia!⁴)

It was readily agreed that, where something had already been fully paid for, delivery need not be refused.⁵ For other current contracts the general answer was No, but a special sub-committee would examine the hard cases in the light of specified criteria.⁶ One of these, it had been proposed, should be that the purchaser be, if not a State, then an "institution belonging to the State"—for private contracts would be so easy to fabricate. This formula, however, did not take in the Chilean nitrate industry, nationally vital if anything could be. "Europeans," observed the Chilean delegate, "had sometimes difficulty in understanding the circumstances of countries in other continents." So a more inclusive expression was found.

In the 'outstanding claims' discussion a leading part was played by Roumania and Yugoslavia. Those clearing credit balances of theirs "constituted precise, liquid, and clearly-defined claims which were and could be checked. There was no possibility of abuse."⁷ How would it benefit Italy to be asked to deliver goods for which no present counterpart would be due? "Why should Roumania be placed in the position of refusing payment of a claim from Italy, a payment which the latter would not fail to offer as soon as she heard of the prohibition?"⁸ "Roumania's

¹ "There was a world cartel for nitrates, and Chile sold in Italy 50,000 or 60,000 tons of nitrates which she could not sell elsewhere. . . . Moreover the sea route to Italy passed via Spain, and advantage was taken of that circumstance to exchange goods with the latter country." S.S. 146, p. 29.

² "It might be assumed," stated the French delegate, "that the total of commercial debt arrears would amount to 500 millions of francs." S.S. 146, p. 55.

³ S.S. 145, p. 106.

⁴ S.S. 146, p. 19.

⁵ S.S. 146, p. 71.

⁶ S.S. 146, p. 58.

⁷ S.S. 146, p. 56.

⁸ S.S. 146, p. 48.

⁹ S.S. 146, p. 57.

trade with Italy," said M. Titulesco, "amounts to £7,200,000. . . . That means £7,200,000 of profits sacrificed on the altar of the League."¹ (Yes, he really does seem to have said that.)

Not that anybody supposed Italy was likely, when invited, to liquidate speedily these balances. That, however, was another matter.

The main objection seems to have rested rather on psychological than economic considerations. Would the public in other sanctionist countries be content to see any continued outflow of Italy's products? "Half the world," ventured the Canadian, "does not know what a clearing agreement is."

The inevitable sub-committee, being instructed, evolved a masterly resolution, somewhat as follows: 'We consider that these debts will remain valid at their present value; and recognise that we ought to help each other, when sanctions end, to get Italy to pay up. If, nevertheless, serious losses result, mutual support will be "specially given," by "all appropriate measures" to make the losses good.' The Committee on Mutual Support would make a list of the debts, and study the "appropriate measures."²

Remains to mention the most intriguing query of all, put by the ingenious M. Stucki,³ from Berne. He was so original as to doubt the very principle of Proposal III. Its prime object admittedly was to affect Italy's supply of surplus foreign exchange. Now Italy's total commercial balance was strongly passive.⁴ Her imports included many products which she must accept "because of the commercial treaties she had signed, but which she did not really require. . . ." If Proposal III went into force, Italy would certainly stop taking these products.⁵ "Such an import embargo would enable Italy to retain the foreign exchange hitherto required for buying these articles." Hence, an actual risk of "improving her position in the matter of surplus supplies of foreign currency."

Without insisting that he had perfectly followed the argument, Mr. Eden believed that—in the particular case of a country which "had been endeavouring for years to

¹ S.S. 146, p. 32.

² S.S. 145, p. 116.

³ "He . . . had come to the definite conclusion that Italy could dispense with all imports from Switzerland without any serious difficulty." S.S. 145, p. 107.

⁴ S.S. 146, p. 12.

⁵ S.S. 145, p. 97.

maintain the value of its currency by restricting superfluous imports"—to dispense with what it had still been admitting might be less easy than M. Stucki supposed. Some day, if the facts are then available, it may be interesting to recall this pretty confrontation of theories.

In Switzerland's case, after all, an exception was allowed. M. Motta, describing the Ticino, had pronounced the imports prohibition absolutely impossible, politically, for his country.¹ *Vis-à-vis* Switzerland, Italy's trade balance happened to be active.² "Could not the same result—namely to deprive Italy of this surplus foreign currency—be achieved if Switzerland undertook to make no further direct payments to Italy . . . to reduce her trade to compensation transactions?"

Small wonder that Mr. de Water could report that "rightly or wrongly the impression had got abroad, in the streets of Cape Town, and in the streets of London, that the Swiss attitude in this matter had been obstructive."³ *Securus uidicat* . . . ? But why bring in London?

Much else in these proceedings was of interest. Switzerland was not the only country conscious of having a special position. The Argentine, with over 1,000,000 Italians,⁴ and Venezuela, whose liberal policy amid a world of trade barriers had left her already a shorn lamb,⁵ were 'all for' the 1921 flexibility business. Chile too had a reservation to make.⁶ One delegate, M. Litvinoff, said some blunt things about these exceptional attitudes.⁷ Yet, on the whole, the impression one gets is that, if only at the Geneva end, the sanctionist countries were co-operating fairly well. "Collective enthusiasm, but individual coolness," remarked a Frenchman.⁸ Perhaps it was the coolness of determination.

It was not, however, in Geneva only that sanctions formed in 1935 a topic for discussion. In England, while war was still but an ugly probability, a belated process of public self-education began. The Covenant almost ceased to be 'academic.' Fresh minds grasped for the first time what it said. Old hands for the *n*th time said what they took

¹ S.S. 145, p. 41. Cf. M. Stucki "Was there any" (other) "country which had to promulgate decrees for the application of sanctions in Italian?" S.S. 145, p. 108.

² S.S. 146, p. 35.

³ S.S. 145, p. 52.

⁴ S.S. 146, p. 8.

⁵ Cf. Geneva Correspondent, *Manchester Guardian*, October 16th.

⁶ S.S. 146, p. 36.

⁷ S.S. 145, p. 19.

⁸ S.S. 145, p. 27.

it to mean. Space does not permit more than a cursory mention of these exercises.

Does Article 16 still bind us? 'No,' said Sir Arnold Wilson¹—'not since the defection of America.' 'No,' said Mr. Amery²—'not since the rejection of the Protocol.' 'Yes,' said simpler folk.

In what sense does it bind? 'In its literal sense,' said M. Fachiri³ and Sir Malcolm Robertson.⁴ 'In its 1921 sense,' said Sir John Fischer Williams.⁵ 'In its 1925 sense,' said Lord Cecil.⁶

Is the obligation 'joint' or 'joint and several'? 'Joint, as among the League members,' said His Grace the Archbishop of York.⁷ 'Joint as among all the original signatories,' said Sir Arnold Wilson.⁸ 'Several,' said M. Fachiri,⁹ confirming the impression of Mr. Cyril Asquith.¹⁰ 'Neither joint nor several, but general,' said Sir John Fischer Williams,¹¹ breaking new ground.

Do sanctions mean war? 'Yes,' said the *Daily Mail*,¹² representing Mussolini. 'No,' said Mr. Maxwell Garnett,¹³ explaining the difference between war and the collective enforcement of peace. 'Nonsense,' said Mr. Bernard Shaw.¹⁴ 'It depends on the aggressor,' said Lord Cecil.¹⁵ 'That is—not on us,' said Sir Francis Lindley.¹⁶

What exactly is "collective action"? 'One torpedo-boat each,' suggested someone. '95 per cent. us,' said Lord

¹ "We should not ourselves apply sanctions unless we have the active co-operation of every Power that signed the Treaty of Versailles. I hold that to be the meaning of our bond." Article in the *Evening Standard*, October 11th.

² Letter, *The Times*, October 4th.

³ Letter, *The Times*, October 15th.

⁴ Letter, *The Times*, October 17th.

⁵ Letter, *The Times*, October 21st.

⁶ Letter, *The Times*, September 28th.

⁷ Letter, *The Times*, September 20th.

⁸ Article, *Evening Standard*, October 11th.

⁹ Letter, *The Times*, October 15th.

¹⁰ Letter, *The Times*, October 3rd.

¹¹ Letter, *The Times*, October 5th.

¹² Leading article of September 26th: "In his interview with . . . Mr. G. Ward Price, Signor Mussolini said: . . . 'if sanctions are voted against Italy at Geneva she will at once leave the League, and it should be realised, without possibility of misunderstanding, that whoever applies sanctions against Italy will be met by the armed hostility of our country'."

¹³ Letter, *The Times*, October 18th.

¹⁴ "Old as I am I am not yet so pitifully imbecile as to believe that the modern habit of calling torpedoes, mines, blockades, sieges, battles and bombs 'sanctions' alters their nature so completely that a vote for sanctions is a vote for peace." Letter to *The Times*, October 22nd.

¹⁵ Letter, *The Times*, September 28th.

¹⁶ Letter, *The Times*, September 16th.

Mansfield.¹ "O + O = O," said Sir Francis Lindley.² 'As far as the others will go,' said H.M.G. "The delaying formula is excellent," said Mr. Garvin.³

What precisely is the issue? 'British versus Italian Imperialism,' said, disapprovingly, the I.L.P.⁴ 'The future of the Commonwealth,' said, approvingly if not so very differently, Sir Abe Bailey.⁵ 'The philosophy of violence—shall it triumph?' said Sir Charles Grant Robertson.⁶ 'Birmingham lads—shall they die for Abyssinia?' said Mr. Amery.⁷ 'I need more information,' said Professor Laski.⁸

Ought we to act without France? 'Yes,' said Mr. Lloyd George.⁹

Are we powerful enough? 'Yes,' said the Bishop of Durham.¹⁰

Should the League take a stronger line? 'We believe the great mass of the people would approve,' said the L.N.U.¹¹ 'That's because they don't have conscription,' said *Le Temps*.¹² 'Economic sanctions alone will not succeed,' said Mr. Amery.¹³ 'I hope you and your children will keep out of it,' said Field Marshal Lord Milne,¹⁴ addressing his veterans.

¹ Speech reported, *Manchester Guardian*, October 17th.

² Letter, *The Times*, September 16th.

³ *The Observer*, September 25th.

⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, October 11th.

⁵ Letter, *The Times*, September 29th.

⁶ Letter, *The Times*, September 19th.

⁷ Speech reported, *The Times*, October 9th.

⁸ Letter, *Manchester Guardian*, September 21st.

⁹ *The Times*, September 26th.

Not every mind was altogether clear on this cardinal point. Mr. G. N. Barnes, pressed by Sir John Marriott for a precise answer, wrote in *The Times*, September 15th: "We are pledged to 'severance of trade or financial relations.' I should 'sever.' Sir John might say, how about France? Well, that is an ugly question which may have to be faced one day. But obviously the present emergency does not admit of its being opened up at this moment. We must act together."

¹⁰ "The salient feature of the present situation is the union of responsibility and power. Geography assists justice. Great Britain is not only responsible . . . but also able as a great Mediterranean Power to interfere effectively in the cause of justice and international good faith." Letter, *The Times*, August 30th.

¹¹ *Manchester Guardian*, October 11th.

¹² "Cette opinion publique envisage beaucoup plus facilement que l'opinion française des sanctions militaires car, la Grande-Bretagne ignorant la conscription, le public considère les sanctions militaires comme une question concernant uniquement la marine et l'armée de métier." *Le Temps*, October 13th.

¹³ Letter, *The Times*, October 4th.

Sir Francis Lindley, in a letter to *The Times*, December 20th, wrote: "Without recourse to war it" [the League] "has never had the means of settling any question in which a first class Power is vitally interested. . . . Without war no settlement can be obtained which is the one or the other" [i.e. in accordance with League principles or abstract justice]. On December 23rd Sir Malcolm Robertson wrote protesting against this "Sir Francis Lindley's terrible view."

¹⁴ Speech reported, *The Times*, October 7th.

Summary of UK debate over the League of Nations
Diversity of opinions clearly presented

"The light-hearted manner in which some suggest that the Suez Canal should be closed to Italy displays an irresponsibility which appals me," said Sir Henry Page Croft.¹ "If the love of which Dante wrote cannot move Mussolini," wrote Lord Parmoor,² "then we and the French will have to start employing sanctions in a quiet way—for example, closing the Suez Canal by the authority of the League."

Have we done all that was due? "No one can accuse us of having failed in the slightest degree in our international duty," said Mr. Winston Churchill on October 8th.³ "The chief danger ahead," said Professor Gilbert Murray⁴ on the 16th, "is that in the general desire for peace the League may be content merely to save its diplomatic conscience . . . and may forget that its duty is to defend Abyssinia." "The present sanctions," wrote Professor H. A. Smith in December,⁵ "fall far short of what the Covenant demands and the endless repetition of a shibboleth that the League is 'the keystone of British policy' must not blind us to the fact that we, like all other member States, are violating the Covenant."

The many-sidedness of the subject if not thus made plain will perhaps be discovered by the supplementary jottings with which this paper will now conclude.

On the strictly procedural side the October events seem to have puzzled even some specialists. One was reported as declaring that the machine had in effect 'broken down'⁶—his idea being that, finding themselves blocked by the unanimity rule, the Council as such and the Assembly as such had abdicated in favour of the League members in their individual character. True there was—*pace the Times correspondent*⁷—no League 'decision' against Italy. But, that the recognising of aggression is the affair of the States themselves was perceived in 1921—and the most then proposed, even as an amendment, was that an 'opinion' (not, that is, a decision) should be given on the facts by the Council (if necessary, by a majority vote).⁸

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, August 30th.

² *New York Times*, September 1st.

³ Speech reported, *The Times*, October 9th.

⁴ Speech reported, *Manchester Guardian*, October 17th.

⁵ Letter, *The Times*, December 17th. ⁶ *Sunday Times*, October 20th.

⁷ Geneva telegram, *The Times*, October 8th.

⁸ See especially Signor Schanzer's speech, 2nd Assembly, plenary meetings, p. 452.

Yet, see e.g. "Scrutator" in the *Sunday Times*, September 25th: "There are no sanctions under the Covenant possible except by the unanimous decision of all members of the Council, apart from the actual parties to the quarrel and those who abstain from voting."

The identification of 'the aggressor' without a Council decision constitutes, it has been said, a precedent in relation to any future 'non-flagrant' case under the Locarno Treaty: but this seems to ignore the specific mention in 'Locarno' of a rôle to be played by the Council; whereas, at least since 1921, the position under the Covenant has been seen to be otherwise.

In some quarters it had been feared that, to embarrass 'the Council,' Italy, in attacking Ethiopia, might deny, *à la Japonaise*, the nature of her deed.¹ 'The Council' was, in this respect, spared. By October 7th President Roosevelt had already said 'That's war, that is'—and said it very loud and clear.² Yet, Mr. Stimson, in his historic letter to Mr. Borah, had been just as positive and almost as audible. The real difference, surely, was that this time the aggression was more forthright, and the guarantors a little, if only a little, more forthcoming.

The absence of any official definition of aggression appears to have caused no regret³—except to Baron Aloisi, who said Abyssinia had more than satisfied the fashionable tests.⁴ M. Litvinoff—to whose formula the Baron had plainly been alluding—had the hardihood to make a debater's use of this unsolicited testimonial.⁵ Others may have drawn a different moral.

So much for the Council. At the Assembly stage⁶—a stage wholly unsuggested in either 1919 or 1921—the official theory of things does seem to have wobbled a bit. Explaining what he called "the Assembly's task," the President, M. Benes, rightly noted that the next stage was "the assent of each Government individually. We are not going to propose a vote." So far so good, if we forgive its being called the 'Assembly's' task. Then after mentioning "the coordinating body which the Council is inviting us to set up," M. Benes said it would be "the Assembly's" important task . . . to take "such decisions as may be required, such as for instance the setting up of a coordinating body and

¹ Cf. leader, *Manchester Guardian*, September 22nd.

² "We are compelled to recognise the simple and indisputable fact that Ethiopian and Italian forces are engaged in combat, thus creating a state of war within the intent and meaning of the joint resolution." *The Times*, October 7th. (This neatly left open the question whether there was 'war within the intent and meaning of Article 16'.)

³ It is only in the exceptionally difficult cases that the advocates of a conventional definition say its absence will be felt.

⁴ *League of Nations Official Journal*, 16th year, No. 11, p. 1136.

⁵ 16th Assembly, plenary meetings, September 14th.

⁶ 16th Assembly, plenary meetings, September 9th and after.

Churchill on Abyssinia

range of opinion, but little contribution

M denies League broken bec to be the decision of states w/ v. limited role to League Council

prob of aggression def.

cf to Japan which denied its action was war

M says no expected role for the Assembly

priority - but more bec no Ass. task

the definition of its terms of reference." The General Committee were proposing, he said, that the Assembly should "invite" the members in general to "set up a committee . . . to consider and facilitate the coordination" of the measures and, if necessary, "to draw the attention, etc. . . ." This would be "a conference of States members meeting to consult together with a view to the application of the provisions of Article 16." What was proposed was "not a resolution . . . in the strict sense of the word, but an invitation addressed by the Assembly to the member States." Baron Aloisi's contention that the League, as such, having taken no decision, the Assembly, as such, was not competent "to take any action at all in the matter" was deemed to be met by writing "recommends" instead of "invites." The "recommendation" to member States was declared adopted "unanimously, except for one adverse vote and two abstentions." If not quite a 'bull's eye,' the Baron had clearly scored some sort of an 'inner.' Perhaps, in another such case, the President might address the States 'as' on his own individual responsibility. The Assembly should in any case prefer to find one good verb and stick to it. And, when an adverse vote is being, not ignored, but counted, the outcome ought not even conventionally to be reckoned as unanimity.

Despite the care with which the presidential impromptus in all these proceedings were evidently drafted, the layman is perhaps likely to go on believing that 'Italy was found guilty by both the Council and the Assembly of the League'—a result which, who knows?, will perhaps have been not unintended.

While on the subject of thoughts, words, and deeds not provided for in the text, much might be said concerning sundry up-to-date ideas as to the aims of the Covenant. That coercion would compromise the essential spirit of a League of peace; or, that to localise is more important than to abbreviate a war—neither of these views is based on the legible words. This also seems true of the thesis that sanctions and conciliation should explore hand-in-hand. Whereas we used to say that sanctions might have to spare neutral trade 'for fear of offending the neutral,' it would almost be orthodox now to say, 'for fear of offending the aggressor.'¹

¹ Cf. leader in *Le Temps*, October 9th.

Ought such fear to be overcome? Sir Edward Grigg has put the view that Britain should only risk war with Italy if prepared, at a pinch, to carry it alone.¹ This the Bishop of Durham seems to have thought might be done.² The Admiralty, according to a London message to the *New York Times*, was probably not so sanguine.³ Ministers openly declared that Britain's known unpreparedness had made negotiations more difficult.⁴ From this some have gone on to urge that she get ready to take in future a more effective share in upholding collective peace. Excellent as the case may otherwise be for strengthening Britain's diplomatic hands, for service of course to noble ends, a positive duty to bear, or get ready to bear, the League's burdens single-handed can hardly be extracted from the Covenant.

For there is supposed to be 'mutual support.' And this the French did not deny, at any rate for the case where 'sanctionist' action would have been taken only after consultation with them. What it seems they probably did deny was the duty to help an England attacked before sanctions had been agreed on at all. The Covenant's silence concerning the interval between aggression and sanctions came to be classed as yet another 'gap' in that allegedly intermittent text. But the Covenant says 'sanctions "immediately"': hence, no interval: hence no 'gap.'

In so far as any such gap exists it is in the system, not of 1919, but of 1921. — *what does this mean?* ^{US Govt?} ^{US Govt?} The crucial case would be where Britain, transcending 1921, and invoking the still valid letter of Article 16, paragraph 1, did her duty—as she saw it—without any 'by your (French) leave': and then got attacked. Would France acknowledge, and perform, her obligation to help? And, for another day, there is the converse possibility. May it perhaps have been partly in view of this converse possibility that we seem, as a matter of policy, to have treated our loyalty to Ethiopia not as categorically imposed by the Covenant but as contingent on the concurrence of France?

¹ *The Times*, September 29th.

² Letter, *The Times*, August 30th.

³ London telegram, *New York Times*, September 23rd.

⁴ Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking at Edgbaston, said that in the discussions which had been taking place . . . the Government had been conscious that their hands had been weakened by the knowledge of other countries that Britain was not strong enough . . . to make her words good if trouble were to come. Reported in *Manchester Guardian*, November 14th. Cf. also Mr. Runciman, "The strength of Britain's foreign policy . . . was to be measured by the strength of the British fleet." Reported in *The Times*, October 21st.

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— this is what drove
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such!

It was only after 1919 that the principle of 'increasing stringency' first was affirmed. Sir John Fischer Williams, while granting that the text remains unamended, doubts if a member State whose delegation did not oppose the 1921 resolutions, can complain if they be followed now.¹ Even if that were conceded, Ethiopia, after all, was admitted only in 1923. Must she be deemed first to have mastered the 19 "rules for guidance" and to have judged that the Covenant, meaning no longer what it still said, had come already to mean what it might, or might not, eventually come to say?

It may be also worth recalling that the original official basis of the 'gradualness' principle was concern at the bugbear of trouble with America²—at a time, of course, when no President of that country had yet desired "it to be understood that any of our people who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk."³

M. Teclé Hawariate told the Assembly that the Ethiopians were "conscious of defending not only their existence but the sacred cause of the independence of all small States."⁴ But, would even the complete triumph of an unassisted Ethiopia improve substantially the sleep of the other little nations? What some of them are wanting is, not a successful Ethiopian self-defence, but a precedent for effective collective intervention. And this France, of all countries, has seemed curiously unconcerned to ensure.⁵

Yet, in justice, be it said, to French logic, neither Clemenceau nor Briand had ever given the Covenant system full marks for 'security.'

The thesis that if loyally observed it would, in itself, 'furnish all we need to ask'⁶ was never orthodox in France.

The vindication of the Covenant to-day would weaken, rather than confirm, the characteristic French contention, namely that, for checking the 'deliberate,' as distinct from the 'accidental' war, something more was needed. For

¹ Letter, *The Times*, October 21st.

² and Assembly, plenary meetings, pp. 402 and 405.

³ *The Times*, October 7th.

⁴ *The Times*, October 6th.

⁵ Cf. the *Times* Paris correspondent: "Nobody who has followed the course of events . . . can doubt that the policy of sanctions is extremely unpopular in France. It is one that the French, if left to themselves, would never have dreamed of initiating." *The Times*, October 19th.

⁶ The *mot* belongs to Sir John Fischer Williams.

⁷ The terminology is Sir Austen Chamberlain's.

Ethiopia had lacked that something more: there was no African 'Locarno.'

In further justice to the same great nation—let the pot not call the kettle black. In the stock case of Covenant theory there is one victim—and one aggressor. In predicting that in practice there would be more aggressors than one, Sir Arnold Wilson,¹ if this time wrong, is not utterly and entirely wrong. Does anyone suppose that, if Italy were the only object of France's fear, France's fear of Italy would make her so strongly object to sanctions?² Her special strategic situation no doubt necessitates, in French eyes, a qualified reading of the law. Others too have had their special strategic situations. 'Hong Kong,' for instance, in 1931.

If her attitude this time is technically correct, there remains the question, debated at home and abroad, of Britain's motives. The failure, usual in such a discussion, to differentiate between a people and its Government, has intensified the apparent confusedness of an inherently complex theme. While M. Jules Sauerwein³ could write, in the *New York Times*, of Britain's egoistic exploitation of the crisis, the Archbishop of Canterbury⁴ was certain that the British people were singlemindedly out for a noble cause, and Sir Austen Chamberlain⁵ entirely failed to comprehend the foreigner's view. Lord Cecil, who imagined that very few Englishmen had even so much as heard of Lake Tana, was not expressly referring to the Cabinet. The

¹ Letter, *The Times*, September 24th.

² Cf. the *Manchester Guardian's* London letter, September 12th: "The shadow of German rearmament still lies across the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia."

³ "His Majesty's Government uses the League of Nations for its own purposes as it once used the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of Berlin and the Peace Conference. It utilises these meetings of the nations to seek support for its policies." *New York Times*, September 29th.

⁴ Cf. also Mr. J. L. Garvin in the *Observer*, October 20th: "It is the world's belief, even where opinion is most favourable to us, that, if Manchuria had bordered on the Red Sea, our action would have been different then, and that, if Abyssinia had been a thousand miles from Egypt, our action would have been different now."

⁵ His Grace was addressing the Diocesan Conference: "The issues involved are fundamentally moral and, indeed, in the true sense of the word, religious. They are not . . . primarily political. . . . Quite certainly the thought of British interests has not been the motive which has so singularly united the people of this country." *The Times*, October 22nd.

⁶ In a speech at the Albert Hall: "It was one of the most incomprehensible things to an Englishman that, not in Italy only, so many people on the Continent and elsewhere believed that Britain in this matter was inspired by some purely British interest. So far from that being the case, he did not hesitate to say that, if we thought only of our own interest, we would wash our hands of the whole affair, we would make what profit we could out of the circumstances of the struggle." *The Times*, November 1st.

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Financial News,¹ on September 23rd, had candidly appraised the situation in terms of the British interests definitely at stake.² And Sir Norman Angell's point, that in the same camp with Britain there were Socialists, Communists, and even Mr. de Valera, was surely a little inconclusive, in a discussion not of formal positions but of motives.³

They who opposed the British attitude on its merits were relatively few. There were the claims of Christianity, as seen by the Lansburys and Sheppards: of sanity, as understood by Sir Charles Mallet⁴: of the Kellogg Pact, as read by Sir Owen Seaman.⁵ There was A. A. Milne, who deplored "the low reeling-point of the political imagination."⁶ A few endorsed the French conception of the paramount claims of European peace.⁷

On the other hand no opponent seems, in the General Election, to have fought the Government for doing not enough. The reiterated principle of the 'united front' appears to have passed unchallenged. Though not enshrined in the Covenant, this doctrine now indeed looks like having come to stay.⁸

It is no doubt a little difficult to square with the theory of Signor Mussolini's having had full and early warning of firm resistance ahead. If, of course, that warning was couched in terms of the policy of a united front—that is, of proceeding to the rescue in convoy formation at the speed

¹ Leader, *Financial News*, September 23rd.

² For a discussion of the significance of Lake Tana see letters to *The Times*, August 30th and September 27th.

³ Reported in *New York Times*, November 24th. Sir Norman went on to say: "The truth is, of course, that two opposing political philosophies are at war with one another in England, and that the line of demarcation cuts athwart the old political divisions."

⁴ Letter, *The Times*, September 21st.

⁵ "Peace is more important than any instrument of peace. Our primary pledge, solemnly declared in the Kellogg Pact, and written in blood on all our hearts, is to follow the way of peace; our pledge to uphold a particular instrument of peace, the League of Nations, is only secondary. If by adhering to the Covenant and insisting on sanctions we expose ourselves to the peril of another great war, we are false to our most sacred vows. Whenever two loyalties clash, the lesser must yield to the greater." Letter, *The Times*, September 2nd.

⁶ Letter, *The Times*, September 30th.

⁷ Cf. T. S. Bazley, letter, *The Times*, September 18th, and leader, *Le Temps*, October 5th.

⁸ "Unity first, and then the pressure of moral and economic forces, steady, patient, and persistent, is what we have to try." Leading article in the *Manchester Guardian*, September 26th. Cf. also a *Times* leader of October 17th.

"The maintenance of the largest possible measure of agreement among the fifty nations concerned is more important than the immediate stopping of every loophole. The practical purpose is more certain to be accomplished if united action is given time to breed confidence..." Leader, *The Times*, October 17th.

of the slowest ship¹—its 'gravity' may not have impressed the Duce in the intended sense. He had—well—been warned.

And now, still, after four months, Ethiopia is "fighting fearful odds."² And it was the present Foreign Secretary who, on October 11th, said, on the air, from Geneva: "We cannot afford to dally, for at this moment men are being killed and homes are being shattered. Action must be swift and action must be effective if the League is to achieve the end for which it was set up."³

London,

February 17th, 1936.

¹ Cf. London telegram, *Manchester Guardian*, October 16th.

² See *International Affairs*, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 95 and 96, speech by Miss Freda White.

In his Assembly speech on September 9th, M. Teclé Hawariate had begun thus: "I desire first of all to express my deep gratitude to all those members of the League which, in accordance with the Covenant, have guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of my country by admitting it to the League of Nations as a member."

³ Reported in the *Manchester Guardian*, October 12th.

M's new line of the oblig's under the League - strictly legal + v minimal. No or at least little League responsibilities or roles at all

but this then means the need for unanimity which simultaneously paralyses the LON but frees the several states.

M: Club analogy - responsibility lies w/ members not the club orgn separately. → v. limited view of what LOS are

Right & Left on same side re the League but for diff reasons

No-one in UK criticised govt for doing too little

need for a united front → weakest link, LCD reaction

Hadn't noticed over at

again, sarcasm