

# OUT TO GRASS — AND A LINGERING LOOK BEHIND

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The subject of this article is of particular interest to the Institute since the late Lord Davies of Llandinam was responsible for the establishment of the first Chair in International Relations at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth in 1920.

Time was, or well may have been, when professors on the eve of their retirement would be permitted, if not required, to deliver a 'valedictory'.<sup>1</sup> Time certainly still is when on the morrow of their installation an 'inaugural' is in many places *de rigueur*: but nowadays at any rate they are not officially called upon elaborately to say goodbye. This however is not obviously a reason why they should refrain their tongue from just a heart-felt word or two, if others be willing to hear.

The goodbye is notoriously a process of varying length. Sometimes it may be no more than a wave of the hand. Sometimes it involves the perpetrating of an autobiography. And an autobiography may be either sparing or not so sparing of the reader's patience.

For a retiring professor, to be 'not so sparing' could in practice be to relate the chequered tale of his 'triumphs and disasters'. If there were no fielders there could be no batting. Were there no opposition, life would not be life. And university life is life with a lifesize 'I'. Not indeed nature red, but nature let us say pinkish ... civilized life, in short. Life, that is, in free society. In other words—competitive co-existence.

The 'not so sparing' way of telling of the past was something to Professor Carr's eschewing of which Professor Trevor Roper took such articulate exception. The full story of, for instance, a cricket innings is but poorly perpetuated in the mere figures in the book. What about all those attempted strokes that didn't quite make contact? And those fast ones that a fellow barely managed to stop? And the chances he gave, which people unaccountably missed?

One thing life does teach about the comparative evaluation of successes. It warns us not to think less highly of a score of, say, forty than of a score of sixty, unless we have first made due allowance for such variables as what the weather was like, not to say the umpiring, what the bowling was like, what the fielding,

<sup>1</sup> Beginning 1st January 1930 the author's tenure, at the London School of Economics, of the London Chair of International Relations, ended 30th September 1962.



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what was the state of the wicket and, above all, what was the state of the game. For, to vary the metaphor, sometimes Alice has to run like a rabbit merely to remain where she is. Or, in plain English, we may be delighted to give her an ovation even when she carries her bat for nought.

Some day, when men's need of world awareness is as universally accepted as is their need of air, some puzzled British social historian may think to research into why, when once that need had become so apparent to some folk, it had not equally become apparent to all. For this, he will require all the imagination, all the social psychology, and all the flair for surmise that he can muster. Even today it may be hard enough with such inquiries to get very far, or to feel very certain. Men commonly do not disclose, even when they know them, the motives they obey. The question why say Cambridge, for instance, will have been so dilatory in finding a place for social cosmology may come to rank for difficulty with the question why in Oxford it took so long to do away with 'divvers'. Given what one presumes to be the purposes, in the 20th century, of a university education, the non-acceptance in the one case of the one may in 'retrospect' seem hardly less anachronistic than the retention in the other of the other.

And why, on the other hand, will London have been so much the earlier in its accommodating of International Relations? This question however is not within our present terms of reference. London had taken the plunge already, 'way back' in 1924. Let us stick to our *termini - a quo* no less than *ad quem*. That need not after all preclude our recalling what in 1930, that is, within our period, we assumed that London must presumably have seen itself as doing, way back in 1924. What did we so assume?

There operates in England, to her credit, an association for the provision, after appropriate training — of the dogs — of guide-dogs for the blind. Whatever other qualifications such animals may initially require, one at least of them will be this: that themselves they be able to see. A major part of the *raison d'être* of International Relations as an academic discipline — or so in 1930 one assumed — would be as it were a training of guide-dogs for the blind. In relation to world affairs, some people at any rate were not congenitally well endowed with sight. If they were to find their way in safety, they would need a guide, who himself must be able not simply to see but to take a sophisticated view of what he was seeing.

Where then had the new professor supposed that he himself came in? I am afraid I should need some notice of any such question. But anyhow *that* would have been 'way back' in 1929.

So perhaps we need not answer that one either. Now, during 1962, I can only assume that I must somehow have imagined, during 1929, that there might be, even at that time, something that I could contribute to the training. In short, that for giving training to the dogs I myself was sufficiently trained. This at least I do have to assume.

In any event, friends told me, I would now have the time to write my book. Time! The index to that book was to be completed in November 1961.<sup>2</sup>

The Department of International Relations — thanks to its brilliant and dynamic creator, my predecessor Noel-Baker — was already then very much of a going concern. With the related subjects of Geography, and of International Law, in the hands respectively of L. G. Robinson (soon to become Reader in International History also) and of Professor H. A. Smith (assisted and complemented by Hersch Lauterpacht) and with important sections of the subject covered by Lucy Mair and S. H. Bailey, it could have mattered relatively little even had the new professor found nothing, at first, to say. He did in fact say some things, from the angle of one with a modicum of direct experience of a lawyerly approach. Of any value? A candid colleague once told him he had a reputation for the splitting of hairs: but he never implemented a promise to recall for him some example of his having furnished colour for this charge. Even so...! (The point of course was that pedantryism is not enough).

It was not, I think, in those days the habit of the elevated to speak, however much they may have been thinking, of certain subjects as 'main' ones. Nowadays, even if all subjects are potentially main, some may in fact be more main than the rest. And even in those earlier days some were rather obviously less than main. Thus was it, for example, in my now admittedly distant youth, with — dare I say it — economics, at least in one old university that I knew. True enough, it was told me, such a subject did exist; but there were others of less debatable standing. There indeed were subjects in which one could take a degree! So I settled for a couple of those. Whether, had International Relations then existed, it would have ranked in effect as other than main, I have at times been tempted to wonder. But since it did not then exist, *cadit quaestio*.

So the new professor had not even a glimmering of economics? Nor any...? Perhaps it may suffice to recall what a privilege and a profit it was for him to 'sit in' on the seminars chaired by Noel-Baker's erstwhile assistants, so having his horizons extended and his moorings made less insecure. Besides, being not yet at that

<sup>2</sup> *The Nature of International Society* — George Bell & Sons, 1952.



time an alien, he still belonged to Chatham House; whose meetings were still then in the evening. One stopped off there, after a bite in the School refectory, on one's homeward way to South Kensington. (Yes, how incredibly long ago! From Aldwych to South Kensington it was 3d. by train or bus). Evening meetings. As a bachelor, one was then in less of a hurry to be home.

Most striking of the many other changes that have come about since then has been the depletion, replenishment and growth of the staff. Lucy Mair, moving out from her specialisation in the League mandates, had opted for a future in the teaching of Colonial Administration. Bailey, at 34, had died. Fergus Chalmers Wright, ours for a short while after his gallant and adventurous war, was captured from us by the United Nations. Meanwhile Brian Tunstall, beginning at very short notice in October 1945, was doing yeoman service along several new lines at once. Next, Frank Chambers, with his justly popular 'This Age of Conflict'. Then, Geoffrey Goodwin, who, besides having relevant Army and Foreign Office experience, was the first of those, five now in all, who themselves had taken International Relations at the School. Martin Wight too we were most lucky to acquire, so eruditely impressive in every way: when he eventually transferred his exhilarating services to Brighton, several of his supervisees went there too! With us still are Fred Northedge, now a Reader; Hedley Bull, cited, on arms control, in every intelligent part of the world; Alan James, Geoffrey Stern, Michael Banks. The overall picture is a source of inexpressible satisfaction to the person who, were it not now so encouraging, would doubtless be wishing that he might have had yet a little more time.

Meanwhile, in 1932 the new Chair of International History had been accepted by the formidable Charles Webster: whether to Lords, or to Twickenham, or to a Conference in Madrid, it was always a lively adventure to go places with him. And whereas in the 'thirties' it was Bailey who, more than anyone in the School, did intensive work in international economics, this recalcitrant territory has since then rightly become the responsibility of a Department of its own. Geoffrey Goodwin is strong on the political aspects of such things and has kept us well in touch with that particular vein in the conglomerate of international affairs.

Every silver lining, some wag has remarked, has a cloud to go with it. Before looking for the clouds, let us notice some bits of silver lining. Many good things have happened, of which only one or two will be mentioned. A sound development, in 1931, was the inaugurating of the course for the School's Certificate in International Studies. Why, it has been asked, a 'certificate', not a 'diploma'? The answer is because the course was introduced in

specific replacement of a pre-existing diploma course; and that, representing as it was to do a higher and more exacting level of training, it seemed to require a different name. For graduates not wishing or in a position, to register for a higher degree this alternative has been a manifest boon. The standard has been maintained at the cost of many disappointments, but even the failures may well have benefited, if only in those of their subjects that did not prove too far beyond them. The course has in recent years owed much to the nurturing of Dr. Northedge. And the holders of the Certificate have, I would claim, been a credit to the School.

Likewise of prime importance was the creation at University College, in the Faculty of Laws, of a post in International Law and Relations. Dr. Schwarzenberger, who so became in a sense my opposite number at the sister institution, had previously taken a doctorate at the School, and was not out of sympathy with the purportedly sociological manner in which I in those days was approaching our subject. Indeed his tendency has been rather to dot the i's and cross the t's—more rigorously than I may myself have done—of that approach. It has fallen to us to work usefully together on many things, and, though the emphasis in the teaching and the *'specialités de la maison'* have not been in both colleges quite the same, our candidates have year after year confronted, without marked embarrassment, identical papers. The spread of our then infant discipline to that other great college was something the news of which was transmitted to me, not in advance, through none other, as it happens, than the economics lecturer, Hugh Gaitskell. He has doubtless forgotten all about it by now, but to us it has made a great difference. What our students would have done when evacuated to Cambridge for the war years, had not University College also been there, and Dr. Schwarzenberger, with only one brief interruption, on the job, I cannot think. As it was, they went to him for their international law, and, with help in other things from L. G. Robinson, and, after October 1943, a little also from me, somehow managed. Managed! Susan Strange was one of that contingent. There wasn't much mere managing about her. Dr. Schwarzenberger indeed did wisely to secure her for a colleague as soon as he could.

Another beneficent development, though it needs explaining, was the shifting of international law, from being part of a special subject 'International Law and Relations', to a position among the 'alternative' subjects, to become technically optional, though in practice still insisted upon, for our group of first degree students. The point was partly that this spared them from including some other 'alternative', and so lightened their theretofore disproportionate load. It at the same time enabled us thenceforth



to have separate papers in international relations and in international institutions, to the obvious advantage of those who took with seriousness their study of each. The 'special subject' now became, simply, International Relations, the first of its compulsory papers still being, as before, the one in international history.

Then too, biggest upheaval of all, there was the 1949 reform of the entire Bsc. (Econ.) degree. This can scarcely be said to have resulted from any urging by the teachers of international relations—or to have been inspired by much concern with their interests and ideas. It was too much to be hoped for that a new-fangled scheme, if it sufficiently suited other people, could have long been retarded by any objections from them. It is one of the ironies of our academic history that it was they alone, or almost alone, who were not after a very few years' experience of it, to be heard in complaint against the new regime. What had saved the situation for them was the eleventh-hour introduction into the new Part I of a new alternative subject, 'Structure of International Society', thanks to which their students, in replacement of a part share in a two-years 'finals' course, would have a one-year Part II, so to say, to themselves, and would make their first acquaintance with international relations in their freshman year. This for all concerned was a considerable improvement, and in a number of ways. If, now that in 1961, on the urging of so many others, yet a further revision has been effected in the scheme of the degree, one must hope that the improved arrangements may once again serve the interests as well of international relations specialists as of the others.

Even more important, under the 1949 regulations, had been the opportunity then for the first time afforded, to some *non-prospective-specialists* in international relations, also to have 'Structure of International Society' for a time upon their plate. Their two years of this having now been cut to one, the advantage for them of this subject may presumably have been reduced. There can now be all too little time for such candidates fully to realise the value to them of their safari into an area of intellectual inquiry traditionally accessible to none but a more or less professional few. Teachers must console themselves with the reflection that perhaps after all a little learning may not always be so dangerous a thing, and that half even of a mere half-loaf may, if of superior substance, be better than no bread at all. And they must just bend their endeavours to making the bread as good as they can get it. It is something that along with their breadcrumb the beginners have now only four, instead of seven, originally eight, other subjects to assimilate. Many students, on the old basis, may well have tended to skimp their 'Structure' studies, in their congested second year, anyway. In short the latest formula may yet turn

out to be the best one after all. And the new system has, for international relations specialists, some positive attractions too. Courage, brothers!

In one further respect too the 1949 reforms had redounded to our positive advantage. Between the wars those specialising with us had included some admirable people, to whose friendship one has clung; few if any of them, however, would be found to contest the following proposition: they were unlikely, as a category, to collect many 'firsts'. Why? Because the candidate with first class potentialities was unlikely to disregard, in his choosing of a special subject, the ones for which he had already shown such an aptitude in his Intermediate year.<sup>1</sup> And international relations was unrepresented in the intermediate syllabus. So no one had the opportunity to excel in it at that choice-affecting level. Hence, our run mainly of goodish seconds, at best, in finals, up to 1952. And hence, possibly, our better results since then.

And what now of those clouds? Of these one at least remembers two. A feature of the pre-1939 silver lining had been the opportunities in those days accessible, and eagerly availed of, for regular consorting by members of the staff with birds of their feather elsewhere. There was Geneva, and there was the International Studies Conference. During most, though not the whole, of the 'thirties', the teachers of International Relations and of International Law were encouraged, and financially enabled, to spend their Septembers in company and often in lively argument with their confrères from a score of countries, and incidentally studying the functioning of the international institutions, at the seat of the League of Nations. Happily, for example, for him and happily also for the world it was not until after Hersch Lauterpacht had moved on, to the Whewell Chair in Cambridge, that this arrangement was discontinued. It is hard to exaggerate what that opportunity could mean to those, like Lucy Mair, and Bailey, and Lauterpacht, who understood how best to use it. There are teachers now on the staff who have never had a comparable experience.

When the International Studies Conference was created in 1928, it was expressly in order to foster contact and cooperation between the personnel of institutions for the "scientific study of international relations." Up to its Bergen meeting in August 1939 it had a Conference, as well as lesser comings together, in every year. As in other countries where more than one such institution was found to exist, there was created in Britain a Coordinating Committee for International Studies, to cater for the British parti-

<sup>1</sup> Northedge in 1948 was a shining exception. And his, as it happened, had been an external, not internal, Intermediate.



cipation. On this committee we some of us regularly served. And besides the big annual gatherings, whether in Paris, Milan, Madrid, Copenhagen, Prague, London or elsewhere, there were the occasional Conferences at the School, of representatives of the Universities of Great Britain. These last, in his honoured memory, since he had been their organising genius, we have taken to calling 'Bailey' Conferences, and they still are held. But the International Studies Conference, backed in pre-war years by the Rockefeller Foundation and for a short time supported by Unesco, is now no more. Not all those who knew the I.S.C. have mourned its disappearance. But then not all those who knew it had had for it identical hopes.

The success of say an Edinburgh Festival, while partly dependent upon its organisers, depends partly also upon the individual performers who attend it and upon what they do. If in a given year a serious proportion of these have come along primarily for a stay in bonny Scotland, full success will scarcely be achieved. Yet there may even so persist the feeling that on some future occasion, with a stronger leavening of true musicians as well in their enthusiasms as in their skills, things may develop as intended. *Mutatis mutandis*, one's hopes with the I.S.C. were much the same. Full-time teachers of our subject were in those days only a small minority among those assembled—being still so small a minority in the lands from which they came. When, some day, thanks possibly to the Conference itself, that position would have changed, those vocal in the debates would be more likely themselves to have studied the documentation so assiduously prepared and so profusely and, on the whole, so punctually, distributed for their convenience and edification. By its warmer supporters the Conference will have been valued less for what it already was than for what it might presently have become.

But also very highly for what it already was, especially in the discussions it every year promoted on its standing item, the university teaching of international relations. Conference by conference, these discussions grew more relevant, more sophisticated, more realistic. Incidentally, though there were views and views on what exactly the subject consisted in and on how it should be taught, one does not recollect anyone ever in all that series of debates advancing the suggestion that it was merely a part, offshoot or sidebranch of anything else. Nor was this altogether surprising, given that in its very origins the Conference pre-supposed the possibility and the experience of a scientific study of international relations.

What motive any man of judgment might have had for wanting to turn the deathray onto so widely valued an organisation is

something that our future historian might well be moved to consider. What one does at least know is that, by particular individuals, particular discontents might have been expressed, and this with certain consequences, among them the strange situation in which Unesco could officially have the impression that the I.S.C. itself was by way of wanting to wind itself up! On what sort of evidence can Unesco so have assumed? Not, at all events, on any formal decision, in the suggested sense, by the Conference itself. Nor even by its national committees. One of these indeed, getting word of what particular individuals were envisaging, may have gone so far as to resolve that, *should* enough of the other national committees desire a winding-up, the idea should not be resisted. Since, however, no other national committee seems even to have got so far as that, the contingency can hardly be said to have arisen. At the Rome meeting of the Executive Committee in early 1952, where account would have had to be taken of any such reported wishes, no such wishes were reported. On the contrary, the feeling was that the organisation should continue.

It was only when intelligence was received of Unesco's having cut off the financial lifestream on which the organisation depended, that there came to be accepted the conclusion that there must, at least in effect, be a winding up. (He who stopped paying the piper had thereby called off the tune.) Even so, at the London meeting where this took place, it was decided that some of the activities should in some form be resumed, should conditions eventually make this once more possible.

The historian might wish for more on these matters: but he will not find it here. Let him meanwhile be slow to blame anybody, unless he in fact knows whom to blame. Not every woodpile has even a European in it. Accidents do occur. Unesco, in particular, in its aspect as some committee, need not have seen what was at stake. What was the I.S.C. anyway? What was the study of international relations? Almost one asks, but one forbears to: Why should so middle-of-the-road an organisation as Unesco have concern for such a sideline as the study of international relations? But that question would be much too cheap, and not really very nice. It will not be asked.

I have now and again been chided with not having contrived to make the subject more widely appreciated. And it is something for which I do rather tend to reproach myself. Assuming however that one might indeed have manufactured the time not merely to pursue and to present but also systematically to publicise the subject, a difficulty must yet have remained. Those that one did speak to so seldom seemed to know, even though they so confidently claimed to, what exactly one must presumably be



talking about. Their magnanimity was related they knew not just to what. Their mistrust, or near-hostility, in other cases, was nursed towards their private 'image' of the subject, rather than to anything it anywhere ever had been or ever was likely to be.

Sometimes, unless a given commodity, the potato perhaps, or the prune, or the panama hat, is methodically provided with a re-created image, the mere fact of its having, physically, been rehabilitated may not be of much avail. The image of international relations as a phase of international history; or simply as current events; or as a 'bundle' or constellation or 'field' of studies; or, as international law demythologised and rechristened; or as a branch of political science; or as 'the United Nations and all that'—none of these over-simplifications could well have been expected to command for it the solicitude of Unesco or to win for it the needed hospitality at the level where ideas for future expansion in the universities are sifted and adopted or pigeonholed or scrapped. The fact of a subject's not having become more widely accepted may have little to do with the shape of its public image. But the falseness of its public image may have everything to do with its not becoming more widely accepted.

Evidence of the subject's so frequent misappraisal was seldom far to seek. As also of its low esteem. I recall the look with which my own migration from a post in something old-established to a chair in this "hot-air" innovation was noted by some of my friends. I recall how at that Unesco Conference, 'way back' in 1948, when the creation of chairs of international relations was recommended as urgent, one apparently serious person voiced a doubt as to how, in so small a country as his, so "small" a subject as that could in practice be made the full-time responsibility of a whole professor. What sort of a subject, one at such times felt like asking, do they think ours is? And what sort of scholars do they think we are? And what sort of teaching do they think our students get?

On one semi-public occasion, it was specifically averred, with respect to a certain sort of teacher, that, in the view he represented, a previous acquaintance with history could, to the beginner in international relations, be 'more of a hindrance than a help'. Particularly instructive was the apparent confidence with which the offender, before eventually conceding his *faux pas*, addressed himself to an unrewarding search for some of that evidence on which his aspersion might have rested. It was revelatory of the light in which one at least among the learned public had presumably been seeing, or thinking to see, the subject of international relations and the level on which it was being handled. One may be thankful that such things don't happen every day. Not that one would necessarily know of it if they did.

Mistrust of the unfamiliar subject might take many forms. Was it not, presumably, in its origin, just a line in League of Nations propaganda, or at best, a pleading for disarmament, or in general for peace? Was not its very existence attributable to the personal whims of highminded millionaires? Was it not something that they went in for in America?! And was not the subject of necessity dependent upon guesswork, given that the facts in which it must profess to deal were never yet accessible, and would have become the business of the historian by the time they were? Gossip, when you came to think of it—didn't you think? Whether any such things were ever specifically said one has not, it is true, very carefully inquired. But very well they might have been, for all that was being done to make further provision for the subject, even in places where it most obviously was needed.

Meanwhile its authorized expositors were progressively elaborating their conception of what their subject-matter comprehended. To borrow a notion from the historians of culture, it was as if there were a case of differentiations being effected within an original compactness. When, for example, there was formally identified that subdiscipline, or sub-specialism, which came to have the name of the Sociology of International Law, this was not by the detaching of a part, of the developing of an offshoot, of international relations proper, but simply by the educing and pointing up of an element implicit in the very idea of a study of international society. The same is to be said of the several other sub-specialisms—the strategic aspects, for instance, and the psychological, and the philosophical—for the teaching of which it was found necessary to provide—all of them not so much as amplifications, but rather as accentuations of existing aspects, of the original subject. The metaphor of the matrix has also its application here.

For the matrix-concept was that of a study of universal society as such. It was this that, as teachers of international relations, we were essentially concerned to promote. *Too much so?* Were we asking for too much detachment, too austere a disinterestedness, on the part of the beginner? It is anyhow easy for the teacher to misconceive the real life situation as it confronts, and well-nigh overwhelms, some at least of the freshmen. It is so tempting to think of them as if having the time, and the urge, to brood indefinitely on all the vexing issues compresent in the overall state of the world. The problem of international relations teaching at first year level is not that of how to keep citizens abreast of all the newest developments in the field—whether of action or of study. It is how to elicit the right kind of interest in the right kind of approach to the right kinds of inquiry, into elementals. This



is not necessarily by diverting the mind from a contemplation of current events: but by pointing, among the tangle of issues to which the events give rise, to those that have most feeding in them for the freshman. And, by sharpening his perception of the relation between these particular issues and those others that for the time being he should be content to leave aside. By providing him, that is, with one of the adornments of the educated man: the disposition and the ability to assess and allow for the nature and extent of his ignorance.

While there might never be the time, even could the necessary arrangements be made, for doing full justice, at undergraduate level, to all the ramifications of the international relations subject-matter, at least it might be possible, were its importance sufficiently felt, to ensure that every serious student of the subject knew in general the identity and nature of those facets of international affairs respecting which his scholarly equipment still was least sufficient. If there do remain aspects in which he still is relatively untutored, he should know enough about them not therefore blithely to discount their importance. And conversely, let him not overrate the relative importance of such aspects of the subject as he may himself have had particular occasion to pursue. 'Very good option — blank blank! / did blank blank.' This 'I did...' is a criterion of selective commendation which it is normally advisable to eschew.

In common with the foreign policy practitioner, the leader-writer, and the man in the street, it is in concrete international situations as currently occurring that the intending specialist may in practice feel initially an interest. What should presently differentiate him from some of those others is not the orientation of his vision, but the disposition of his mind. What the layman perceives as in effect a dilettante, he, the intending specialist, will examine as a connoisseur. For the pre-requisite to an appreciation of the situation in the here and now is a special world-awareness in the connoisseur. World awareness: that, rather than what is vaguely referred to as international understanding, may be named as the desideratum at all stages in the teaching. Awareness of the world. One man's world is not another's. Every man's world is inadequate. It should be a function of education to render less inadequate the student's world — his picture, his image, that is, of *the* world. One lives along with one's personal world image as one lives with one's personal situation. By taking thought and action, one may improve, or retard the worsening, alike of one's situation and of one's image. Education should show a man what this day to day attention to his image can demand. What literature he will be wise to read. What problems he need bother about. What issues he should be willing to neglect.

Connoisseurship of international gamesmanship: that too denotes a desideratum devoutly to be borne in mind. But, whereas

for the out-and-out beginner it is on the basic nature of the world, the milieu, the institutional environment, that the emphasis should have been, now it is at the second and third year men that one is looking. Connoisseurship of international behaviour postulates an awareness of the nature not only of the world, but in particular of the statesman's problems and of the peculiar manner in which they may present themselves to him. It presupposes, for example, a grasp of the distinctively strategic aspects of a situation, the factors and the forces that bear upon its treatment and the implications of whatever may come to be the accepted line. And, sooner than ask what list of subjects the connoisseur should cumulatively have studied, it is better to remark the varieties of insight for the lack of which he might be left at a disadvantage. Be he, for instance, a historian or not, he may aspire to understand better how any given situation has come about; and how those involved in it severally believe, or would like to believe, or would like to be thought to believe, or would like others to believe, that it has come about. Whether professionally an economist or not, he may wish to appreciate the anxieties, the hopes, the calculations that go towards determining the attitudes of people, of peoples, of officials and of governments to what may be classed as economic issues—and the reasons why it is more difficult at the international than at the domestic level even to conceive of what, with better intelligence or wider and more dependable electoral support, might be the feasible and propitious thing to do. Whether a psychologist or not, he may want not to misconceive what it is that makes people behave the ways they do in situations that might lend themselves so much better to beneficial treatment if only people's attitudes toward them were sufficiently other than they are. The question is not, what subjects must be assembled and blended into one, but what sorts of insight may be needed for the full illuminating of that social reality which in the life of man at the global level invites, and challenges, the appreciation of the connoisseur. The connoisseur, that is, of international gamesmanship. And again, whether a lawyer or not, he may be concerned to see the relevance of legal elements, and of legal reasoning with respect to them, in the life of international society.

Humanity-as-a-whole, *alias* the social cosmos, is 'out there', having of itself a collective self-image as of a plurality of independent sovereign states. The point here is not just simply what those entities are, but in what way they are officially conceived of. The phenomenon of the co-existence of so many sovereign statehoods is more than that of the co-existence of so many human beings. And no one can adequately understand that co-existence of the sovereign statehoods who does not sufficiently appreciate: (a) the structure of the international society as such; (b) the social psychology relevant thereto; (c) the economics, (d) the legalistics,



(e) the geographics and strategics, and (g) the semantics relevant thereto.

In a certain sense therefore social cosmology as well at its more advanced as its elementary levels is a blending of many varieties of insight: but it is not therefore merely a synthesis of the disciplines from which those insights should derive. The man of affairs is not aptly to be thought of as an economist plus a social historian plus a psychologist plus a lawyer. Yet he may well have an adult sensitivity to the economic, the social, the psychological and the legal aspects of the situations that he meets with in his doings from day to day. Lifemanship, gamesmanship, world awareness, sociocosmonautics. There may be many words for it. What counts is not what we may elect to call it, but what it essentially is.

The needed sensitivity is more than a certain merely intellectual standpoint which we must be wishing to foster. It is a kind of artistry as well. Hence my insistence on the idea of connoisseurship. And hence what has now to be confessed, namely, my realisation that my former semi-infatuation with the strictly scientific approach was overdone. Overdone, because insufficient, if situations were to be appreciated in their wholeness, with justice to every demand that might be made upon the mind. The demand, in particular, to think, and this on the requisite mental wavelength, about questions of value, no less than about questions of fact. For lifemanship means living, and living, means inescapably and perennially a juxtaposing and a contraposing of values.

There is nothing improper in a strictly scientific approach to a strictly scientific question. There will always be plenty of these. But other questions must also be understood. Man the mature is not the mathematician merely, nor even the mathematician-cum-man-of-natural-science. He is the philosopher also. The more mature, the more the philosopher.

Well does one remember what it was that in those early days one mainly had in mind. There was teaching and there was preaching. The latter was no business of the academic discussion-leader. Preaching was tendentious. Teaching should be non-tendentious. To be non-tendentious should mean to be impartial, objective, dispassionate, detached. To be, in short, scientific? At some point in this reasoning a *non sequitur* must somehow have found its way in. For is everything that is non-tendentious therefore scientific? And the best teachers of philosophy, are they necessarily tendentious? To have a philosophy, and to preach it: that might indeed be tendentious. But to have a philosophy, and to defend it, in the course of an authentically philosophical inquiry: that could well be different. And this difference is what in those early days one had largely failed to see. There must, one

maintained, be no philosophy, for there must be no tendentiousness. And the firmness with which one adhered to this contention, in argument whether with a Zimmern or a Lindsay, did more credit to one's juvenile self-assurance than to one's understanding of the point at issue.

For to agree — even before one had ever heard of him — with Max Weber, was quite all right, if it was the specifically sociological standpoint that one was seeking to defend. The mistake was in making such a fetish of the strictly sociological standpoint. By all means let preaching be abjured. But let not the student be therefore denied all experienced aid in his attempted appreciating of situations as a whole. For the tasks of science let him be helped to acquire the tools of science. But for the application of judgment let him by the practice of judgment be led to discover what the art of judgment means. If academic respectability is indeed to be cherished, let it not be supposed that the scientists have any monopoly of that.

For a treatment to be severely scientific, as opposed to being unscientific: that is one thing. For it to be narrowly scientific as opposed to being humanistic or philosophic: that is another. In the first case, presumably, a mistake is being avoided. In the second very possibly a bus is being missed. It was these two distinctions which, in debate with my elders-and-betters, I can now see myself as having been so prone to muddle up. *Peccavi*, or at least *erravi*. I rather doubt now if I shall ever quite overtake that bus.

However, the vehicle will even so have been there, like the sycamore in the college quad. The bus was there, and others might have been catching it, had more of them been having the chance. International relationships, as a reality of importance for the offspring even of consequential people, would have that importance however unhurriedly such people might come to see it. But the question remained: Why were leading people, people with policy-affecting influence in the universities, and why are they still, in this respect, so slow? This was in a sense the question for a probing of which the Windsor meeting in February 1950, as reported upon in the 'Goodwin booklet', had been convened. As readers of that publication may well have gathered, the course of those discussions did not fully conform to their original plan. Wise men who ostensibly had come along to do one thing ended up by doing something different—in the sense that inquiry into why a thing is not being done, is one thing; whereas recommending that it should be, is another. So, despite the Windsor meeting, the future historian may still find himself in difficulty when he comes to asking Why? If there is reluctance



among the eminent to be thinking about why they should not be admitting something new into their curricular scheme of things. there might almost appear to be a comparable reluctance among expositors of international relations to be thinking about why university leaders are so reluctant to be thinking about... Perhaps if one were wiser one might oneself be more reluctant to be thinking about why one's confrères in international relations can be so reluctant...!

But I myself am not half as wise as that. I shall offer therefore a theory of my own. People, I suspect, may feel it to be time-wasting or worse to attempt inquiries that can make only for a sense of frustration. If there is to be found the way to a change, it will, they feel, be through individuals with real, and not merely official, opportunities for the removing of those mountains of seeming indifference that bar every prospect of advance. The less headlining, the better the hope of seeing something quietly accomplished, by and by.

Another possibility could be that persons with a superior sense of social responsibility have seen danger in any such probing by busybodies like me into the doings of the not-sufficiently-busy bodies on which they serve. Would even I really wish the community in general to concern itself with university affairs? It does not, as yet: and for this small but solid mercy ought not I, with others, to be thankful?

But suppose, after all, that it were to do so. Suppose the community, alerted to the peril of persistent world-political illiteracy that threatens the coming generation, were to address itself to the need for a change. What advice would I be wishing to give it? My answer is that in the universities it is not on the personnel so much as on the machinery that the reforming eye should focus. It is not on the people but on the bodies on which they sit. Bring together a dozen or so of persons; or, as the jargon now has it, of 'bodies'; and put them around a table. What you so get is in the more traditional sense itself a single body—an academic body perhaps, composed of individual academic 'bodies'. And it is not the work put in by the individual 'bodies' but rather the working of 'bodies', and put them around a table. What you so get is in perhaps we should say that, of the work put in by the 'bodies', it is only that part which has some impact upon the working of the bodies, that counts. It is thus rather a matter of constitutional mechanics than of personal 'energetics'.

Essential to our understanding of the working of academic bodies is the fact that those who serve on them can scarcely discard their preoccupations as the salaried custodians of subjects

each of which, to its particular sponsor, is the very *raison d'être* of his professional existence. Also that, even where the 'democratic' principle of majority decisions is formally adhered to, this happens within a system in which the usual parliamentary possibility of majorities and minorities exchanging roles may not, in practice, very effectively obtain. The 'large' faculty, section, department or what have you may tomorrow be a larger still. It is unlikely to be less large. And for these purposes the 'large' department is not just the department with a large subject, or large numbers, be it of staff or students, or even with large responsibilities; but rather the department with large representation at the appropriate point. (And between larger and less large departments there is naturally enough this significant difference: when the larger department knows what it wants, but does not get it, its well-wishers are likely to wonder why: when the smaller men are apt to think they know. It is among the anomalies of democracy that, even though all individuals may have an equal voice, yet, if the component categories in the population are not all of them equally numerous, some may in practice find it not so altogether different from not being represented at all). If in the university kingdom there could be said to exist some overmighty subjects, international relations, for all its importance, might seem unlikely for a long while yet to look like one of these.

Indeed, as concerns so much of the university kingdom as lies within the United Kingdom, it may be questioned how far, as yet, the subject of international relations, as indeed a subject, can strictly be considered as having found general acceptance at all. Ask the average 'estabman' (to coin a needed term) if it mightn't be well to approve the subject and to change the traditional system: the chances are that he will be more inclined to approve the system, and to change the subject! The trouble is that the system is all too just and fair. It makes no favourites. In it a subject, any subject, while it can count for one, cannot be permitted to count for more than one—even if that is what in fact it is. This means that some subjects may not after all count for anything, independently, at all. Can we not imagine our estabman's reply? 'Your young folk want, or at least they obviously need the opportunity, should they choose, to acquaint themselves with the elements of the global social set-up in terms of which they are apparently destined to live. That is sufficiently understandable, and commendable. You are looking to us to see that they have this opportunity. That too is understandable. But please consider. It isn't terribly easy for us to give your young folk this opportunity that they so admittedly need. Mind you, it is not at bottom a question of finance. No one is telling us that were we to seek from the public purse the wherewithal to



accommodate the teaching of international relations we would not get it. There are precedents for all that. But it so happens that, with us, it is almost as if no one were supposed to be interested in his global social milieu unless he happened to have entered himself for a specialisation in government and that sort of thing. And that you see, rather tends to rule out a big majority of our students right away. And it is rather assumed, I think, that it is the political scientists, if anybody, who will be wanting to make some sort of beginning with it, by and by.

'Though our politics departments do apparently want to expand into international relations, this is only one of many lines of new development that they apparently have in mind: and they cannot hope to do everything at once. Other departments also have their aspirations. Actually I am not sure that our politics people are as bothered about the need for international relations as some of the rest of us might be, if it were any of our concern. I am not really sure that they have put it very high on their list. Anyhow these things take time, you know.'

Meanwhile the young men come along in, year by year, and year by year they go along out, their spiritual and intellectual bellies as empty in this respect as when they first moved in.

The same sort of reply would of course be equally appropriate for the teaching in economics, or sociology, or cultural anthropology, had political scientists but bethought themselves of asserting a monopoly in the teaching of these subjects also, and been permitted, as so commonly in the case of international relations, to get away with their intemperate claim.

Why should London for so long have been almost alone in accepting that international relations, like any other subject, be suffered to count for one, and not for less than one?<sup>2</sup> Why is it ever so uncritically assumed that it 'comes under' political science?

<sup>2</sup> Even in London, the fact that international relations so commonly did not exist—as one—and therefore could not count as one, elsewhere, may now and then, and here and there, have served not altogether surprisingly, to cast if only a *souçon* of a suspicion on its credentials; inhibiting, however slightly, the ability to envisage it for what it was, and the disposition to provide for it those extra-special opportunities that in its earlier stages any such urgent and uncondensable new discipline might have been seen to require. To say that its future, in London, had ever been problematic, could be an exaggeration. Though it is true that in thirty-eight years it has never had but a single Chair, lesser posts in it have indeed been created. But not in particular haste. It would be a pity, and a mistake, if others, in other centres, resolving, however belatedly, to give the subject its intrinsic due, were to take the London scale and tempo as an ensample of how swiftly and how openhandedly to proceed. (*Mea culpa? Comme vous voudrez.*)

Rational debate on this sort of issue might sometimes have been less difficult were champions of the greater 'politics' more precise on what they were trying to prove. Was it merely that, because students of politics need to know about international relations, the latter has often, to the general advantage, been introduced into departments of political science? Or, were they claiming that by the very nature of these subjects one was a part of the other? And this whether so treated or not.

A special difficulty might well have derived from that already mentioned imprecision in the image of international relations. What your political scientist was talking about might not be the same as what your international relations specialist was talking about. So each might be right with respect to what he, though not the other, was talking about. Two things moreover need here to be distinguished: the attaching, to what is strictly but a part of something else, of the label international relations; and, the treating of international relations as if it were but a part of something else.

Often your political scientist has indeed seemed to be arguing that international relations was by its nature a part, outgrowth, offshoot, subdivision, or side-branch, of political science. And if the strength of his case was to be measured by the poverty of the reasoning sometimes offered in its support, it must be weak indeed. True, he would not invariably seek to establish what he was saying by simply recalling that it had been said before; or, by showing that it had been acted upon as if known to be true. Commonly he would so far have looked into the matter as to see that students of political science, *qua* the study of the state, need also to study the society of states. So, international relations became *eo ipso* but a part of the study of the state. And had therefore no justification for existing on its own! But could not theology equally be something that political scientists might be well advised to study? Or economics? Or nuclear physics? Or constitutional law?

Granted that international relations had indeed been taught in departments of political science. Equally, literature had been sold in drug-stores. Maybe there were potent reasons for classing some sorts of literature as a drug: but their availability in drug-stores was not in itself conclusive on the point. One knew how things got sold in drug-stores. One had been told too how subjects had come to be taught in departments of political science.<sup>3</sup>

To argue that, simply because specializers in political science have need of international relations, therefore the latter subject

<sup>3</sup> See for instance, Morgenthau's, "Dilemmas of Politics" pp. 7–26



is in strictness a part of the former, is like contending that political science, since it is needed by economists, is therefore a part of economics. To argue on the other hand that, merely because students of international relations have need to know something of politics, therefore their subject ought, correctly, to be taught in departments of political science, is like saying that, because engineers have need of arithmetic, engineering ought only to be taught in departments of that. The dependence of engineering upon arithmetic is obvious enough. But is it not dependent on other things as well? Is international relations not also dependent on subjects other than political science? Is it therefore equally to be seen as but a frill upon these; instead of being itself a cloak indispensable to anyone, whether a political scientist or not, who ventures forth into the international rain?

To the teaching of international relations within departments of political science there need be no sort of objection: any more than to the sale of books in drug-stores. But are drug-stores entitled to monopolise the sale of books? What kind of a right could political scientists possibly have to monopolise the teaching of international relations?

Sometimes in such discussions it might be the easier to appreciate the attitude of some political scientists if one could better understand their motives. Is it always so certain that they are particularly interested in the substance of the issue at all? Why care they what is to be considered part of what, provided it be accessible to those who need to get it? Whence all these take-over bids?

It might, I have suggested, seem almost like a law of academic dynamics that to that that hath shall be given. The stronger in senior posts a department is, the stronger does it seem predestined to become. If French has a preponderance in the languages committee, is it likely gladly to imperil the advantage that this gives it by pushing for an improvement in the relative position of Swahili? Or, if on the praesidium of a college of mathematics, while geometry has five seats, algebra has only three—arithmetic, if you like, having two—it little becomes arithmetic to affect incomprehension if algebra girds at being so frequently overridden by a majority vote—perhaps even toying with the possibility of forming along with arithmetic a united front, since arithmetic is after all but an offshoot, sidebranch, or what you will, of algebra, is it not? Do not schools of algebra prefer their pupils to know some arithmetic, to the point even of perhaps teaching a bit of it themselves? Since this is not imperialism, make the most of it!

There was something alas only too plausible in a suggestion,

offered by someone who certainly knew a thing or two, that the relation of sundry other subjects to political science was at bottom really a question of 'voting strength'. To be perpetually outnumbered in committee was for any subject an inconvenience, even were it nearly, but not quite, the best represented subject of all.

Is it so surprising if, when launching an association for the advancement of their interests and needing for their internal purposes a demarcation of their field, political scientists should have stretched their definition to the limit? It is known that when the International Political Science Association first was formed, it was by political scientists that international relations was listed among the parts of political science. After which it came by some of them seemingly to be thought sufficient, as determining the nature of international relations, to refer to this pronouncement by some of themselves. Railway regulations might for passage-booking purposes determine that cats were 'dogs', but even railway officials would not therefore suppose that such was what they were.

But has it really mattered? Has it really made a difference? Has it not?! An effect of what was done in the framing of the IPSA constitution was that Unesco, after having originally recognised the long established International Studies Conference as the association specifically dealing with the university teaching of international relations, found itself now the sponsor also of a more powerful association with pretensions to a monopoly in respect of that. And presently we saw Unesco discontinuing its effective support of the older organisation.

It might perhaps have been expected that from then on international relations would figure fairly high, though doubtless not disproportionately high, among the preoccupations of IPSA, if not also of its participating national associations. How far this ever proved to be the case may be gathered from the records of the associations in question. 'Infinitesimal' might be much too strong a word for the share of collective attention devoted over the years by IPSA to matters essentially of international relations concern. The agenda for their conferences will rightly, however, have been framed to suit the tastes of those most likely to be taking part. Certainly more, for the advancement and diffusion of international studies, had been done by the International Studies Conference in 10 or even in 5 years before the War than appears even to have been attempted by the wealthier IPSA in more than 15 since.



But, though outside support and encouragement for international relations as a discipline autonomous and distinct might drop to a trickle, or even virtually cease, its distinctive subject matter, pregnant as always with perils and perplexities for mankind, continued unliquidated and untamed, its mortgage upon the mental energies just as onerous as before. In the idiom of an eminent Frenchman, reporting on the then state of the study in France, in the days when Unesco still was blessing such inquiries, '*le complexe relationnel internationale*' would remain extant, and insatiable in its demands upon the timetable and the attention of anyone with a commitment in this threatened area and at least an inkling of what was amiss. The processes of world-wide social coexistence would continue even were the study of them to stop. And certainly they still invited study. So it was business-as-usual on the domestic front. Much else might have been attempted, but with so few on the job it was a matter of putting first things first. Others would no doubt see the point of it all, some day. Unless, of course . . . Unless what?

Medical research, if so far successful as to eliminate disease, would by the same token eliminate the need for further such research. Ideally, you may say, the aim of the research-worker should be to work himself out of his job. He need have no fear of ever fulfilling such an aim. Similarly, when in lighter moments friends would ask me what would be happening to my subject, and to me, should world society cease to be international, becoming one-and-undivided, I would reply that I reckoned it would last out my time. What neither they nor I ever played with was the alternative hypothesis, of international society, not so much ceasing to be international as ceasing to be in effect a society. That indeed would have been a sobering line of speculation. What if the artificial assumptions in terms of which civilization had hung, however precariously, together, at least since the close of the Middle Ages, should cease to command that measure of general acceptance which made business dealings feasible, intelligible and sufficiently sensible as well between enemies as between friends? What if, instead of merely taking liberties with the rules of the international game, powers in revolt against the inherited scheme of things should act as if no longer caring to be players at all? We did not think of that one. Yet we manifestly should have. For although we too, in common with the ever-multiplying confraternity of diplomatic officialdom, continued as in effect from time immemorial to take those artificial assumptions as given, it surely was up to us, as distinct perhaps from them, to beware of ever forgetting how fundamentally artificial they were. And beware of course we did, making our stressing of that artificiality the very staple of our teaching. But

the artificial is commonly manmade, and what man has made he may destroy. Why did we not think of that? But did we not? Of course yes. Only we did not experience our thinking in our bones. Tomorrow, it was true, the traditional myths might evanesce. Meanwhile, sufficient unto the day . . . *Our* day at least, even if *après nous le désillusion*. There were all sorts of reasons why I must have been chafing to get on with that book. But fear lest its delineating of the cosmos might be outdated by events was hardly one of these. Folks used actually to ask me in, for instance, the autumn of 1931, or the summer of 1936, whether the content of my subject had not become transmogrified as it were overnight. 'No', I would tell them, 'it's still the same old world, with men the same fallible creatures as ever they were. It is just because the world has always been like this, with no one really understanding what to do about it, that it seems to me so important to be trying to help the young people to see it and if possible to take their measure of it as it is. The things that have recently been causing you such dismay are after all only the latest illustrations of what sort of a world ours is'. And so the years rolled by. The way of the transgressor was with us a perennial theme. Not that we always were at one in our specifying of the current transgressor. Some of us sometimes even thought in shades of grey. And the *peccavis* were seldom so audible as the *peccavits* and the *peccaverunt*.

The old order of course was changing, all the time. Anyone could have told you that. But not in so catastrophic a manner as ever in effect to be yielding place to the altogether new. If it is *le provisoire* that lasts, why not the artificial also? Oh yes, it was artificial all right, that old order. We certainly appreciated that. But not in our very bones. So, although we quite well enough knew that it might not endure for ever, we never thought to effect an insurance on its life. Could we have? What chances would its doctors have given it?

And so the years rolled by, and presently one's own term of duty was drawing toward a close. So one 'stepped on it', and cut out the non-essentials, and at last one had finished the book. The old order, in a nutshell! Just in time, did someone say? Or was it not perhaps just a little bit too late?

It was from Martin Wight, I think, that like many others I learned, in any attempted classifying of international relations theorists, to make much of the radical difference between those, the 'realists', whose concern it was to shed light upon things as they were, and those others, the 'revolutionists', whose minds,



whose writings, and whose activities were animated, as with Mazzini, by some vision of what the world might come to be. In my own approach, I have, I hope, sought to emulate the virtues of the realists, leaving blueprintings for the future to those whose capabilities I have never claimed to share. So too with respect to the past. While trying to base my teaching upon what little I may have learnt of history, history is not what it has been my personal responsibility to teach. So if, as I remember someone saying, in a Bailey Conference long ago, 'There's nothing so impoverishing to the mind as the study of the present', my teaching must always have been pretty destructive of mental wealth. And if the world as I have been visualising it gets superseded, I must for the purposes of my teaching learn to see it anew. Suppose old Professor Euclid had still been a teacher when it emerged that his was not the only possible form of geometry. Could he thereafter simply have carried on as before? My own book is not in the least like his one. But it shares with his the susceptibility to having its assumptions rendered out of date. Up to now (September 1962) no reviewer has yet found fault with it on that account. But I am always expecting that one of them will. Had the proofs come to me at any time after last December I could hardly have left all the wordings as they are. On the other hand it is even now a bit too early to be knowing just how different they ought to be.

Mussolini, for all the ways we woo'd him, was never really a fully accepted member of the club. Neither, come-to-think-of-it, was Uncle Joe. And as for 'that bad man'! But Jawarhalal Nehru? Ah yes. There, if ever you wanted him, was Estabman with a capital E. There was the man upon whose every pronouncement the world, with bated breath, was wont to hang. There was the one in whose smiles, if only he were not so sparing of them, even the most self-sufficient of us would fain have basked. There was he whose frowns, if we could but have escaped them, we would have been so happy to avoid.

No misdoings of a Duce, or a Tojo: not even Hitler's Rhineland *coup*, ever filled me with quite the same sort of revulsion and distress as . . . However, this is not properly an autobiography. Otherwise one might now be disclosing who it was that gave vent to some of his feelings in the following form:

'When the righteous man turneth aside from the way into what is unlawful and wrong, it requires of his friends and admirers a cool reappraisal of where they belong. Doubtless it might now be undiplomatic antiquity's teachings to quote: but that shouldn't mean systematic rejection of all that the ancestors wrote . . .

Yesterday still there were civilized standards that had the allegiance of all: not the most mighty were wanting in scruples respecting the rights of the small. Landmarks were landmarks and neighbours were neighbours and crimes were regarded as crimes. Let us pray the collapse of the idol of clay figure not for a sign of the times!'

Of a professor no longer young, in a university no longer new, holding office on terms no longer typical—the terms, namely, of tenure for life—his reading, and in consequence his teaching, no longer up-to-the-minute—it is related that he was fond of saying 'They used to call me an anachronism. I am now an "abuse". I hope I shall live long enough to become a scandal!' One who has doubtless always been a bit of an abuse, even something of a scandal, must now admit that in his teaching, as reflected in his book, he too may now have become an anachronism. 'That's Shell—that was!' ran a once familiar slogan. 'That's international society—that was!' might at the time, not indeed of its writing (1959) but of its appearing (1962) have been a natural verdict on the book. Nobody could be more anxious than the author that this assessment should eventually prove not after all to have been a true one. But it can not any longer, even if ever it could, depend on him. The significance of things is not always easily measured at the moment when they occur. More's the pity. What made March 7, 1936, so momentous a turning point was not the way its moral impact was discounted but the degree to which its strategic import was unperceived. Have the peoples perceived the symbolic importance of what happened last December? After all, it was only into his own back garden that Hitler had meandered.

In a sense we may say that a civilization gets the future it deserves. Can international society dissolve and Western society, in other respects, continue as before? Or, will it be equally a case of 'That's Western society—that was!' When in 1948 that Unesco Conference urged the universities to make provision for international relations, this was seen by some, themselves of course estabmen, as a piece of impertinence. Will it, even if and when it has become all too true, still be an impertinence to say 'That was Western civilization'? It all depends, does it, on what you mean by 'impertinence'? This last, at any rate, is surely not an impertinent question.