

INFLUENCE AND IMMUNITY

The Spider and the Cat

To have pointed to the element of influence, with the profusion of its manifestations, is to have focused upon what gives its distinctiveness to Diplomats as a branch of study. Influence, as someone well said long ago, is *not* government. And Political Science, at least as heretofore developed, has centred essentially upon the governmental process. International Relations (*alias* Diplomats), its neighbour discipline, presupposes indeed a quasi-social coexistence of 'governed' countries. But its own peculiar concern is with the special nature of one special mode of social co-existence, marked by the absence, even in principle, of any inclusive system of governmental arrangements, any over-arching framework, that is, of formal authority. On the universal, world-wide, scale it is essentially as influence, and not as institutionalised authority, that power, for instance, has its impact on affairs.

As Political Science (*alias* Public Administration *alias* Government) is *par excellence* about government, so is Diplomats characteristically about influence. Sister topics, neighbour disciplines. It might, on the face of it, seem a useful arrangement if every student of politics officially a specialiser in either of these two subjects could be in a position to pursue along with it, as an 'underpinner', the other. For the connoisseur-in-the-making of international relationships it would be scarcely less inopportune to eschew the study of government than it so patently would be to forgo the study of international law.

How then may one analytically differentiate between government and influence? Crudely, and far too innocently, one might think to put the point as follows. Government is what you give them when you have them where you want them:

influence comes in when, not having them where you want them, you can, at most, endeavour to get them to want you to have them where you want them. Overdrawn illustrations are: on the one hand, the cat with a mouse and, on the other, the spider on the watch for a fly.

All of which however is of course oversimplified to the point of caricature. On the one hand, the truth is that government, as political scientists are accustomed to understanding it, is far from being merely a matter of the pushing of people around. And, on the other hand, so far from being the *differentia* of diplomacy, influence, alike in all the affairs of human kind, is more ubiquitous even than speech. One has only to think of salesmanship, gospel-preaching, barracking, courtship, fly-fishing, to perceive that to define a subject as having for its subject-matter the manifestations of influence would be as intemperate (while at the same time just as inhibiting) as it would be to define another subject as simply the study, in its various forms, of power.

Sorts of Social Worlds

What differentiates Diplomats from Government is the difference between the milieux within which by these respective subjects the element of influence is studied. Whereas in the latter case there is presupposed as its context a functioning governmental system, in the former there distinctively is not. The arrangements in relation to which influence is employed are in the one case governmental, in the other inter-governmental. The relationships, the problems, the possibilities, belong in the two cases to different institutional levels, different social worlds. And one has only to look again at the examples given above of sorts of situation, to see that the techniques invoked for the exercise of influence may be as dissimilar in many respects as they may, it is true, be similar in some. All's fair, they say, in love and war: yet there are *ruses de guerre* for which a suitor might with difficulty be forgiven.

Between the techniques of little Johnnie negotiating at the tea table for a second slice of cake, and those of a Big Bill Thompson canvassing in Chicago for re-election to the mayoralty, there may be things in common. But electioneering has in particular the quality of a dual approach. It is hardly less

concerned with dissuading the marginal elector from voting for another than with persuading him to vote for oneself. Now it will be seen that at the extra-domestic level, in the field, that is, of international politics, there may well, as they say, be more 'future' in suborning one's opponent's supporters than in attracting supporters of one's own. And one is tempted to suggest that in international 'electioneering', as practised by say an Eisenhower or a Khrushchev when he goes abroad, more's fair than on the home front, though still perhaps less than in love and war. But what in reality is the limiting factor, on unfairness, in canvassing techniques, at either level? Is it the conscientious scruples of the candidate? Or is it the amount that the market will absorb? Bad sportsmanship at either level is only too liable to drive out good, if only it be not *too* bad. And 'too' bad, here, is alas liable to mean too bad to be got away with.

The Good, the Better, and the Bad

It is easier to see the excuses for the occasional lapse from perfect candour when the sleight-of-hand is being successfully practised by those on 'our' side than on 'theirs'. And if the leaders in an advanced democracy give the impression of being less unscrupulous than some of those in a totalitarian camp, it may be partly because the less scrupulous types are perhaps rather less likely to become the leaders in a democracy sufficiently advanced. But in a country of little political experience there is an unfortunate likelihood that he who does not stoop to conquer may be conquered by those who will stoop to no matter what. That is why we may wish on the whole that the newer 'democracies' were more sophisticated, more discriminating, more mature. (It is no use inveighing against those who exploit the gullibility of a public if the certainty is that, were they not to do it, others would.) And that also is why we may wish on the whole that the relative maturity, political literacy, and awareness of what everything is all about, could in the case of the older democracies be at least as evident in matters of international, as of domestic, affairs. For the perils of political illiteracy are not less in the one sphere than in the other.

For though literacy may not of itself preclude apathy, the

effective vigilance which liberty requires might be difficult to maintain without it. And even under the extremest form of autocracy there is a residual freedom in the spirit of man; and hence probably a greater dependence upon the element of influence than on the crude pushing of people around. Meanwhile, apart from this, there are three further sorts of government, two being a governing of others, the third the governing of self. Colonial administration, or, as some may still prefer to call it, imperial rule, has not nowadays a sympathetic press. However good it be, it is, as if by definition, less good than is self-government, however bad. Nor is colonial administration necessarily even good. But whether government be bad, or good, or better, the element of influence, employed in the locally-productive forms and subject to the locally-operative limitations, is as characteristic in the contexts of government as in those of diplomacy. Since, however, this essay is not a treatise on government, it is specifically to influence, and to the conditions in which, internationally, this is exerted and competed for, that our further inquiry will relate.

Code-words for Co-operation

At the opera, incognito in the stalls, there sat a famous fiddler. Of a sudden there came the cry of 'FIRE!' All, in a rush, started for the exits. Surely somebody was going to get hurt. But no. Seizing from one in the orchestra a fiddle, the virtuoso began to play. As by magic, the confusion ended. Within seconds all were motionless, entranced by the wonder of his playing. The situation was saved. Panic was averted. But alas they all perished in the flames.

Listening, in the war, to pep talks, few who had heard it can not have been reminded of that story. But did they therefore cease to heed? Not if they knew what they were at. Full well they knew what the talking was for. Why does the pugilist, during training, so often mutter: 'I shall win!'? Why, before elections, do parties proclaim their assurance of success? The function of the pep talk is not merely to reiterate an axiom, but to recall the *motif* of that composition in the rendering of which all are glad to be reminded of their part.

No one in a well-commanded army queries the orders for the

day. No player thinks to question the decisions of his captain. Strength is what is wanted. Unity is strength. Unity in action postulates unity in idea, in conception. 'You understand, young man? In our emporium the customer is always right.' Such is the doctrine by which a successful salesmanship will be informed. The whips are on: let no backbencher have opinions of his own: leastways not overtly. Heresy to the stake. Deviation to the salt mines. 'If the missus says it's black, it's black!'

But is it? Don't customers *ever* err? Is the emperor clad? Is everything that serves the revolution *eo ipso* right? Aren't we downhearted?

Effective behaviour in politics is concerted, harmonised, collective, 'team' behaviour. Of this the ideal model is the racing crew. As to who shall set the time, there will be no contention, any more than in the case of musicians with a conductor. The conductor is the typical master of ceremonies. The instrumentalist is the teamsman. What in politics is solidarity, in games is the spirit of the team. The good party member is the teamsman if not in inward feelings then at least in word and deed. Conformity in politics may flow from teamship, or conviction, or coercion: or, perhaps we should nowadays add, from manipulation. In the West the opportunity for such coercion is virtually non-existent, the need for such conviction relatively small, the scope for such manipulation greater perhaps than we may like to believe; but teamship is almost universally the big idea. Men know which side they are on and who is captain. Like the conductor of the orchestra, who is the executant of a programme not of his composing, so the 'leader' in politics may affect to be merely the instrument of a purpose greater than his own. Meanwhile that participational response from others which alone makes his leadership a possibility is at any given moment just an empirical fact.

Modes of Leadership

If there should have seemed to be anything over-curious about the distinction earlier elaborated between communal, and prevalent, opinion, it should at least be conceded that it is not strictly new. The theories on which old-style Marxist

conspirators prepared to meet their opportunity when it should come turned partly on this very distinction, differently though they may have expressed it. Where we here have written of communal, as opposed to prevalent, opinion, they, those theoreticians of revolution, would speak of 'consciousness' as opposed to 'spontaneity'. It would be of little use, they some of them judged, to wait for the masses to rise against their rulers, or, rising, to know what to do. Leadership must, when the time was ripe, be given, and consciousness engendered, from the top. And where in the wide, wide world today is muscovite subversion looking solely to the many? How about those cadres, Moscow-groomed? If Communism comes tomorrow, in what countries will this be on a popular vote?

Meanwhile that process known officially as 'agitation', as opposed to 'propaganda', is perpetually on the go, not so much for the instruction of the intelligent as for the anticipatory softening up of the unfortified popular mind, and the fanning of every flicker of potential discontent, wherever those spreading tentacles can get to—which nowadays means virtually throughout the world.

Making Friends and Influencing . . .

What in general are politics in the free world all about? What is the essence of a general election? A sort of sublimated civil war, is it not, between positions important mainly as being widely enough shared? It is a competition in the attempted winning away, by either side, of the less fanatical adherents of the other. Deviationism, heresy, non-conformity, non-docility, Durkheimian *anomie*, disarray—these are what 'we' shall be wishing to see among 'their' supporters, and they among ours. What in one light appears as the 'disease' of orthodoxy is the health of monolithic homogeneity when viewed in another. The art of the leader is to dictate and control: to be composer and conductor, while posturing as merely a leader and nothing more. Nasserism has to present itself as Arabism, Hitlerism as nationalism, Kremlinism as Leninism, Maoism as anti-imperialism. Carrots, sticks, slogans, incantations—many are the means whereby people's participation is brought about in the pursuit of purposes not immediately their own.

Diplomacy, more now than ever in the old days of the

'gentleman's' wars or of the fields of cloth of gold, is similarly a competition for influence. We speak, say, or at one time we could, of Britain's 'position' in the Middle East, meaning her influence in those parts. To reduce absolutely an opponent's influence-quantum is to add, relatively, to one's own. As the bedside portable fades out, the sound becomes the more perceptible of the set next door. Now is the opportunity for the set next door to smear what the portable had been praising.

It's All in the Day's Work, for Somebody

The competition for influence may be seen as an aspect of the ever-shifting world-wide balance of sympathies. Somewhere at this moment, for instance, there will presumably be busy the organisers, on a suitable scale, of a momentous operation: the setting of the West against the West. Reconnaissance for this purpose includes the spotting of ambivalencies. That means, in particular, uncovering the shadow-side of every perishable relationship of mutual esteem. No doubt George III was never typically English. But the Americans, having fought against England, long continued to find a sense of fulfilment in the twisting of a long since repentant lion's tail. In a later age they favoured a league of nations. But, having narrowly failed to vote themselves into one, they had thenceforth to keep on seeing how wise they must surely so have been. What a positive psycho-diplomacy will nowadays be doing is to spot and to exploit any comparable relationships of a qualified love, feeding the qualifications at the expense of the love.

They Must Educate Our Masters?

There are of course many differences between the so-called 'free' countries and those within the other camp. In each there are the decision-making élite and the public-at-large. But between these the relation is not in the two cases the same. Of two things an Eisenhower is well aware: that he must avoid doing what he could not hope to justify in the eyes of his public, and, that the judgment of his public is not going to be affected by him alone. A Khrushchev by contrast can count upon his public at least not to advertise any dangerous new insights that a distinguished visitor may have managed to wash into their brains.

The American régime, as being a democratic one, is like the parson with an active-minded flock. It is from his pulpit that he strives to keep them on the strait and narrow roadway. When outside, they cannot, by him, be prevented from attending to the atheist at the corner. But need he lend the man his pulpit? When a luncheon-guest at the Waldorf Astoria, Mr. K. is as it were a visiting preacher in the democratic parish church. Disarray: that is the word. It is this that totalitarian cordiality is so naturally concerned to be promoting within the democratic camp. And it is from this that within their own camp the monopolisers of the communications media are so anxious to preserve the public mind. And the care with which they so preserve it is itself an index of their respect for the efficiency of the washing-machine as a weapon of sociological war.

When Vyshinsky said: 'We shall win the world with our ideas', what he may well have meant was: 'The world becomes our captive when its trust is sufficiently eroded in what it has been getting from you.' Not 'our ideas', but 'their dubieties', his words might well have been.

Yes, but 'our ideas' also: and especially also 'our' neatly-timed achievements. In effect, the members of international society are on the TV screen all the time. Throughout the year, throughout the world, politicians, publicists and people generally are continually revising their impressions of at least the better known to them, be it only by repute, of the members of the society of states. Like candidates nursing constituencies, the states are forever posturing for the improvement of their 'image' in the minds of those whose ill-will they must wish to temper, even if their affection they cannot hope to win. To enjoy an exceptional prestige, to be in good standing, to have a following, are desiderata that no contestant in the arena either of politics or of diplomacies can afford not to entertain. 'Look to your moat' it used to be said. 'Look to your image' is the more up-to-date idea.

Disparity of Esteem

'I like a man,' sang Sir Harry Lauder, 'who is a man.' And his touchstone of man-ness was not the one accepted for birth certificate purposes. His touchstone was that of capacity—

the capacity, specifically, for convivial participation. All men may be equal but all are not equally men! (Witness the traditional rating of diners-out in terms of bottles, one or more than one, of port!)

And so it is with states. They vary not in formal status. Their sovereignty is unqualified and as uniform as is the humanity, biologically speaking, of men. Yet one state differs from another in political magnitude—by whatever yardstick tested.

As Lauder held not all his fellow-revellers in equal esteem—neither does the state its fellow-states. While a country's status remains incontestable, its standing may fluctuate almost from hour to hour. And its standing is conditioned by its stature. In contrast with its physical analogue—which he can do so proverbially little, by taking thought, to enhance—to his moral stature a man, by taking opportunities, may add from day to day. Similarly to its stature—moral, political, diplomatic—a state may add, and no state ever lightly neglects an opportunity to do so.

And perhaps because diplomatic stature is so tied in with strategic capability, it is of 'powers', rather than of countries or of states, that we tend in our historiography to talk. We speak, that is, not of power merely, but of powers, and powers unequally graded. Graded in terms of what? Of their sheer strength? No, not of their sheer strength, but rather of their stature, and hence of their standing. The great power is the power great in standing, great in the eyes of other states. It is the power deferred to as great. And similarly for the near-great, the middle and the small.

I heed, a diplomatic Lauder might say, a state which is a state—with a capacity for diplomatic participation.

So even the states are not states merely. They are 'powers', and, though equally powers, not all of equal power. Through the lens, that is, of dynamics, as distinct from formal structure, it is not simply a system of states. And, while states have status, powers have stature and standing and strength. The binocularity which avails itself of both the lenses at once has its relevance to the appreciation of much else in social experience besides the mutual dealings of states. And much of this 'much else' is, like the relative standing and stature of the powers, changing all the while.

Is relative stature not just another name for relative influence? Not exactly. For influence is a function not of a country's stature only, but of its connections. The small power with big friends may be bigger in influence than the bigger with few.

Nothing that a state may publicly do can fail to affect its 'image' in the minds of many. Some states, in their manner of life, show less sense of the importance of this consideration than others.

Even those of us who, when Lunik II landed, so publicly, on the moon, might have simulated indifference to the technological achievement, on the vague general ground that wonders notoriously never cease, can hardly have failed to be struck by how scientists had been struck by how the moon had been struck. And certainly no student of diplomatics can but have been impressed by the apparent careful timing of the achievement. And that was only one of the many examples that there recently have been of the virtuosity of Moscow's constant conditioning of that image of the social cosmos which, in the mind of so-called uncommitted peoples, may well be a decisive factor at some day of reckoning not perhaps, as yet, in sight.

Watering the Seeds of Self-reproach

Asked what they would do were they to suffer defeat in the War, Nazis are said to have said that they would at once set about 'organizing sympathy'. They failed of course to allow for their own approaching absence from the scene and consequent inability personally to carry out that programme. But certainly the sort of thing they so envisaged does appear to have been undertaken by some of their predecessors after 1918. It was not long then before the defeated Germans had got in Britain an anti-Versailles movement. And by and by this had its counterpart in France. Frenchmen were found developing doubts on the propriety of their having sought to preserve a settlement designed for the preservation of France. It is, one may suggest, the Achilles heel of democratic self-rule that foreign policy must rest upon the support of those who cannot be expected to understand what at bottom it is all about—the support, that is, not of the sophisticated few, but of the gullible many. 'Don't,' said, in effect, Mr. John Foster Dulles,

'come quoting to me what those people say. I judge by what they do.' With how many of his countrymen will this have improved his standing? Did it not earn him a name for excessive inflexibility? When Wendell Willkie toured the world in the early 'forties his book was in one place reviewed as 'Gullible's Travels'. No one would dream of so referring to the travels of a Mr. K. His, rather, have been travels *among* the gullibles. Or, at least, the lullables. 'Lullaby's Travels' might better in his case have filled the bill.

If with my right hand I can mesmerise my neighbour, I shall with my left hand be able to acquire his purse. Sometimes it is almost as if Mr. K.'s public-relations right hand was not even aware of what his power-avid left hand was about. It is his right hand that he gives to mass opinion in the democracies. The glad hand indeed—and gladly does he give it. For with it he gives nothing except the grip. And what, with his left hand, he may all the while be doing some people do not even pause to consider. With justice was it written that wars had their origin in the minds of men. It is in the minds of men that the moral underproppings of peace may now be in the process of being 'washed' away.

Summer is Icumen In

Mr. K. is not going west just to gaze at the corn on the cob.¹ The visitor will have more than that to see. Will he be disturbed when he finds that, despite their capitalistic fetters, the people of the U.S.A. are happy and content. The happier the better, may he not feel? Notoriously the price of liberty is vigilance. He might well be only too pleased to see them happier yet. Forward the mood-engineer. A job for you.

Writing on 17th September 1959, it is difficult not to advert upon tomorrow's prospect of Mr. K. making a new disarmament proposal at the United Nations. Ostensibly he will be addressing the assembled delegations. But not to them the delegates, nor even to them, their governments, will he in reality be appealing: but to them, the peoples of the United Nations, in whose name the Charter was ostensibly drawn up. It was symbolic that so early on his first morning in the U.S.A., the visitor should have been seen without his jacket.

¹ This (cf. the next paragraph) was written in 1959. It has not lost its point.

Like every other great illusionist, he was doubtless anxious to convince his public that he had nothing up his sleeve. One might have guessed that Moscow would on such an occasion run so true to form. Ever since Litvinov disconcerted the Preparatory Commission at Geneva in 19 (was it 27?) with his plan for a total abolition of armaments, that has been a recurring motif in so much that for world consumption has emanated from that selfsame source. As well might Moscow propose immediate agreement on the setting up of a world state, the form of it, whether Stalinist or Jeffersonian, being left over as a mere matter of detail.

Writing with the hindsight of 17th January 1960, there seems no more reason to modify now the wording of that last paragraph than Moscow seems to have seen to revise its proposal of a generation ago. As, in Detroit, Mr. K. so enthusiastically exclaimed, munching his second hot-dog: 'It's excellent! don't change the formula!'

Flies Today, Mice Tomorrow

It used to be said, of the gods, that when bent on destroying a man they would begin by making him mad. As with men, so with societies. For, as John Austin perceived, what gives its essential character to political society is the element of 'habitual obedience'. One thinks of the lighting system of a city. So long as the power keeps on flowing, the globes will continue to glow. Let the current fail and out go the lights. Let 'the habitual obedience of the bulk' be subverted, and no longer does the society conform to the Austinian definition. Austin's concern was not, of course, to explain, but merely to postulate, the obedience. To explain it would have meant moving into social psychology: speaking, that is, of prejudices and predilections, and above all of beliefs. Switch off the basic beliefs, and out go the political, the constitutional, and along with these the legal, lights. In a society, if not equally in the individual, madness might almost be defined as a compound dislocation of basic beliefs. And on them depends unity, that condition for collective self-preservation in the hour of trial.¹

¹ My respect for Austin, which is unabated, was expressed in *Modern Theories of Law*, W. I. Jennings (ed.) 1933.

The Conditioning of the Image

Whether or not Waterloo will have been won where they say it was, the future of many little children is probably now being predetermined on the field of psychological war. Anyone who doubts that the agents of the Kremlin are playing on the minds of the young folk wherever in the world they can, must presumably himself have been played upon, whether by those agents in person or by others upon whom they have played. Most likely by some of these last. Such people even flatter themselves that their concepts and interpretations are their own.

Any Answer?

If a young man takes an illness, he may not know how he came by it, but, if he comes to see that, but for the bigotry of his parents, he might have had immunity against it, he will hardly acquit them of blame. Why, the young folk yet may ask, when we were so evidently the object of certain processes, was there so little undertaken to protect us from their effects? Are our elders, in their seeming indifference, themselves so cogent a testimonial to the kind of education with which in our turn they seemingly would have us rest content? Might we not have been offered at least the chance to discover whether, by a different method, we might not have become even better equipped? Not perhaps well, but at any rate better, equipped?

What would such an offer have involved? What in this field are the conditions of connoisseurship?

The Connoisseurship of the Middlebrow

It is not strictly necessary, before one can prudently take part in an intelligent interchange of evaluations on, say, a game of cricket, to have made a lifetime's study of cricket history, of the philosophy of captaincy, or even of the mysteries of every movement with the bat. What is however fairly indispensable is a certain amount of personal experience of at least looking on at the game, and a feel for the dramatic tension of each succeeding moment in a particular match.

Similarly, if one is to contribute to the crystallising of public judgment on an industrial conflict, there are certain basic

insights that one needs must have into the nature of modern society and into those conditions that make it so seemingly unavoidable that the various interests should from time to time feel it so incumbent upon them to dig their moral toes in and put up a fight.

What now, by comparison, must we say of that equipment for the want of which the layman might well be shy to cross argumentative swords with the veteran in diplomatic affairs? Admittedly it is the right of every citizen, in a free society, freely to speak his mind. Yet prudence, if not a sense of humour, may tend to neutralise the impetuosity of anyone who, though speaking 'as a fool' in such concerns, might be minded to favour the public with some bright new notion of his own on whatever world-shaking political issue may happen to have caught the limelight at a given time. What is that virtue of which in such conditions such a person should be conscious of his lack? Is it simply the difference between being, and not being, well posted on current events? Nothing could be more false than such an idea.

Connoisseurship at a cricket match is not simply the knowledge of what at any moment is the score. Every onlooker, however inexpert, may be assumed to have some interest in the state of the game. And in order to show an interest in the course and the state of the 'game' of international politics, one need not be qualified to shed independent light upon what every new development may imply. But on the other hand, to be competent to shed such light, it is not enough merely to have such an interest. For there is a difference between casual alertness to the course and the state of a particular match, and knowledge of the *kind* of game of which it is merely an instance—knowledge, namely, of its principle, its possibilities, its spirit and traditions, its ethos even—knowledge, in short, of the understandings, the assumptions, the anxieties, the expectations and the hopes, with which, as well as the context and conditions in which, so many specimens of man the player come together on such occasions on such a field. There is in particular a knowledge of the *global* 'game', for want of which no holistic appreciation is possible of even the clearest-looking current issue. And the mistake is to suppose that, because only those themselves experienced in the very

playing of it can know the game so to say 'from within', therefore no one not privileged personally to have played it can usefully aspire to any better-than-superficial knowledge of it at all.

By definition, no mother will herself have been a schoolboy. But one ex-schoolboy at any rate can recall the truth of things his mother told him in advance about how it would feel to find himself for the first time at school. And many are those other sorts of strange adventure with respect to which we mortals may well see the sense of learning beforehand, from those who know of it a little more than we do, of how it will be, and look, and feel, 'when the balloon goes up'. We see the sense of this, and it is by no means a matter of being informed, prophetically, of how the battle will go. Comment on current events, as supposedly a medium of education, is something we might be willing to dispense with, did it not make for a familiarity with the setting—that is, the socio-cosmic theatre—which gives to all such events their ultimate significance. What makes such comment so effective for the purpose is partly its relevance to the condition of those concerned, to the felt need, that is, of the students themselves. Men are glad of advance information of 'what it will be like': so much so that they are apt to accept it uncritically from whoever professes to know. How many an anxious soul will not have been grateful to Dante for his circumstantial picturing for them of Paradise, and not of Paradise only. How many will have paused to wonder how he could possibly know, or to note that even ostensibly his was but the story of a dream. There have been well-intentioned teachers of International Relations whose prefigurings of a world just about to be born can have been little better than a dream. There are various visions of paradise in the dreams of new nations today, and more than one Dante to tell them how it will be. Is there nothing to be done, by their teachers, to protect the inexperienced against this traffic in dangerous drugs? What they need is an awareness not just of the current course of the game, but of the nature of the game as such. This, if they continue to seek it, they may progressively acquire; but a taste for it and a notion of where and how to do their seeking could, and surely should, be offered to them in their youth.

Why—Why—Why?

Familiarity with the fabric of the social cosmos, as understood in this essay, has not, at all events in Britain, been typically insisted upon in candidates for either a parliamentary seat or a university degree. Yet for at least two sorts of adult citizen the rudiments, if no more, of such a subject might seem to be something which it was a pity to be without. There are the social science researchers, and, there are, after all, the persons of general education. If of course we assume that for those of general education the subject is strictly unnecessary, we may suspect that the same may be true of the researcher as well. For the economists there is no doubt a recognised ABC, descriptive Economics. And similarly for many other sorts of specialism. Can it be that International Relations, in its fundamentals, is seen by contrast as so readily comprehensible that a command of all of it that matters may be taken as coming incidentally to anyone who reads a paper in the train? Its students, as they proceed with it, will doubtless discover for themselves whether the subject is indeed so self-explanatory as that.

Man is not born politically literate, sophisticated, critically world-aware. But all of these, in his own interest, as well as in society's, the adult may wish he could early have become, even were it at the cost of having a further subject, and that not merely Current Events, in his syllabus as a freshman. The appreciation of present-day problems is of course important enough. But even during the Battle of Britain the Military Academy at Sandhurst will neither have closed down nor been diverted to the discussion of those. As soldiers-in-the-making are steeped systematically in the fundamentals of war, so, one must submit, might citizens in the making be grounded in the fundamentals of peace. The time will come quite soon enough when theirs are the crucial opinions on current events, but the events then in question will not be the events of today. They will by that time be a nasty lot of new ones. But the world-awareness requisite for their understanding: that is something which, with suitable academic arrangements, we might presumably be giving to the young men now.

Survival as a Part-time Job

What proportion of our thinking do, or could, we normally devote to matters of world concern? Can we be expected, for the sake of such things, to neglect matters of personal, parochial, or professional, interest? Should we not be busybodies, rather than responsible citizens, if we did? And what proportion of our thinking time can be given over to thinking in the sense here referred to at all? For there are problems and there are problems. The problem of becoming clearer and more realistic in our conception of global affairs is one sort—a problem of vision. But each day upon our personal and professional plates there arrive a series of problems requiring more than that: requiring indeed that we decide. 'The buck stops here!' 'What does "A" do?' Problems these, of decision. We have so many of this kind: and for so many of them mere snap decisions will scarcely suffice. So much so that unless we do some thinking today in view of possible decisions in possible situations tomorrow we may tomorrow be at a loss to know what then to decide. So, in view of the decisions of tomorrow, we give, if we are responsible persons, some thought to a third category of problems, here and now. Problems these, not of mere vision, or of immediate decision, but of short term and long term pre-vision. Life is not wholly unlike the stock market. All we who have to live it must be studying these three sorts of problem all the time. Vision, decision, prevision. We have plenty of domestic food for thought. We can never be full-time thinkers on world affairs. All the more need then to be equipping ourselves betimes for that part-time thinking on which in the future we may have so largely to depend.

While We Yet Have Time

The ultimate impediment to our salvation, theology tells us, is pride. With our other failings we may come to cope: but pride we must discard before we can. So too for the understanding of the cosmos. Only to the humble in mind can that nursery-talk be acceptable which is requisite for getting straight the fundamentals of their thinking on themes such as we have been touching in this study.

Of the modes of self-indulgence there are few so originally

innocuous as sleep. But even this is to be valued in terms of the where and the when. For sleeping when on duty in a war, a man can be shot. But it might no doubt be admitted in mitigation of sentence if he could claim to have lost his memory—of there being indeed a war. In so far as the young of today may even now be not aware that in effect they are living in a war, and a war, moreover, in which, not their own survival merely, but so much else that they must value, is at stake, they too might perhaps be forgiven if found asleep. But the beginner who perceives that whatever effective service it may by and by be his to offer to the cause of human freedom may depend upon the depth of his awareness of the perils it is in, and having, would he but accept it, the chance to be pursuing that awareness, must, if he forgo that chance, be chargeable with sleeping at his post.

What manner of subject then is this that the freshman might propitiously be permitted and enabled, and encouraged, if not indeed required, to include within his academic purview?