THE ELIMINATION OF WAR—PRINCETON'S NEW APPROACH[1]

I

There are books to which it may be possible to do sufficient justice in a sentence of admiration or dispraise. This one is in its topic too important, in its authorship too substantial, in its provenance too austere, and in its quality too uneven, for that. It commands a careful reading. Its theme is "an old problem", the elimination of war. Not the problem, be it noted, of Nato—of defence, that is, against outside attack. Its concern on the contrary is with what happens within—within, in this case, a rather arbitrary area, comprising countries, 19 in all, alike in being washed by the waters of the North Atlantic and the North Sea.

The idea is not altogether novel. Over large areas, the elimination of war has already occurred. Such areas the authors designate "security-communities", and the process of their establishment "integration".

The book is an interim report on a two-year collective study, conducted at the Princeton Centre for Research on World Political Institutions. It is to the framing of a "strategy of integration" for the North Atlantic area that it seeks to contribute. How, and in what conditions, did certain groups permanently stop warring in the past? How might the resulting state of things be extended over larger and larger areas of the globe?

When, then, can it be said of an area that within it war has been eliminated? Enough, the authors here consider, if war have become so unlikely that leaders are neither preparing for it nor taking its possibility into account. What is *par excellence* the type of such a state of affairs? It is the condition obtaining within the single sovereign state. War (civil in this instance) is here in principle ruled out. Another such situation is where sovereign states are so mutually disposed as are Canada and the U.S.A. Here too, war (in this case international) is seen as out of the question.

Even were this its only merit, the book could be applauded for its advertising of a fact—that it is not by a merging of their sovereignties only that countries have ceased to be a danger to each other. Almost one is led to conclude: Where, for the avoidance of war, amalgamation (e.g. integration-by-federation) is desirable, amalgamation is in practice an impossibility; where it is not an impossibility, it is not needed for the avoidance of war.

With federation sought for other reasons the authors are not concerned. Promoters of integration merely as such might as well, they feel, be indifferent as to which form the desired integration shall be given. On their rather curious reading of the evidence, history even suggests a superior viability in the pluralistic

1. A Comment on *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.* International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Collaborators: K. W. Deutsch, S. A. Burrell, R. A. Kann, M. Lee Jr., M. Lichterman, R. E. Lindgren, F. L. Loewenheim, R. W. van Wagenen. Princeton, N.J., 1957. Princeton University Press. 229 p. $4.75.

form, and a greater effectiveness in the exclusion of war. Why, then, demand a surgical operation, if a diet, say, of better communications will effect a cure? And this, they evidently feel, is a fortunate conclusion, since their patient area shows so little present sign of a willingness to submit to the knife.

They do not however overelaborate their convenient point. It may of course be that many friendships between independent countries have been longer-lasting than many federations. But what does not strictly follow—though the authors apparently think it should—is that, had they stayed independent, the component units of their shortlived federations would presumably have avoided warring with one another for just as long as any other pair of states. Conceivably they might: but about this there surely can have been no "must". What breaks a federation is the development within it of tensions too strong for constitutionality to control. What breaks an international friendship is likewise a situation of strain. But the strains in the respective instances are of different kinds, occurring in different contexts (domestic in the one, diplomatic in the other), and breakdown in the one kind of case teaches little as to viability in the other. The authors' phrasing in this matter seems calculated rather to confuse than to illuminate anyone not initially clear on the radical difference between the two planes of social co-existence.

However, it is specifically of pluralistic integration that, for North Atlantic purposes, the authors invite us to think. And their strategy for such integration is to be grounded on the lessons of the past.

II

An analogy may here suggest itself with the method of men's struggle against death-on-the-roads. Much as members of a borough council, out to ban accidents in their locality, may seek knowledge of the conditions in which the name of safety-areas has been earned by other towns, so do these authors, for application to their chosen area of the North Atlantic, begin by seeking certain particulars on security-communities of the past—to give them their formula for the creation of further such communities in the future.

Of one point of unreal difficulty it should be easy to dispose. The occasions for war, some may argue, are so manifold that no amount of foresight can cover them all. But accidents too may happen in a host of ways. Neither for wars nor for accidents do we require any generalised explanation. What in effect we ask is not, How death-on-the-roads? but, In what conditions fewest deaths? Where the sages were formerly wont to ask, Why war?, these authors, more pertinently, ask, In what conditions has war become unthinkable? And then—by what process? But are they equally pertinent here?

It is no doubt a premise of the social sciences that their subject-matter, while differing from the world of physics, is perhaps not so different as it seems. In the material cosmos men are accustomed to the detection of verifiable process. From the acorn to the tree. From the caterpillar to the butterfly. From the button-pressing to the mushroom cloud. And so, some historians have thought to find

patterns of development in the past. How does feudalism give place to capitalism, and that in turn to what comes next? How do civilisations arise and thrive, decline and die? Such questions have at least been posed, and answers offered. So the question, How do security-communities come about? is something one at least may ask.

If political fusion were known, like its nuclear cousin, to be the pre-determined end-result of a specifiable process, then the listing of the conditions for its coming would have palpable point. But is this in fact known, even with respect to what is here called amalgamation? The authors appear to accept this as given. Never do they seem seriously to have asked themselves whether the notion of a process was more in the first place than a heuristic tool; and whether, after testing, it might not have itself to be discarded as inappropriate to the matter in hand.

Yet surely, even in the familiar case of human courtship, it is always this particular boy (not boy-of-this-type) that meets this particular girl (not girl-of-this-type)—and in these particular conditions. How countries agree in effect to bury the past, and accept and respect each others' existence and needs, is not to be accounted for simply as one more example of something repeatedly seen.

If courtship could be assumed to follow a fixed pattern, the preparation of a handbook for the match-maker might be hopefully essayed. As it is, match-making remains a delicate and uncertain enterprise. Is the "process" by which independent communities come to have with one another the "WE-feeling" necessarily more adherent to a single pattern than that of becoming engaged? Less so, surely, rather than more. By all means let uniformities be looked for, but let there be no amazement if they are not found.

Incidentally it is not in essence so strictly a process, as a procedure, that the authors seem rather to have in mind. Their question is not so much, What are the stages by which this thing develops? as, What are the steps by which it is brought about? In what conditions? Yes: but what, in such conditions, did men do? In short, it is for a programme, a plan of campaign, a strategy of integration, that they seek.

Which men? In which positions? What gives this question point is the difference between a traffic which is indeed "controlled" and a world-political process which after all is not. Who in the case of the postulated integrationist "strategy" is to be deemed the commander-in-chief? And whom has he to face as his opponent?

The point is more important than the authors—since they so largely ignore it—may possibly have noticed. And more embarrassing, since, as they certainly appreciate, there is for the integration of their North Atlantic area neither a big popular movement nor a plank in the programme of the authorised decision-makers in any of the prospective member states. Promoters of integration do—it is assumed—exist, but in so far as they are the leaders of merely non-official movements, not ministers of propaganda or of foreign affairs, the strategies within their competence may have little immediate impact on the course of events.

It would for instance be easier to conceive of the giving of "specific promises to respect the independence and sovereignty of the political units concerned"

(p. 187) if such giving were to be done by decision-makers, who have, as distinct from the mere movement-leaders, who have not, as a rule, some footing for the making of promises to the peoples of other states, or even their own.

III

To some proponents of federation in particular this book should bring useful light—since, besides exposing the error of divers popular beliefs, it provides some firm, if unsensational, findings on when and how the achievement of their objective may hopefully be tried. Useful too is the stress here on flexibility and boldness in the development of new solutions. For the most obvious next step is not always the most opportune. "Imaginative experimentation with hybrid political institutions": that is what they recommend—provided presumably again that some at least of the decision-makers are found in the integrationist camp.

"More responsiveness" the authors ask for—to the needs and the "messages" of other countries—on the part of governments, *élites* and electorates. The illustration they offer is apt and revealing. Let France's fellow-Atlantics take to supporting her on the colonialism issue at the United Nations. So would they manifest their improved "ability" to respond.

They mention too as a further desideratum more "skill" in making compromises at home with opposing political groups. But are we to allow that the making of political compromises is indeed a matter essentially of skill rather than of will? Given the will, the skill to compromise should seldom be wanting. There may however be ground enough for the absence of a will.

Likewise seemingly a little simple are the "findings" they so soberly report on how objectors to past amalgamations have been compensated, or won over; how younger men tend in time to get more influence in affairs; and how in their attitudes they may differ from the old.

The problem, it would seem, is not that of arriving at any confident generalisations at all. Rather it is that of carrying the business beyond the level of what the book itself somewhere describes as "documenting the obvious".

One rather pivotal finding, on the other hand, the authors make little attempt to document. Given that the Atlantic area is not expected to amalgamate, we are offered surprisingly little on the way in which a distinctively pluralistic integration may come about. For a single historical example of how to such a plurality of states as those of the North Atlantic the aspect of a security-community may be given, one looks here in vain. Instead, what is understood as resulting from a study of one sort of integration is permitted rather casually to do duty also partly for the other. The process whereby sovereignties are merged, and that whereby between independent sovereignties war becomes to all intents unthinkable—these two processes, having been given a single name, integration, are treated here as possessing, in effect, a single nature. Tell us, the authors seem to say, how England and Scotland became united and we should then understand how Canada and the U.S.A. stopped seeing one another as foes, and how, therefore, France and

Germany, not to mention the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., might likewise in their turn come so to do.

Again and similarly, they seem rather to suppose that, since it is around "strong core areas" that amalgamated security-communities have, they find, typically tended to form, so it is through the one-by-one accretion of further member countries that a pluralistic community composed originally of Canada and the U.S.A. might presumably be expected by-and-by to include many, or all, of the seventeen other states named in their North Atlantic list. A puzzling inference, surely.

The field of study is one in which metaphor may be a hindrance as much as a help. Is there in reality a "process" of integration at all? Does one usefully speak of "pathways" thereto? Is war something one may hope to "eliminate", or is it not rather that conditions may perhaps be brought about in which wars are unlikely to occur? Is there, awaiting discovery, a solution to the contemporary problem of integration; and, to that solution, may one expect to find "clues". Does one fruitfully borrow from the economists the notion of "take-off" or—is it from the Freudians?—that of "the threshold"? Such metaphors may all have their value; but they want to be used with circumspection.

A greater precision in the use of verbal symbols might also have improved the discussion here of that sense, of community, which is seen as a requirement for integration in whichever form. For this evidently important factor is described in no too consistent a manner. Now it is one belief; now another; next a feeling; and finally a matter of "dynamic process". The reader may see well enough what the authors are after, but may doubt if they have put it very well. And, in any case, he may wonder, why call it a sense of "community" at all? Is this only because it is to a security-"community" that this element is considered essential? If so, the ambiguity in a word may have led men astray. What indeed would common sense suggest as requisite in this connection? Surely not merely a WE-feeling. Is it not rather the absence of a sense of insecurity, determined by peoples' ways of conceiving one another, and the future which they are destined to share? Surely it is for a sense rather of security than of community that in a security-community one should look. "Concrete steps" to increase the sense of community might be of little avail if concrete sources of a sense of insecurity were left unattended to.

IV

There are those in academic circles whose views on the nature of history and of sociology would require a rejection of the main methodological assumptions of this book. In economic studies, and the like, analysis may have plenty of place. In an exercise so distinctively historical as the deriving of broad lessons from an imaginative self-immersion in the recreated experiences of the past—less, if any at all. "Much may be gained", the authors maintain, "by using analytical concepts to guide our historical inquiry..." (p. 14), and their book stands as in some sense an advertisement for their view. For all their punctilious concessions to a reputable scepticism, it is pretty plain that to themselves at least they are

pioneers of a development which may presently be accepted as vital in the progress of their science.

By all means, one feels, let them apply to their "cases" their latest of analytical tools—if only those tools be sharp. Otherwise, by their uncertain performance, they may discredit their reliance on analytical tools as such. Where others have so notoriously overdone it in the use of categories more congenial to their outlook than to their subject-matter, they should at all costs keep the balance, in their historical sociology, between the nomothetic and the ideographic orientations of the inquiring mind. If only international politics were more like chemistry, or even callisthenics, and less like croquet played with hedgehogs and flamingoes, predictabilities in the social process at the international level might be more readily detectable, and collectable, than they are.

True, these authors would say. And yet they have their answer, and a good one too. The basis for men's resting of their policies for the morrow on their generalising interpretations of the past is not at all that they have mistaken the social cosmos for a kingdom of necessity—where everything that happens is determined by discoverable "social laws". The fact merely is that, debatable though the practice may be, it is what in their personal responses to the challenge of their private predicament men are doing every day. Analogies are, it is true, suggestive not conclusive. But since for the most part they are about all that anyone has to live by, it would be "prodigal" to reject them out of hand.

Use has already been made in this review, and without a blush, of a crude analogy—that between traffic control and the avoidance of war. But the analogy soon breaks down. For, whereas in the case of traffic troubles, it is in the normal course of affairs that danger is endemic, in diplomacy it is rather in the occasional situations that the perils inhere. And these situations are each distinct. It is by an individualising judgment, not by the use of a formula, that in such situations events may—fortune willing—be switched away from war. There is little in this book on the handling, internationally, of particular pressures for change. Is it that, given the WE-feeling, such pressures need supposedly not be foreseen?

V

The existence of a security-community is not a means, but only, after all, a witness, to the so-called elimination of war. It is not by playing on the peoples' minds, but by dealing with the facts on which the peoples' minds are playing, that a mood of mutual acceptance is to be ensured. Proposing to eliminate war by establishing a security-community would be like thinking to lessen the rainfall by multiplying the hours of sun.

Two men, yesterday friends, but enamoured today of the selfsame lady, are rivals now in spite of themselves. Their conflict-situation is no mere matter of mutual distaste. Its basis is an incompatibility of objectives on which neither party feels able to give ground.

Analogies, as the authors insist, are at best suggestive. Yet they themselves do rather perceptibly lean upon the idea that to have noted in what conditions

a thing has happened in the past should be to know, more or less, how to have it happen again in the future. This assumes, however, that no important question regarding the past occasions has not been asked; that no crucial condition—either positive or negative—has gone unnoticed. In a manual on the building of houses of cards, all the constructional stages might be exactly described: yet what if it were silent on the absence of a breeze?

Even in their proposed programme of further research there is nothing on concrete issues, obstacles to that North Atlantic integration which is the end in view. Though Britain and Ireland are instanced as possible parts of a sub-area, within the North Atlantic area, which is relatively ripe for early integration—in advance of the area as a whole—there is nothing about the Boundary. Is it really by improving the communications between North and South that the wound of "partition" will be healed? Could Germany so be led to forget the Oder-Neisse line?

"The record", declare the authors, "of what happened in history is richer and deeper than any single scheme of deduction or analysis, and we would ignore it at our peril" (p. 11). So they are to eschew a purely "analytical or deductive approach". The question is—Do they, enough?

The product of so high-powered a working-party, the book has many points of value. But on international tensions and their treatment it will scarcely tell the tough old historians very much. One might almost suppose that the authors were not interested in relations of tension between states, but only in relations of trust. As if doctors were only interested in health.

VI

But this, after all, is only their interim report. No criticism of its essential method could well be more deflationary than that implied in their own prefiguring of what they next propose to do. There are, they say, "gaps" in their knowledge. And of these the first they mention relates to the "current images" concerning Atlantic unity "held in peoples' minds". This, on page 196, is their only use of this expression. As a motif in the composition of the book, it comes in thus belatedly as something dramatically new. At what stage, one wonders, did these investigators first come to conceive their problem in terms of "current images" held in peoples' minds?

The study on which they are here reporting is described as "interdisciplinary". What that, in this case, is shown to mean is that both historians and political scientists have had a hand in the undertaking. But why, one is compelled to ask, these only? How about the philosophers, with their closely-reasoned caution in the uses of language; or the social-psychologists ("psychology", as a word, occurs neither in the index nor in the text); or the seasoned practitioners, whose lifetimes in diplomacy may have left them with a "feel" for what cannot and can come about in the dealings of states? How, if one may but dare to suggest it, about those, the academic students of international relations, whose readings and reflections on the character of the social cosmos should have furnished them, even

in default of official experience, with the fundamentals of a specialised awareness of what the world, of world politics, is like?

Reinforced by the participation of some of these, the thinking here reported might, one suspects, have been more realistic, more rigorous, and more to the point.

To all but the veriest beginners (from whom it should remain out of reach) the book may even so be a boon, for it gives them at least a challenging new perspective from which to re-value their own positions on points of prime and perennial concern.

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SUMMARY

In what "conditions", by what "process", and aided by what "integrationist strategy", might the 19 North Atlantic countries come collectively to constitute a "security-community"—an area, that is, as between whose parts the possibility of war is in political calculations excluded? The interim report of an "inter-disciplinary" syndicate, the book is appreciated with respect as well to the metho-dological premises as to the logical cogency, the semantic rigour and the socio-logical sensibility with which the author's task has so far been performed. With their acceptance, in scientific principle, of analogies drawn from historical case-studies—as pointers, suggestive but not conclusive, to what may apply to a current problem—the reviewer has no quarrel. Nor does he deprecate the use, if it be with skill and insight, of analytical concepts as tools in the interrogation of man's experiences in the past. But whether the problem of war's "elimination" has here been aptly conceptualised, whether the ideographic, not to say the eiconic, perspectives have been emphasised enough, whether the differences between what is open to properly empowered decision-makers and to leaders merely of movements respectively, and between the domestic and diplomatic levels of social co-existence, have not been underplayed, and whether the emo-tional component crucial in the case considered has been correctly designated—on these points at least his reservations appear. In conclusion, and as possibly ac-countable for something, he notes the apparent absence in this inquiry of the philosophers, the diplomats, the social-psychologists, and particularly of those "the academic students of international relations, whose readings and reflections on the character of the social cosmos should have furnished them, even in default of official experience, with the fundamentals of a specialised awareness of what the world, of world politics, is like".

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Ausschaltung des Krieges – Princeton's neue Methode zur Problemlösung. Unter welchen «Bedingungen», durch welchen «Prozess» und mit Hilfe welcher «Integrationsstrategie» könnten die 19 nordatlantischen Staaten zu einer Ge-

meinschaft werden, in der weder gegenseitige Furcht noch Argwohn bestehen – zu einem Gebiet, in welchem die Möglichkeit eines Krieges zwischen den einzelnen Teilen nicht in das politische Kalkül einbezogen wird? Das Buch, ein Interimsbericht einer Arbeitsgruppe, der Vertreter verschiedener Disziplinen angehören, wird gewürdigt sowohl unter dem Blickpunkt der methodologischen Prämissen wie der logischen Zwangsläufigkeit, der semantischen Genauigkeit wie der soziologischen Sensibilität, mit welcher die Verfasser ihre Aufgabe bisher gelöst haben. Mit ihrer Akzeptierung historischer Analogien als einem wissenschaftlichen Prinzip, um mögliche (aber nicht schlüssige) Hinweise darüber zu erhalten, was auf ein heutiges Problem anwendbar ist, geht der Rezensent einig. Noch wendet er sich gegen den Gebrauch analytischer Begriffe als Mittel, um Fragen an die historische Erfahrung zu stellen, sofern dies mit Geschick und Einsicht geschieht. Aber ob hier das Problem der Ausschaltung des Krieges in passende Begriffe gefasst worden ist; ob die ideographischen oder gar die ikonischen («eiconic») Perspektiven genügend betont worden sind; ob die Unterschiede ausreichend hervorgehoben worden sind zwischen dem, was einem mit tatsächlicher Macht und Entscheidungsbefugnis ausgestatteten Politiker und was dem Führer blosser Bewegungen möglich ist, und zwischen sozialer Koexistenz auf innenpolitischer und auf diplomatischer Ebene; und ob die emotionale Komponente, die im vorliegenden Fall entscheidend ist, richtig gesehen und bezeichnet ist – mindestens zu diesen Punkten macht der Rezensent Vorbehalte. Abschliessend vermerkt er, dass – vielleicht nicht ohne Auswirkung auf die Ergebnisse – an dieser Untersuchung anscheinend weder Philosophen noch Diplomaten oder Sozialpsychologen teilgenommen haben und er vermisst insbesondere «die wissenschaftlichen Spezialisten auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Beziehungen (academic students of international relations), deren Belesenheit und Reflexionen über die Natur des sozialen Kosmos, unbeachtet ihrer allenfalls mangelnden praktischen Erfahrung, die Grundwahrheiten eines spezialisierten Wissens darüber hätten vermitteln können, was für eine Welt die Welt der Weltpolitik ist».

RÉSUMÉ

L'élimination de la guerre – Nouvelle «approche» du problème proposée par Princeton. A quelles conditions, par quel processus et à l'aide de quelle «stratégie intégrationniste» les 19 Etats de l'Atlantique-Nord pourraient-ils arriver à constituer une communauté dans laquelle régnerait la sécurité réciproque, c'est-à-dire une zone dans laquelle les possibilités de guerre entre les différentes parties constitutives seraient exclues des calculs politiques? Ce livre, rapport intérimaire d'un groupe composé de représentants de différentes disciplines, est apprécié sous l'angle aussi bien des prémisses méthodologiques que de la puissance des arguments logiques, la rigueur sémantique et la sensibilité sociologique avec lesquelles les auteurs ont rempli jusqu'ici leur tâche. En ce qui concerne leur acceptation des analogies historiques, en tant que principe scientifique, pour obtenir des

indications suggestives, mais non concluantes, sur ce qui peut être appliqué à un problème actuel, le chroniqueur ne soulève pas d'objections. Il ne s'oppose pas non plus à l'emploi de concepts analytiques comme moyens d'interroger les expériences humaines dans le passé, à condition que cela soit fait avec habileté et discernement. Mais en l'occurrence, le chroniqueur exprime des réserves tout au moins sur la question de savoir si le problème de l'élimination de la guerre a été conceptualisé de façon appropriée; si les perspectives «idéographiques» pour ne pas dire «iconiques» ont été suffisamment soulignées; si les différences entre ce qui est respectivement possible aux chefs politiques ayant en fait les pouvoirs de décision et les chefs de simples mouvements, ainsi qu'entre la coexistence sociale sur le plan de la politique intérieure et sur le plan diplomatique n'ont pas été sous-estimées; si les composantes émotionnelles déterminantes dans le cas particulier ont été correctement spécifiées. En conclusion – et cela serait une explication plausible de ces lacunes – le chroniqueur soulève l'absence apparente, dans cette enquête, de philosophes, de diplomates, d'experts en psychologie sociale et en particulier d'universitaires spécialisés dans l'étude des relations internationales, dont les études et les réflexions sur le caractère du cosmos social auraient pu apporter, même en l'absence d'expérience pratique, les fondements d'une connaissance spécialisée, à savoir en quoi consiste le caractère tout particulier de ce monde, qui est celui de la politique internationale.