

pica
IN Downing Street this morning,¹ and here, the question for discussion is the same. It is not, however, so restricted a subject that the last word is likely to be said upon it in either place.

i. *'The Collective System.'* A Term of Art?

any system
① The word 'system', as you know, is not a term of art; it has no settled technical signification. We may give it what meaning we choose. For instance, we may mean by it a method—as when their inventor recommends a set of morning exercises as 'My System': or a grouping—as
② when we speak of the Solar System (in this sense the Collective System may be said to have 'members' belonging to it): or again, as when we talk of the Capitalist System, we may be
③ thinking of a state of social or other relationships. All three ideas seem apposite in explaining the term.

a new term suggested to the US to League of Nations or to parade Americans this as the case
Moreover, unlike certain other expressions, the term 'Collective System' has not yet had either a long or a particularly stormy history. I suspect it was invented, quite recently, as a sly means of suggesting to the more 'soft-boiled' Americans that somehow their country, in signing the Kellogg Pact, had inadvertently and against its desires assumed a quasi-membership in the League.

¹ This lecture was delivered on August 22, 1935.

ii. *Collectivism. A Novelty?*

So much for the term: consider now the fact. It seems commonly supposed that with, say, 1919, history fell into two phases, those respectively of the pre-war international anarchy and the post-war Collective System. Thus, for collectivism, life, as it were, 'began yesterday'. There is, however, an alternative view. Think back to the time when the ideas of the Holy Empire and the Universal Church were losing their grip upon the political mind of men. The doctrine of sovereignty, as you know, then meekly inherited the earth. But is it not true that along therewith mankind gave assent to another, countervailing, idea—the notion of a natural, universal, and hence international law curbing the sovereigns in their relations *inter se*? The stories of the international anarchy and of the Collective System are, thus, but two versions of the one historical episode. Humanity, hitherto, has perhaps nowhere had knowledge of either a thoroughgoing collectivism or an out-and-out anarchy. Even in Chicago.

2 phases
pre-war
war
collective
the latter
but M
disagree
sovereignty
but
also

iii. *The Watchword of this Investigation.*

Whose affair, by the way, is to-day's exposition? And what manner of job may it be? There are, I think, two types of teacher to whom it could well be confided. As concerning current politics, it might for preference be entrusted to someone himself in public life, ever in touch with realities, and familiar with the limits of the politically possible. Well, we are soon to be enchanted by one who probably has given about as much vigorous thought to our subject as any Englishman in politics to-day. Alternatively, the task is a sociologist's; and it is, I hope, in the absence of

ref to
Noel

anyone formally qualified as such that I now propose tackling the matter somewhat in the temper I consider a sociologist should. The sociologist, whether genuine or ersatz, is, par excellence, a man of science. What does this imply? The Dean of Westminster, discoursing on the theatre, recently declared that, while it was not the dramatist's duty to preach, he should anyhow try to give his public a sense of refreshment, a vision of the world as not after all too unpleasant a spot (or words to that effect). Now your authentic scientist is not concerned even for that. A junior subaltern, writing an official 'appreciation of the situation', once finished as follows: 'Our ammunition is running low; our forces are depleted and demoralized; our position is plainly untenable—but our cause is just, Heaven is with us, and we are certain to win'. The General expostulated. 'Your last three remarks', he said, 'though just the stuff to stiffen an exhortation to the troops, are misplaced in what should have been a strictly objective survey of our technical position.' My business, equally, I take it, is not to emit an 'exhortation to the troops'. Were you here as prospective pillars of the American Senate, one might perhaps see you as so many ailing invalids, and try what one could rise to in the way of a bedside manner. Actually, I regard you rather as though you were medical students; and, in that character, if at all susceptible to sentiment, the sooner you outgrow it the better.

After long and honoured circulation, Professor Minobe's book on the Japanese Constitution is now banned from university service, on the ground, not so much that its doctrine is untrue, as that it is not considered socially salutary. 'Shocking', you say. Well, perhaps; but one is tempted to remark that if it comes to the veiling over of truth as

M. says himself
as sociologist
(aka academic analyst)

Sociology +
Science

- not about
giving a vision
of the world
& pleasant

his approach
not to cure
but to
teach medical
students

not improving, it is scarcely for some of us in the peace movement to 'call the kettle black'! Where supposedly our search is for scientific sunlight, our watchword must be 'Insight before uplift—the truth, whether edifying or not.'

Now, in such a sociological study there are, broadly, two lines of advance. You may choose, for example, the abstract approach, or, you may prefer to have your feet on the ground. Being a little weary, if not doubtful, of the abstract avenue, I am lucky to find that this, with his accustomed clarity, has already been explored by Mr. Arnold-Forster. To his moving adumbration of a future world order, to the recital of his seven-point programme, the vision of his seven-pillared temple of peace, there is nothing on those lines that I here desire to add. Collectivism, while it may be conceived in the abstract, must develop, if at all, and manifest itself, in the concrete. My concern, therefore, will be ostensibly with the concrete, and if, notwithstanding, I still seem too academic for the ideas of some of you, you'll doubtless allow a little for my London environment, where the concrete, someone said, not merely never sets on the walls, but is only with inconvenience envisaged by the staff.

iv. *An Article of Faith.*

At last we are getting going, and you'll have my forecast for to-morrow. It runs, succinctly, thus: 'In many quarters continued tension; in all directions fog; further outlook unsettled'. Our concern is not with what as optimists we hope for, but with what, on a cold consideration of realities, we seem able, if dimly, to discern. In my heart, let me confess, and in my bones, I know that the future is with the Collective System. This partly is because, with Mr. Walters,

M chides
Genera type
- argues for
truth before
uplift.

sociological
study -
abstract
concrete
empirical
He claims
to be doing
the latter

concrete
analysis

! LSE!

his
summary
method
realism

hopes + basically assumes in favour
of Coll System

156 *The Future of the Collective System*

I see it as in evolutionary line with the whole of human history. Partly I embrace it as an article of faith. Like the subaltern in the story, I believe in the final triumph of my side. But just now I have simply to assess the technical indications, and explain why it is that, for all the diagrammatic luminosity of Mr. Arnold-Forster's picture, I still put my forecast in terms of uncertainty and fog.

What I propose is to notice generally the setting in which collectivism is being sought to be better established, and then successively to examine certain issues on the answer to which the outcome of this effort may partly be thought to depend. But first a word about the achieved conventional framework of collectivism, as we have it here and now.

v. *The Existing Framework of Collectivism.*

You know the divers grounds of complaint that are proved or averred against the instruments and institutions hitherto contrived. Some there are who regret the theoretical imperfections of the Covenant, the so-called 'gaps', the unanimity rule, the want of precision in certain places. Failures, too, are noted in the realm of action: witness the Far East and Latin-America. The Council's usage, again, has excited unfavourable comment. This vital organ of world co-operation has evolved no true collective consciousness, no authentic *esprit de corps*. This court of judges (in equity if not in law) has proved neither independent nor impartial. All very fine, no doubt, to have the big guns rolling up in Geneva—but of what use is that if, in implied denial both of open diplomacy and the equality of States, the moment a crisis occurs those big guns go off by themselves? Then, too, the Kellogg Pact. After a general renunciation of war, the States continue arming,

just as, after forswearing chemical warfare, they went on making gas masks. On this last point you've perhaps heard tell of the good lady who, when asked 'Do you believe in ghosts?', answered 'No, but I am afraid of them'. That, I surmise, is how the Governments—and with cause for it—feel. After all, to warrant insuring against burglars, you don't need to show you feel sure to be burgled. (It wouldn't assist you if you did.)

Then the failures. In the Far East, since in 1932 the others agreed that in those distant waters Japan should be 'top nation', the League, it is true, has been a little like a player who has overcalled his cards, a clock striking six when its hands say only three. One may follow Professor Gilbert Murray in not accepting that set-back, sobering though it was, as a reason to despair of the League's eventual adequacy elsewhere. In South America, on the other hand, there had been a stage when, the Covenant notwithstanding, the parties were both content to try the test of battle. When, later, in the heat of hostilities, Geneva was first fully seized of that situation, the League apparently took it as fully within the terms and intentions of Article 15 ('a dispute which is likely to lead to a rupture') a brave interpretation indeed. English judges have a maxim—*Volenti non fit injuria* ('You were asking for it, so you shouldn't complain'). This point might bear developing further.

Curious how, when fighting occurs, you seem so often to have, for Covenant purposes, a borderline case. One almost is tempted to see here a sign that, so far as it literally goes, the Covenant can't have been working too ill. It is impossible, you know, to reckon how many shipwrecks a particular lighthouse has prevented. So far, at least, there have been no disasters at the very foot of the structure.

Japan had
called LoN
bluff
(card game)

Re LAm,
LoN didn't
have to be
applied as
was...

haha -
actual
cases are
borderline
not
clear cut.

there are
not
provable
except
in a
line

The coteen and horses have not yet run amok in Piccadilly. However, this is poor consolation.

Impartiality? When offered new peas, I shovel them along just as they come. When it is new potatoes, I pick the ones I fancy. There is some individuality about a boiled potato; whereas peas are interchangeable. A Roman lawyer would put it that peas, at least, are 'fungible' things. Now, when we say that the Englishman has a right to be tried by his peers, those peers are thought of as fungible things. He hasn't any right to be tried by his pals. The States, however, are all either old friends, or old enemies, or both—and know each other well. This inevitable but oft forgotten aspect of any league of nations was confidently foreshadowed by Lord Bryce in his presidential address to the British Academy in 1916.

vi. *The Given Social Milieu: The 'Personnel'.*

But, whether or not we have fairly perceived the insufficiencies of the present conventional framework, we have surely not failed to give it its share of our interest. I pass now to dwell for a little on some leading characteristics of the political setting, the social milieu, in which your dreamt-of collectivism must in practice find its expression.

What, then, is this 'society' where the collective factor has as yet been so imperfectly introduced? Is it simply you and I, and others the likes of us? How often has one not heard speakers invoking an audience's sense of responsibility with the words: 'You, my friends, in this room, are yourselves, in part, the League of Nations'. This sort of thing, while all very charming, is manifestly superficial. First, it is idle to pretend that individuals in this behalf are all of equal weight. There is more joy, trust me, among the

Geneva angels over one hard-boiled man of business who awakens to the League's possibilities than over innumerable just, intelligent, and high-minded undergraduates who need, at least in this respect, no education.

Yet when all is said, and our thoughts are with that *élite*, that scattered handful of individuals, who seem together to have an effective influence on the course of things, shall we even so be in touch with exactly that social milieu to which we should to-day be attending? I suggest not. For the society in question is essentially a society of 'States', nation-States mainly, but rather States than nations—and anyhow, not individual humans. If we internationalists are often accused of reckoning not enough with the vagaries of human nature, we are free, as a debating 'come-back', to reply that it is not always with merely human nature that we directly have to do. The units of our society, if ultimately and in fact individuals, are immediately and in effect something else. Our personnel are not real persons. They are States—mere notional entities, conceived of rather than found, and though personified in the habits of our thinking and our speech, yet intrinsically other than the men and women that we see.

I intend no quarrel with this our flair for personification. Even were it less plainly convenient, we are, in our technique of thinking, too little removed from the anthropomorphic propensities of primitive men easily to adopt a more factual apparatus of ideas. Nor is there serious danger in the States being thought of as behaving like persons, provided those persons be thought of as behaving like States. For, having seen that the States are not persons in fact, we can go on to perceive that they are none the less persons in effect. And the interesting and necessary thing is to differentiate

the
true - 15
soc of
states

our conc
not direct
human nat

X (15)

doesn't
want to
criticise
personification

primitive
men
but be
some that
as
states

between those human qualities that are, and those that are not, in effect the qualities of these notional persons. The nation may, in our thinking, be helpfully and harmlessly invested with a mind. So may the State. There are, in effect, a national mentality, a national attitude, a national outlook, distinguishable from the attitude, outlook and mentality of the individual, and even of the nation-State. Nonsense though this be, it is, convenient and commonplace, nonsense.

Imp But if the State has in effect a mind, has it also in effect a conscience? How much do we properly know about the moral attributes of what the French so engagingly call a 'moral' person? Associate one hundred often unselfish individuals in a trade-union: will there result an often unselfish trade-union? Does one expect magnanimity in a political party, as such? Likewise, who would look for altruism in a democracy? Is a trade-union constituted with an eye to unselfish action? Is a democracy made for the practice of altruism? There is room, in our discussion of State doings, for rather more analysis and a little less indignation.

And, when we talk of a Christian nation, as distinct from a nation of Christians, where do we finish? Does a State become artistic if its citizens take up art?

Individual ethics As affecting you and me there can be differentiated four separate principles of restraint upon anti-social leanings. Religion apart, there are ² personal ethics, where conscience decides; ³ social ethics, or customary morality, where the test is public opinion; and ⁴ law, where the last word is with the courts. Now, in the society of States, though there is deemed to be a law, there seems to be little of customary morality, and, in the way of ethics, as opposed to morality,

V. Imp
In IS: A form of law, little customary morality, no ethics
NO distinction of morality + ethics

it is hard to posit anything at all. Anyhow, it will be wise not to assert unthinkingly that there is no real difference, in these matters, between the positions of the nation-State and of the individual.

Let us talk, by all means, of the psychology of States, but do not let us suppose we understand it. Ourselves men and women, we cannot, by introspection, arrive from the inside, at the way the nations, as nations, think and feel. Still less the nation-States. Much as with the minds of the infantile, the primitive and the sub-human, we can 'know' the minds of States only through watching their conduct. There seems room for a systematic treatise by someone, up equally in international politics and in behaviouristic 'patter', dealing coldly and uncensoriously with the mental make-up of the persons of the international family. And, if it appears that the child-psychology of, say, Professor Piaget, is especially full of suggestions, we shall not be unduly surprised. The State, very true, is not in strictness a child; but in strictness it is not a grown-up either; and in their egocentric outlook, some well-known States are plainly nearer to the youngsters than the grown-ups.

Moreover, a given 'country' may, on inspection, be found to differ sensibly (or foolishly), in its mental motions, from all the other countries. The moves, for example, by which the great American people proceeds in making up its official mind are not exactly paralleled by anything in Italy, France, or Japan. If there is a West of England, there isn't a Middle West. A just appreciation of a given country's acts demands a specialized awareness of the local constitutional process pertinent to the matter in hand, and especially of the sorts of sectional interests tactically best situated to influence that process. If out to infuse a new spirit into international

not
simply to
"know"
states

anthropology
+
childpsych.

states
childlike
in
their
egocentrism

diff nat'l
make ups
culture,
pol system
etc.

practice, it is vain your preaching to 'the World'. Even could it hear you, there is nothing it could do. The poor world is far more sinned against than sinning. To get things done in practice you must address yourself not to the world, but to the nation-States. And this again is hard. Were it possible to have all the important countries around a table and lecture them like a family council, things might soon take an upward turn. But we cannot get the countries together: we can only assemble their representatives. And the difference this little detail makes defies exaggeration.

vii. The Traditional Basis of Association.

If, then, the domestic and international communities are unlike in the nature of their membership, not less deeply do they differ in the doctrinal assumptions that form the bases of their association. The nineteenth century is recalled as an age, in England, of individualism, of *laissez faire*. But *laissez faire* was never the dogmatic starting-point of England's political system: it was simply a principle of legislative philosophy. The law-giver's ideal may well have been to allow in practice a maximum of individual freedom, but, as fundamental to the system, there was assumed the ultimate subordination of the part to the whole, the individual to the collectivity, the citizen to the State. Internationally it is otherwise, not in degree only but in kind. 'No man', someone has said, 'would run his business as the world is run to-day.' How arresting: yet how confused. The truth, and the difficulty, is that the world, as such, is not run by anyone—far from it. As well, and as metaphorically, might you complain of the weather being badly run. The basic assumption of international 'order' still is the idea of the ultimate sovereignty and independence of

but anarchy - not just legislative individualism as in

each component unit. This is no mere legislative individualism. It is the dogmatic component that distinguishes the constitutional basis of order internationally conceived from its counterpart in the domestic context. Inveigh against it, if you will—as crusaders: but as students of the actual, you will not, in our time, go far astray if, in construing the world around you, and even in your dream of to-morrow, you take the sovereignty doctrine for granted—as pioneers of flying perforce took for granted what to some might have seemed the ‘pernicious’ principle of gravitation.

sovereignty
akin
to
gravity

viii. *The Traditional Legal Order.*

The units then are different, the bases of association different. What about the so-called legal system whereby the relations of such units, as so associated, are officially taken as governed? What true place has that law in international affairs? Is it altogether comparable with the place of municipal law within the national community? How about those who refuse this system the title of law strictly so called? The answers depend mainly upon what it is that we choose to consider the essence of law. To some minds law in its essence is nothing if not an instrument of social control, a means whereby society puts a restraining hand upon the self-directing individual. On this acceptance we might readily argue against international law's being, strictly, law at all. For, if anything, it is rather in the nature of a programme of concerted self-control collectively endorsed by the members of the international family. If, on the other hand, consistently with the silent assumptions of every practising lawyer, law be regarded as in essence a body of technical doctrine, the matter assumes a different guise. We see now that to lump together law and social control

Law

R

nature
of
law
&
int'l
law

is like failing to differentiate between a musical composition and an orchestral entertainment. In a sense, once it has been composed, the 'music' exists even though no instrument be forthcoming, no player offer to perform. The law, as law, may exist without being effectively administered as law. On this reading international law is law indeed.

Inasmuch, however, as it lacks that context of governmental machinery which gives to municipal law its characteristic *connexion* with social control, the possible province of international law in the promotion of collectivism is necessarily circumscribed. Professor Zimmern noticed the latter-day growth of international lawlessness. Yes, a disturbing sign. Yet, formerly, when the prohibitions law imposes were less far-reaching, therefore less irksome, the urge to flout them will doubtless have been more easily subdued. Is it wise to burden a beneficent institution with more than it is fitted by nature to bear? Is there no risk that, even within its wonted sphere of influence, the whole system may so be brought into disesteem? The lawyer may know it or not, but political and other extra-legal considerations continue internationally to have a pre-eminent role. Take that question of so-called 'interpretation'. What seems first to need interpreting is the term 'interpretation' itself. Observe how things work out in practice. Mr. Baldwin announces that only in the light of a known American attitude would he support British action under Article 16. Does anyone think this is technically proper under paragraph 1 of the text? Yet does anyone contend that it therefore must not be condoned? Nowadays the statement tends to continue: 'And until I know also what France will be doing. . . .' For, since 1925, if not 1921, the official position has apparently been that under Article 16

The Future of the Collective System 165

the member-State must 'co-operate', but need not act alone. Was that the Phillimore Committee's idea?

overstretching
will law
→

On the other hand, since that same declaration of 1925, it seems either that nothing is officially an 'act of aggression' unless technically a Covenant-breaking 'resort to war', or else, that the leading Governments have tamely, almost tacitly, assented to a substantial enlargement of their sanctioning obligation, promising resistance not merely to breaches of the Covenant's letter, but to 'any act of aggression', in those identical words. Clearly international law, if not intrinsically different, is in effect a rather special sort of system. ✓

ix. *A Problem Sui Generis*

Given, then, a milieu where the units are persons only in idea, where the foundation of ordinary intercourse is the notion of sovereignty, and where law is not even superficially an instrument of social control, the problem of promoting collectivism must, I conceive, be one where analogies drawn from domestic experience may admit, at best, of only the most hesitant application. Essentially it is a separate problem, needing independent study and, perhaps, peculiar treatment.

summary
of
mtg
went - no
D.A. ∴
IK needs
sep study

It remains to consider briefly a further series of what seem to me pertinent issues.

x. *The Super-State. A Sine Qua Non?*

First, the super-State. Does everything hinge on this? Lord Lothian lately declared that except in a super-State there could be no out-and-out abolition of war. Must we agree? Here again we must define our terms. If, as somebody did, you define it as simply 'a system of obligations

166 *The Future of the Collective System*

restrictive of liberty' then clearly your super-State won't of itself prevent war, considering it has been unavailingly with us from the earliest days of international jurisprudence. But Lord Lothian's conception is different. It is technically a federation, nothing less. And I have explicitly doubted the probable disappearance, in our time, of the 'pernicious' sovereignty notion. If you, on the contrary, know you can sweep it away, more power to your elbow, or whatever you use to sweep. Perhaps Lord Lothian is right, and no mere collectivism can suffice. The outlook must then seem gloomy indeed. That being, however, as it may, further consideration of the super-State would, I feel, figure oddly in a discussion of the 'collective', not the 'unified', system. The Collective System, as currently conceived, will aspire to maintain world peace despite the survival of national sovereignty as a given, though not perhaps a chosen, fact.

xi. *Must the Covenant be Amended?*

Next, the question of improving the conventional framework—in particular, amending the Covenant. The unanimity rule, for example: what if member-States be unwilling to renounce their *liberum veto*? That rule, I submit, should not be taken too grimly. Provided the member-States be definitely set on upholding the Covenant, need the Covenant indefinitely 'hold up' the member-States? Need the willing members admit frustration at the hands of the unanimity principle? Article 10, certainly, is difficult, as its wording fails to fix any positive measures as obligatory in default of advice—presumably, unanimous advice—from the Council. But who says Council voting is a postulate for measures under Article 16, paragraph 1?

Or that, unanimity under Article 11 being not attained, the collectivistically-minded (!) States must sit with folded hands? Already there is precedent for the sending, by twelve several members of the Council, of identical notes to an offending member-State. Simultaneous, individual, similar, and concerted action by a group of resolute countries might go far to make 'effectual' the League's 'wise' endeavours for the safeguarding of international peace. It was impressive having Mr. Walters's opinion that, given loyalty in the member-States, the existing Covenant should prove enough in itself. More helpful, that is, than any change in the formal framework would be a worthier attitude among Governments towards their present obligations. Amending the Covenant is a hard undertaking, the ill-judged initiation of which may tend merely to undermine what confidence to-day's procedures enjoy. Build the super-State if you know how; amend the Covenant if you can; but make meanwhile the most of such instruments and institutions as already are available for use.

xii. *Collectivism and Force.*

The issue I now intended taking was finely handled by Professor Zimmern last night. I mean the role of violence in the organization of collectivism. What should a Christian's position be towards a programme for meeting force with force, a system which, in Lord Lothian's idiom, substitutes war as an instrument of collective, for war as an instrument of national, policy? The Christian, willing to render Caesar's things to Caesar, may hesitate to put with these the use of naked force. But what if, on analysis, he find that only by violence—albeit organized, disciplined, violence—violence, so to say, 'sterilized' in a central bank—

all
- note th
unanim
no acc
if none

Gov't
make
work - n
a new
framework

calls to
reverse
underm
present

can there come, or continue, to be any Caesar at all? And, if force be condoned for the State's eventual defence against adversaries within, why not also for its protection against enemies without? Besides, self-defence apart, who knows what the Good Samaritan would have done had he arrived to find the thieves still busy?

We may carry our questioning further. Take power diplomacy. This, you say, should surely be a thing of the past. And, if the term means putting the augmentation of power as a prime objective of policy, your point may be sound enough. If, however, it simply means diplomacy dependent, in the last ditch, on a possible appeal to superiority of power, the matter is more complex. What about the notion of power government? Service, not power, you may say, should be the modern watchword. Yet in a sense all government is power government, and all diplomacy power diplomacy.

You'll lately have seen a schoolmaster's letter opposing the O.T.C. as apt to give immature minds the idea that war was 'part of the scheme of things'. If we are to join in deprecating such suggestions, we anyhow ought to know why. As untrue? Or, as not being socially salutary? With things as they are, war is, with a vengeance, part—at least in theory—of the scheme. Hence our concern for a collective system. Hence the O.T.C. Hence the need for a closing of the ranks by all who intend the repression of war. Of the aspiring young Britishers who affirmed the other day their unwillingness ever to fight for King and Country, many meant, no doubt, as a tacit corollary, that they would all the more zealously fight for the Collective System. But Mussolini, and other outsiders (no offence intended), may be pardoned if in their dullness they missed the implication.

that of
the catagories
and kind of public
(and was
Cala Laski)

war = part
of the
scheme

anti-war
may mean
a not policy
only
but...

xiii. *Will War Become Unthinkable?*

Of wishful thinking there can be few more facile, not to say unfortunate, examples than the conception some pacifists form of the abolition of war. Unfortunate, because unrealistic, where realism may be vital to success. Conceive war as a plain abnormality, or a crime, and you may tend to talk of its outlawry and simple elimination. Realize that in our inherited system occasional war has until now been only too normal, and that under any mere collectivism it will remain a theoretical, if illicit, possibility, and you may join intelligently in the effort to avert it. Postpone war in practice to infinity, and its paper abolition may be left to accomplish itself. The metaphor of the crime has here perhaps been overdone. You'll remember the man who, being cabled: 'Your mother-in-law has passed away shall we bury cremate or embalm', replied: 'Bury, cremate, embalm, take no risks'. In combating war, let us not for fear of mixing metaphors leave any stone unturned. Let us condemn and repress it as a crime, supersede it as a mode of litigation, guard against it as a disease, regulate against it as a traffic-smash. Let us assail it with every weapon simultaneously all along the front. Then, in our endeavour to postpone it progressively further, to render it increasingly rare, we may, for our humility, be rewarded with what we were not officially expecting—to wit, the effective obsolescence of war.

xiv. *The Settling of Disputes: An Unsolved Problem.*

A mode of litigation! In a world without war, it is now a commonplace to declare that there must be found other methods for settling international differences. And

v. Imp.

facile view
of abolition
of war

critical of
war as crime
war -
he proposes
re-organizing
war to
over it

10. Imp.

If no war
then
other means
of settling
disputes
needed

170 *The Future of the Collective System*

this seems evident enough—if we ‘soft-pedal’ the fact that not all differences otherwise unsettled tend to be settled by force. It is at least for the dangerous disputes that provision is needed. Of these, some doubtless will depend on a point of law. We are nowadays used to the idea that for handling the legal issues, or issues of fact, the international judge is qualified and available. It has besides been pointed out—perhaps to excess—that never is it technically unthinkable for a ruling to be rendered as to how the law stands, or stood, at any given moment. Let us not ascribe to writers who labour this point the supposition that such recourse to a judge will always be necessarily useful. Although you can at any time, if you like, seek a third-party opinion on the law or the facts, the search will be superfluous if folks are not divided on that particular point. The crux is that there can arise issues—call them non-legal, non-justiciable, or any fancy name you prefer—where a judge merely of law or fact can not just in that capacity give the needed help. For instance, the question whether a given treaty-provision shall, or shall not, at a given stage, be suppressed. To resolving that species of question our machinery as yet offers no assured approach. Some put their hope in proposals to ‘implement’ Article 19. A blessed word—to ‘implement’. Such cool ambiguity. Now it means to amplify, now merely to fulfil. Can it possibly mean the two at once? To supplement that Article may be indispensable, but is not by law incumbent on such as are only pledged to fulfil. Yet that text is often mentioned as ‘providing’ for ‘the reconsideration of treaties and situations of danger’. Would that my liability to income tax were ‘provided for’ in similar terms. (‘H.M. Commissioners may from time to time advise the payment . . .!’) Better

all
provisions can
be decided
by law—
eg,
a. 19

to insist that, with or without Article 19, the problem of the resented legal position remains a challenge to international statesmanship. Article 15 goes some way towards meeting the need. Nothing therein precludes—where a rupture is feared—the recommending, by Council or Assembly, of territorial or other such changes. But in a world that respects the Kellogg Pact, it looks as though passive resistance to such recommendations might be offered with impunity. Nor is there solid hope in the idea of an equity tribunal. Even could we have such an organ, safely to be trusted to look at equity alone, are you certain that would answer the need? Do we expect to achieve internationally what would amount to an improvement, theoretically, upon the sort of thing that happens in the domestic sphere? 'The State', says my cynical friend, 'is an institution whereby people combine to overcome their moral scruples to their mutual advantage.' It needs no Karl Marx to see that in any given régime the scales of influence are apt to be weighted in favour of those who blessedly possess. Within its limits law does afford some sort of justice. But where law is indifferent, the strong, in the domestic sphere, are apt to expect rather more than the merely equitable, and they are apt to get it. The lion, where the law is silent, is used, not simply to an equitable, but to a lion's, share. Recognize this, if you choose: and aim to produce, internationally, a like result. But let us label the organ a tribunal, not in equity, but in expediency, naked if not unashamed. At least among our scientific selves, let us call things by their names.

Wherever possible, let us certainly insist that territorial claims be, as Mr. Arnold-Forster foresees, 'de-bunked'. But will they so be suppressed? The serious thing is, not

a19

a15

w/out war,
passive
resistance
to any change
will work!

eg power
matters

+ will
shape (R as
it shapes
don.

(1/15
Car?)

that this problem has yet to be solved, or even that it has yet to be tackled: but rather that, officially, it has hardly as yet been perceived. One is free to hold that the treaties, or their remaining parts, are sound—but not therefore to insist that they be acknowledged as sacrosanct, undiscussable. Are our countrymen in general prepared for the sort of sacrifices Mr. Lansbury favours? Do we even agree that, morally, they should so be prepared? And are the 'have nots' disposed to forgo any claim not endorsed by third-party opinion as reasonable? What's wanted, in truth, is not simply a new procedure. That would come of itself—if once you had the needed fresh philosophy of international life, the willingness, diplomatically, for a new deal.

xv. *Wanted: A New Ethic?*

A new philosophy of life—or, in Mr. Arnold-Forster's phrase, a new social ethic. He desired it more specifically as touching the question of war. But we may wonder if that change could be fully forthcoming except as part of an altered attitude towards international things as a whole.

A new ethic—because no mere legal code could avail in international, any more than in industrial or matrimonial, affairs, to safeguard a harmony whose maintenance is dependent on the spirit. And the ethic must be new in more senses than one. Machiavelli may be condemned for denying the relevance of morals to diplomacy: but some of his critics are curiously unspecific in putting their alternative view. I myself am unable baldly to insist that States have the same kind of conscience or are bothered by the same sort of ethics as we in domestic concerns. The most I would ask is that they should institutionalize, as a matter of policy, the practice of behaving *as though* they had what collectivities,

to get a
change re
end wars
treaties law
isn't enough

V. Imp

state
ethics
-by act
as if
socially
responsible

as opposed to individuals, do not commonly seem to have, a sense of social responsibility. President Roosevelt has given us a propitious slogan—the policy of the good neighbour. (The policy; not, that is, the ethic.) Or should we say the policy of the Better Samaritan, who turns up in time? Would that men and Governments might come to conceive the States, more than they do, as a 'family' of nations, a brotherhood of peoples. The answer to Cain, you know, is not 'Yes, you *are* your brother's keeper', but 'Keeper or no keeper, you *are* your brother's brother'.

// to Coll
sec?
| a better
ethic

xvi. *A New Ideology?*

For it is largely a question of how international relations are currently conceived. If in practice there were successfully established a new social ethic, it would scarcely emerge unassociated with a new ideology, a new phase in the realm of accepted ideas.

Let us only trust that, if and when such new ideology invites our attention, we shall prize it for its potential influence, and not too jealously scrutinize it for its accordance with observable facts. If the new ideology is to save us, this will be, not because it is true, but because it is suitable.

Monsieur Briand made a brave attempt at spreading some such new set of ideas. His failure may not have been primarily imputable to his academic commentators: but they did little to help. Had he managed to get Frenchmen and Germans to see one another as fellow-Europeans he might thereby have worked the miracle for which our age so despairingly longs. Yet, friends of mine felt it right to attack that noble idea, analysing it, testing it in the light of antecedent realities, asking what in common the Greek and the Swede possessed, contrasting the figures of intra-

} prevalence
of
ideas +
their effect

} eg EC!

} critical
analysis
demolished
the idea

174 *The Future of the Collective System*

and of inter-continental trade. They might, to express their opinion, have borrowed the Castlereagh formula, 'a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense'—as if that had anything to do with the case. 'A living thing is born', said Woodrow Wilson in 1919. 'L'enfant est né', said Aristide Briand in 1930. 'Silly old women', rather inconsistently remarked those who liked to call a spade a spade. All honour, let us say, to the silly old women. They may yet do more for civilization than the clever young men.

xvii. *The Conclusion of the Whole Matter.*

And now let us finally ask what will be the true, the only possible, foundation for any effectively functioning collective system? For once, I'll accept the domestic analogy. What, ultimately, is the basis of orderly coexistence within the local community? Nobody has put it more simply than Professor MacIver. You'll remember his phrase—'the will *for* the State'—that is, the sufficiently prevalent disposition, if not to approve, then anyway to tolerate, the retention of those social arrangements that form the constitutional régime. Correspondingly, if the Collective System is ever to have the strength of a domestic order, it will be upon the foundation of an adequate 'will *for* the Collective System'. Note, moreover, that with MacIver it is the will, not for '*a*' State, but for '*the*' State, that is, the particular State in question. Not every State is assured of permanence, not every régime can command an adequate 'will *for*'. And, as there are States *and* States, may there not likewise be systems and systems? The collective system that survives will be one that sustains the adequate 'will *for*'. Even if not fully acceptable to the fastidious, it must be endurable enough to a sufficient bulk of the community concerned, that is,

ideology of
LON + the
elaborately
critical
response!
but ideas
may be our hope...
D.A.

Coll System
wakes of
sufficiently
prevalent

the system
(as might be
indicated
by alternate
news of
...)

[the society of States. In 1919, while we know how welcome it was to the peoples, how it was believed in by Wilson himself, and how, at his instance, the other Governments gave it their assent, it is less safe to suppose that statesmen at large (!), and therefore 'States' in general, had equal faith in the League's political fitness to survive. The most we can say is that Wilson did at least 'put it across', much as in a later year Secretary Kellogg was to put across the Pact of Paris. The States accepted the Covenant, whether loving it or not. Do we know that there actually was, among the 'States', as distinct from the peoples, an adequate will for any, let alone for the, League of Nations? The 'haves', maybe, will have approved the tendency to stabilize, to stereotype, the *status quo*. Theirs was rather the moral position of the gambler who, just when by chance all the cash has come into his hands, remembers his mother's admonition that gambling is sinful—and insists that the play do cease. They, the 'haves', were a little in the mood of him who, having got on, and got honour, gets honest. So far did the arrangements of 1919 fall short of universal acceptance as to be reminiscent of the badly set broken leg, which, if ever fully to recover, must first be broken again. Is it possible, except through this further relapse into violence, hopefully to attempt a cure? When all the consequential States, and for this purpose all the key personalities, are supporters of some single system, then you may sleep in your beds. If light is wanted on the future of collectivism, why ask me? Why not rather ask persons who count in the affairs of our time: for instance, General von Fritsch of the Reichswehr? Then you'll be getting your tip straight from the mouth of *one* of the horses! In a world composed wholly of Swedens a collective system might be unnecessary, in a world of

likelihood
of success
of LON-
depends on
ideas of it
among the
states

but fell
far short!

precise?
?

critical
new
haves

176 *The Future of the Collective System*

Czechoslovakias it ought to be possible, in a world of Japans it could hardly be conceived.

Faced with this problem of social engineering, or, if you like, political architecture, people like us are rather in the plight of an architect whose clients demand that he build with unsuitable materials on an impossible site to self-contradictory suggestions of their own and without cost to themselves. There is also the simile of the showman who, stirred on review-day by the sight of aircraft evolving in formation, conceives the idea of having his elephants do the same. His difficulty will not come in planning a nice formation; but in ever getting his animals off the ground. From the *terra firma* of national self-interest sovereign States are almost equally ungiven to ascent.

xviii. *W(h)ither Sovereignty?*

One additional word about the fate to be foreseen, in our imagined future, for that aforesaid friend, the doctrine of sovereignty. You now know that, save by accepting this doctrine and allowing for it, as airmen accept the law of gravitation, I believe we are unlikely in our time to witness even such modest steps forward as current conditions might permit. Rather than ask that the adversary throw up the sponge, that the States forthwith renounce outright this cherished idea, I fancy we should be content to play for a draw—lest worse befall. For the moment, the super-State *stricto sensu* is hardly a feasible aim; but there is another line of advance. Embrace, *faute de mieux*, the philosophy of Article 11. Let every independent State, jealous of its sovereignty, yet interested in the keeping of peace under a tolerable form of collectivism, co-operate in creating for the League, in its efforts under Article 11, the maximum