

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

Is 'revenge by the blacks' the only thing of which white South Africans need be assumed to have an initial fear? (p. 67). Have they no anxious concern for the perpetuation of their community existence, their distinctive nationhood? Might the working party not have noticed, and pointed out, that South Africa's dominant ideology of folkish nationhood is faced in the present-day world today by not fewer than four great antagonists: liberalism, communism, Pan-Africanist expansionism and what we must please be permitted to refer to as political Christianity? It is not just a question of the conflict between two interchangeable policies. It is a conflict between one social philosophy and a wartime coalition of four. For Afrikaners it is not merely the individual that has seemed to matter, nor the class, nor the race, but the people. Sociologically speaking the world, for them, is peopled not with people only but with peoples, and like Rousseau they hold that it is the peoples who count. Does not even the United Nations Charter relate peace to the self-determination of peoples?

The survival of a people is for that people more than just a question of policy. The rationale of the 1909 compromise was that a people was determined to survive. And now for the dominant element in South Africa the option is between corporate survival and the eventual liquidation of a collective selfhood. This is not what one ordinarily understands by a choice between alternative policies. And to have called the Afrikaner's position a blasphemy, or merely to have declared it contrary to the teachings of Jesus Christ, was not a very propitious opening gambit if a fraternal dialogue was to have been got under way. For it implied not merely an inability to sympathise with the other man's position, but failure even to have seen it for what it was.

The report is of course quite specific on the need to understand the situation (p. 30), and it refers to the efforts the members made to correct their initial viewpoints (p. 7). With what success they did this it is hard to tell, for in one place only—on the advisability of sanctions—are a majority recorded as having had second thoughts after making a closer study of the facts.

The question is whether even with a deeper awareness of the South African situation the working party would in fact have taken a different line on major issues. It may be that they would in any case have been inhibited by their fundamental stance. It is said that even today there are in France individuals who have still to accept the French Revolution. Certainly in South Africa there are those who have not yet fully accommodated themselves to the Constitution of 1910. No need to allocate praise or blame: but it does behove us to notice that the working party would appear to have all been in the camp of those in South Africa who for ideological reasons are unable to accept the 1910 compromise between the liberalism of the south and the exclusivism of the north. Call their position British, or churchy, or what you will, the nefariousness of

community survival
Fear of
Revenge by Blacks
folkish nationhood
in SA
vs.

ness,
is
central

val of
is central to
1909 constitution as
settlement
vs. now...

justification of
not accepted by
all
- by now 1961
state has superseded
it, right?

Report
reflects views
of those who
don't like
the 1910
compromise

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

apartheid is for the working party a matter not just of personal predilection but of doctrinal orthodoxy. This was evidently not among the topics on which they so diligently sought to correct their initial viewpoints.

And what is more—this doctrine is for the working party more than just an item in their social faith. It is not simply an element in their political liberalism. With them it is a very part of their religion. They believe that, as Christians, they can do and think no other. It is to them apparently inconceivable that a Christian should really at the same time believe that God made all men of one blood, and that in given historical and sociological conditions it could be legitimate, because socially salutary—even from the Christian point of view—for public arrangements to be based on the palpable fact that history and social evolution have produced men as members of communities. It is thus difficult for them to believe that those in South Africa who support the Government can truly be Christians in any acceptable meaning of the term. No doubt they do manage to think they believe it, but they find it a bit of an effort.

Where you have two or more communities living side by side, with a strong sense of their mutual distinctness, there may all too readily develop tensions between them irrespective of any element of colour. The Irish Catholics and Protestants, Indians Hindu and Muslim, the Canadian French and English-speaking elements, the Flemings and Walloons, are cases of this: and communism dwells, and depends for its basic appeal, not typically on any contrast of colour (though such contrasts may cause prejudice which communism is happy enough to exploit). Suppose in South Africa the Africans, though not European, were nonetheless white, and suppose that they occupied in society the same positions as today, can one doubt that the African proletariat would be incited by communists against the capitalists, even in the absence of any difference in colour?

To the empirical sociologist South Africa is, as John Hatch has said in the *New Statesman*, a 'collection' (and not just a couple) of communities, (January 17 1964). To the working party, however, South Africa is a land just of two communities which should be and presently will be a land of one. The whites and the blacks are, so to say, one community, and the blacks are the core, as well as the bulk, of that community. But the truth is that, in their collective self-interpretation, the Zulus, like the Swazis and the Basuto, are a community distinct. In the Leninist analysis any society is in effect made up of two classes, the have-nots and the haves. And it is essential that the haves, as such, shall cease to be. If they are not content—and they never are—to efface themselves, others must perform the service for them, and on them and to them.

The members of the working party are thus not unique in this kind of attitude. They exemplify a recognisable type of mind which sees apartheid in much the same sort of way as Lenin saw capitalism, or

accuse
of being
whose
asserts
'refo

Commun
ter
eg be

though
y Africa

SA =

not

Zulus

comp
to be

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

Soekarno sees Malaysia, or Nasser Israel. It is not a thing with which you can compromise. It is utterly and incorrigibly evil. As Lenin could not allow it to be supposed that parliamentary government and reformist politics might eventually be able to accomplish something worthwhile for alleviating the lot of the working man, so in this report there is excluded any suggestion that separate development might ever possibly be of benefit to the Bantu. No doubt the Afrikaner may persuade himself that it will. But he is wrong. Tolerance in respect of the religious beliefs of others may now be considered liberal rather than weak. But tolerance of the social beliefs of others is something at which many professedly liberal-minded people seem still to draw the line. And it is not that liberals are nowadays less virtuous than they used to be. 'Wars,' wrote Sir Norman Angell, 'are made by good men, profoundly convinced that they are right.'

The working party's analysis of the South African social situation is thus essentially that set forth in the gospel according to Karl Marx, with colour war in place of class. There are the two communities, black and white, locked in mortal struggle: and the certainty is that the exasperation of the blacks will go on mounting until one fine morning they will arise and cast off the yoke of their 'oppressors.' Such political forecasting is confident rather than subtle. The working party have a certitude that Africanism will sooner or later submerge the southern tip of Africa (p. 68), a feeling reminiscent of how in 1946 some people felt that communism would presently engulf the western tip of the Euro-Asian landmass. This latter nightmare has by now somewhat receded, and may not materialise at all. On the other hand, who knows? And who knows what further surprises tomorrow may have in store for us all in Africa? It is notable that the word 'perhaps' does not feature in the working party's prefiguring of the future of the Republic. The fact that in their adumbrating of the shape of things to come that word does not occur renders less rather than more compelling what they say.

So this view of the situation in South Africa is in its way not very original. What is significant is its appearance in the pages of so purportedly serious a study. Which is the working party's vision? Is it no more than the liberal ideal of an equal, or common, society? Or is it, at bottom, the classless society that is to follow upon the expropriation of the expropriators? In either event it implies the replacement of white minority by black rule, be it black majority rule or something else. Their point of departure must, they say, be the witness of the church in the new Africa. Apartheid is a 'grievous hindrance' to the gospel in Africa (p. 14). Such a man as the Bishop of Masasi, better remembered as Father Huddleston, who has, we learn, won the love of Africans, Christian and non-Christian alike, knows exactly where he stands (p. 90). The church, he writes, should as a whole identify itself with that opposition to Nationalist South Africa which has been voiced by Bishops Ambrose Reeves and

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

Joost de Blank. If the Christian churches do not dissociate themselves from the cause of the white man in Africa, they will only leave open the field to the advance of Islam, presumably to the elimination of such outposts of Christianity as missionary endeavour has succeeded in establishing on the African continent.

There are in fact two elements with which the working party seem unable to conceive that there can be any point in trying to argue. In the South African Government, as distinct from the less steadfast of its supporters, they do not reckon on any change of heart. And at the other extreme there seems to be nothing that they imagine can be done regarding the hostility to South Africa of the newly emancipated African states—nothing except to recognise it and to leap upon its bandwagon. That hostility is like a force of nature, like the wind to which the wise navigator will be quick to trim his sails.

There is no doubt a tendency to equate, or at least to associate, ideological obsessiveness with a totalitarian approach to life. A picture is evoked of totalitarianism on the one hand, and liberalism on the other, with the fixations all in the totalitarian camp. But the truth is that, while the totalitarians can be systematically empiricist and opportunistic in their practice, the liberals can be unswervingly doctrinaire in theirs. Liberalism too, and especially in relation to South Africa, can be as obsessively ideological as is communism in its anti-capitalist posture.

What do we mean by a 'compulsive revolutionary'? Lenin was lately described as one. The compulsive revolutionary may perhaps be best defined as the person who, judging unendurable the social and economic conditions prevailing under the given political dispensation, is so doubtful of the possibility of its ever being sufficiently modified by constitutional processes that he holds it indispensable for the very 'system' itself to be radically transformed, whether with or without the consent of those presently in positions of privilege, which positions it will be for them to lose. The compulsive revolutionary may, though he need not necessarily, believe in violence—fomented possibly from abroad—as the single feasible method of bringing the revolution about. And even if believing in violence he may not personally relish the prospect of it. He may expect it without identifying himself with the ambition to see it happen. In relation to capitalism as such, Lenin, for instance, was a compulsive revolutionary because he had at least purportedly no belief in the possibility of peaceful, progressive, amelioration in the plight of the proletariat. In relation to the South African system of white minority rule, the working party expose themselves as revolutionaries of a no less compulsive order—and, whether or not believing themselves in the possibility of piecemeal improvement, are resolved that their readers shall have no belief in it at all. It is thus for them imperative to ensure that British Christians do not come even to suspect that Dr Verwoerd may himself be a believer in change.

strategic
keep

Black sta
hostility
impl

liberalism
espilly res

accuses
beny

er... real
Verwoerd

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

On this interpretation, it will be perceived that the reformist's problem is basically not so much moral, or political, or even psychological, but institutional. It is the problem of how you are to alter institutions except by the procedures which those institutions themselves provide for their alteration. How for instance could one hope to change the United Nations Charter except with the concurrence of those who in terms of its own provisions have a veto on suggested changes in the charter? How can you unseat the white oligarchy in South Africa except with that oligarchy's consent? And since experience shows that the more pressure there is put from abroad upon the white oligarchy the more of its white subjects rally to the support of those holding office under that institutional set-up, it is not easy to see how, while that pressure is maintained, you may hope for any alteration in the institutional system against which, understandably but in no very sophisticated manner, you are inveighing.

It's critique of
the reform
from outside

Christians and diplomacy

A South African would be foolish to resent the report merely because there is so little in it for his comfort. It was not written as a service to the likes of him. What the working party are avowedly out to discuss is the problem of Her Majesty's Government, and at the same time the related problem of the Christian church, and of individual Christians.* Faced with the sanctions issue and the possible outcome of the South West Africa case, what in the circumstances are Her Majesty's Government and the churches to do? What is their line to be? That, officially and ostensibly, is what the report is about.

But, while such is the official business of this report, it is almost impossible not to see it as having also a further purpose. Between the lines of it there are clues to what could well be its true concern. Through the British Council of Churches the working party is addressing itself to all the Christians in Britain. If their opinion could be suitably crystallised, it might influence policy; which is another way of saying that, if policy could count on their unhesitating endorsement, policy could be the more confidently and effectively pursued; whereas, conversely, if opinion is at once impassioned and divided, policy may be immobilised at the very moment when action is urgently required. If there do indeed exist many, among the older-fashioned Christians in the United Kingdom, to whom the case for Britain's aligning herself, with associates of more recent vintages against her ally of two world wars, makes little appeal, it is necessary that they be led to see the incorrectness of their way of thought. What more plausible explanation could one need for the tone and tenor of this clever little book?

SC:asm

Crudely stated, the problem to whose solution, as distinct from the mere study of it, the working party are concerned to contribute is the *Which of these two problems has pride of place in their scale of priorities is revealed when they emphasise that their fundamental point of departure must be 'the witness of the Church in the new Africa in the years to 2000 and far beyond.'

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

problem of 'selling' to British Christians a line that they might not else be predisposed to 'buy'—a policy, namely, of open-eyed appeasement of the up-and-coming new African states. What these latter want, and the sooner the better, is black majority rule in the Republic as a whole. Until this comes about, black dignity will, in their eyes, be affronted. So come about it must, in whatever way. Probably there will be a decision at the Hague which, if South Africa is not prompt to implement it, should offer a clear legal basis for intervention, and the eventual displacement in South West Africa of South African rule. This accomplished, the morale of white South Africans will have suffered so rude a shock that their capitulation on the even larger issue could be the more easily brought about (p. 87).

Not that it would be true to suggest that the working party show total ignorance of the predicament of white South Africans. For the trouble is not that they do not understand it. Rather it is that it gets too little of their sympathy. Marx, it may be recalled, understood well enough the capitalist point of view. But he saw the bourgeoisie as scheduled for extinction. And so do the working party see as predestined to supersession the system of white supremacy in South Africa today. They cannot at one and the same time court the approval of the African states and render more than lip service to the interests of the whites.

All this may sound a trifle tough for good Christians to digest. But is it really? What has to be demanded of South Africa, say the working party, need not, after all, be acceptance of out-and-out black domination. 'No more grievous disservice can be done to the prospect of reconciliation than to present the issue as one of unconditional surrender. . . ' South Africa after all is not Zambia. Neither is it Kenya. Let there be worked out such a settlement as all may accept. And let it include a bill of rights. And let the settlement be such incidentally that no section will want to use it as a stepping-stone to more. In other words, let it leave the African states with nothing further to ask for—even were it only for the reinforcement of their re-established self-esteem. Let nothing remain that could constitute for black dignity an affront. And then there will be nothing for the whites to fear.

But is not the proposed Anglo-American guarantee precisely the sort of thing that the Africans can be relied on to regard as an affront? It is at this point that the working party's edifice of inventive ingenuity begins to crumble. But never mind. Not everything can be determined down to the last detail in advance. Let the parties be brought to the table and then let us see what can be done. Perhaps someone will come up with some bright new idea. And meanwhile, perhaps, if this difficulty is not referred to in the report, Christians may accept the plan without noticing the fault in its construction.

Why? Because white South Africans may fail to see the catch? No, not really for that reason. Rather, because it is the British Christians who

policy to Sh
app
→ black ma

predicam
white

again 11/5 w
b

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

may fail to see the catch. After all, what we are here engaged in solving is not the problem of persuading white South Africans to throw in their hand. That one we must leave to the United Nations. Ours is the problem of persuading Christian Britain to applaud, or at worst to keep silence, when it happens. And this is why the working party are so careful to have something apparently reassuring to say on certain points of law. Christians they perhaps correctly suppose will be jealous and zealous for the rule of law. It is necessary therefore to show them that what is here envisaged is consistent with that ideal. In particular it is necessary to show that national sovereignty has not been forgotten about, nor matters of domestic jurisdiction improperly interfered in. But on all these points the working party are able to advise their reader not to worry. International law itself is an inherited conflation no longer in line with the moral realities of the situation. National sovereignty is nowadays giving way to the world rule of law, especially where human rights are concerned. And by what comes close to being no better than a verbal stratagem they reach the comfortable conclusion that apartheid is somehow no longer covered by the domestic jurisdiction clause of the charter.

What precisely do the working party mean by the upholding of the rule of law? Compliance with the law's requirements and respect for its restraints? Enforcement of such compliance and respect by others? But what if such enforcement, by A, of compliance by B, involve defiance by A of some restraints of the law? Transgression, that is, of limits set by the law in respect of methods, or occasions, for such enforcement? On the Calvo-Cossio doctrine such overstepping of the limits could be construed as a testing, a defining, and as if by the same token an extending, of the rule of law itself. It is an exciting, original, and in some ways an attractive doctrine which, while it may have something to do with politics, has of course nothing to do with law.

So just as they forbear to challenge the piece of official mystification whereby a matter essentially domestic is shunted out of its protected category with a phrase about its being *sui generis*, so equally do they tolerate the ingenious theory that, if in so special a matter as the protection of human rights the law is against you, what you need to do is to brush the law aside, claiming thereby to 'test, define, and extend' the rule of law. No one having a proper feeling for the rule of law could ever be a party to such a manoeuvre. It is sad that the working party, while professing such solicitude for the rule of law, should succumb to the allurements of this untenable idea.

To appreciate in proper perspective these proposals for bringing revolutionary change it is necessary to reiterate that the working party are expressly not in favour of a substitution of black domination for white. They are categorical on this. What one has rather to regret is their seeming unwillingness to discuss the improbability of their proposed alternative to white domination working out in practice as

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

anything other than domination by the blacks. It is compassion, they tell us, that has constrained them to seek to enter into the situation of those who have to bear the cross of reconciliation. Their concern is for 'all God's children of all races' (p. 88). But to what does this really add up? Does it mean anything other than that the whites must agree to the ending of white minority rule? Is it not this, and this alone, that the working party are demanding? And this, not necessarily because blacks in South Africa are in fact suffering under oppression, but because states elsewhere in Africa are calling for the end of South African white minority rule, and, in the working party's view, they must at all costs be appeased? Is it not their assumption that, whereas for the purpose of their desired reconciliation the whites may properly be expected to show a change of heart, no comparable change of heart could possibly be expected of anyone other than the South African whites?

We must think less, say the working party, of the total situation than of the peculiar witness of the church within it. No government, by contrast, can afford to ignore that total situation. So it is as if the working party were to say, 'Listen to us please, but we appreciate that you must listen to others too, and that your decision is unable to be determined by our advice exclusively.' By adopting this position the working party seek the best of two worlds. An analysis which points the way to violent action ends with a refusal to go along, a refusal which is not really expected to determine whether others go or not.

They speak of the moral judgment of the world as though it were synonymous with the prompting of the Christian conscience—without attempting to establish a relation between the precepts of Christianity and the processes whereby the wordings to be voted by the General Assembly are negotiated in the corridors of New York.

'War begins in the minds of men'

The report is declaredly intended to help individual Christians to enter into the real dimensions of a problem 'which must be a subject for their prayer and on which as citizens they are required to pass political judgment.' It is of course of the essence of the democratic way of life that it permits, and is even reputed to encourage, the free development of political ideas, including those whose acceptance may irk the government of the day. There is supposed to be free competition, between alternative schools of thought, on what needs doing in the general interest, so that, whatever in any given matter the government may in fact elect to do, there are liable to be voices declaring that it would have been better to have done something different.

Now it must often have been remarked that while for the treatment of domestic issues there could scarcely be a more opportune system than this one, this is less conspicuously so when it comes to the conduct of foreign affairs. In time of actual war, it is more or less accepted that in

the interests of the total effort any doubts about the validity of the country's cause had better go unexpressed. And the fewer the doubts, whether voiced or not, the better. From this point of view it will for instance have been a good thing for Britain as a belligerent that her challenge to Hitler had passed from the plane of diplomatic to that of military confrontation at a stage when so many publicly significant voices had already joined in the clamour for the country to make a stand. The time of the Spanish Civil War was on the other hand one when British policy was in difficulties through the absence of a popular policy-consensus on the issues.

The question that must have suggested itself to any thoughtful South African who, when first hearing of this report, remembered its last year's forerunner, the Report of the United Nations so-called Committee of Experts—that question, namely: Is this to be an objective study, or, is it to be a cold war propaganda piece?—is a question which every careful reader had better try to answer for himself.

'As a nation,' wrote Marc Bloch, 'we had been content with incomplete knowledge and imperfectly thought-out ideas.*' 'To understand why some things are done,' writes Ben Marais in a book from which the working party themselves include quotations, 'it is necessary to see the whole picture, and the true South African picture is very different from the caricature as seen by the world.†' It is a pity that the working party were not more eager to correct that caricature.

True, they do at one point ask, 'Is this the language of journalism or of history?' (p. 90). But their question, so asked, refers not to anything that they themselves have written, but to a passage from the Foot Report to the United Nations.

Admittedly their touch on some of the vital points of detail is less uncertain than on others. But one wonders what would happen to a company promoter who in the drawing up of his prospectus was not more circumspect than they. Are we to allow that a company prospectus is serious business, more serious, that is, than a report on South Africa's future and how to make it short?

Were it not that this report has in some sense the imprimatur of the Christian churches and were its pious accents not therefore calculated to attract for it a readership that it otherwise could hardly expect, the book might simply be acknowledged as one more addition to the growing corpus of anti-apartheid lore. If however we assume that the whole object of the enterprise was to kindle, mobilise and organise among British Christian churchmen a specific prejudice, as a means of preconditioning their reactions for the event of Britain's finding herself diplomatically constrained to sell South Africa down the river, much that might else be puzzling becomes easier to explain.

It is trite learning that in time of war—and this certainly includes cold

*Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat*, p. 143

†Ben Marais, *The Two Faces of Africa*, p. 2

the
love
Report
support
selling

typo?

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

war—it is truth that first is put in peril. There can be no better illustration of this than in the image that has been given to South Africa in Britain in recent years. The anti-apartheid movement is uncompromisingly dedicated to the combating of what South Africa is doing to preserve her very existence as a piece of Europe overseas. And the effect of its activities has been reinforced by the slanted treatment of South African issues on the mass media and even in much of the press. The pattern is all too familiar, at any rate to anyone whose memories extend back for 30 years. 'Quite deliberately . . . Hitler kept the truth from his servile masses. Instead of intellectual persuasion he gave them emotional suggestion.'* Is it so very surprising that a Hitler should have stooped so low when we see so similar a tendency to stooping in the organs of public enlightenment in the country of Milton and C. P. Scott?

It is well that one should be thinking of those 1930s. Looking at the three-cornered situation involving South Africa, the black African states and Britain, one is moved to wonder whether the current development of things is not simply Munich all over again.

What is the pattern? A state with an oligarchic structure, born with Britain's blessing, becomes the object of the ambitions of a new and dynamic group of powers. To stave off a showdown that might imperil British security, Britain is to accept the idea that the inherited order in that other country has become indefensible, and to use her diplomacy to placate the potential aggressors and to render impotent the now universally execrated object of their greedy hate. This partly by offering to guarantee a compromise solution, but mainly by creating in Britain at least a climate of opinion in which the appointed victim of the process shall seem deserving of what is to be his fate. Have we not seen it all before? Before the régime of Dr Benes could be liquidated, it was necessary for the British public to suspect that it had somehow become detestable. This, with Hitler's skilled co-operation, was more or less successfully brought about. Now, the working party is taking towards the South African constitution of 1910 the attitude the Munich powers took to the Czechoslovak constitution of 1919—seeing it as detestable. So they are preparing a similar process of liquidation. Hence the vituperative treatment of separate development in their report. The working party speak of the moral indignation of governments as if they mistook it for a human emotion. Do they not know how official feelings may be synthesised for every new occasion, and switched on and off as diplomacy requires? What have official emotions to do with existential evaluations?

Lately the British Foreign Secretary, referring to the Munich agreement of 1938, assured the present Czechoslovak Foreign Minister that Britain now regarded it as 'detestable, unjust, dangerous and dead.'† The working party, one gathers, regard international law as we have it today

*Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat*, p. 144

†*The Times*, April 4 1965

complaints
been not
over SA

SA, Africa
= Munich

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

as mildly detestable and deserving to be buried. Oddly enough, at the time of Munich it was the Czechoslovak constitution that was regarded as detestable.

In each case you have a constitutional set-up for the inauguration of which Britain might at one time have claimed some proportion of the credit. In each case there comes from abroad a challenge to this established order, based on the alleged sufferings of those in an underprivileged position. In each case, for the avoidance of a conflagration that may have no foreseeable end, Britain withdraws her support from those who are trying to uphold the now criticised order. In each case there is a barrage of defamatory propaganda to brainwash the British conscience in anticipation of what might look like the betrayal of a friend. In each case there is talk of a happier future for all. And the offer of a guarantee for the new system. And in both cases the basis of the business is power politics and the need to appease an aggressor.

Looked at in this light the report becomes the voice of the young men, sons of Belial, whom Jezebel engaged to give Naboth a bad press, preliminary to his early liquidation.

It was, as we saw, none other than the British Foreign Secretary who described the Munich agreement as detestable. How long would it be before the working party's proposed new Munich, to be brought about similarly at the instances of Britain, would similarly come to be denounced by Britain as detestable, unjust, dangerous—and deserving to be dead?

The working party speak of their proposals as having to be based on 'true justice' (p. 30), and they plead for emphasis on the positive possibilities of their solution (p. 68). But do they reflect on what 'true' justice would involve? From the whole tenor of their report it might well be inferred that there could be no difference, for them, between justice as envisaged by the underprivileged and the true justice to which they refer. But must we not insist that, whereas the justice demanded by the underdog is apt to mean justice for *him*, true justice should more correctly be conceived as meaning justice as between the several elements in society, justice, that is, as between the underdog, the topdog, and society as a whole? Those who clamour for justice, and are given just that, are not always pleased with what they get. It is also incidentally an element in justice, as commonly understood, that judgment is not given until there has been adequate consideration of the contentions of all sides in a case. There are altogether too many matters touched upon within the covers of this report of which the view of the working party sees the justice question as through the eyes of the underdog only.

And as for the desirability of looking at the positive possibilities in a situation—why, if this is such a good idea, do the working party not have it in mind when discoursing on the implications of separate development? From what they say of it one might imagine that it had no positive possibilities at all.

THE BRITISH CHURCHES AND SOUTH AFRICA

It is to be hoped that, in the not very likely event of South African Christian churchmen preparing a report on the future of Britain, they may approach their task in such a spirit that their proposals, if any, will spring—and be seen to spring—if not from compassion, true or simulated—then at least from the true justice which the working party describe as an integral part of love (*p.* 30).

Professor C. A. W. Manning, a South African of mixed English, Scots and French Huguenot descent, is a church-going Anglican whose impressions of the racial problem in South Africa go back to the turn of the century. Coming to England in 1914 as a Diocesan College Rhodes scholar, he served with the British Army throughout the first world war. Thereafter at Oxford he took degrees in philosophy and in law. Then, after periods in the International Labour Office and in the League of Nations Secretariat, he returned to teach law at Oxford. From there he moved (in 1930) to hold for more than 32 years the Chair of International Relations in the University of London. A founder member of the South Africa Society, he has lectured widely on South African issues in Britain, Canada and the United States. His writings include *The Nature of International Society*, London, George Bell and Son, 1962.