I. A Necessary Component in the Organisation of Peace.

1. Bound up with the problem of organised security is the subject of 'peaceful change'. Is it enough to say that 'there is peace when the law-abiding folk are stronger than the bandits'? In theory it may be that a collective-security system might work well enough, though making no special provision for peaceful change. So too might an analogously constituted State - as witness the Medes and Persians. Yet it seems likely that 'no system for the collective restraint of aggression can possibly stand the strain to which it will be subjected unless there is going on all the time a process by which the resulting strains can be eased by modifications of the status quo'. 'Past experience', says Lord Halifax, 'teaches that a stable international order must admit of ordered change in the relations between States'.

2. While, for the analogous function of changing its municipal law, every country has a system of its own, none can claim to have found a perfect method. Under none is there absolute security against possible crime or revolution. Nor can absolute security be promised by any international scheme. Collective security depends, not merely on paper commitments assumed by sovereign States, but on the presence of preponderant power at the service of actively cooperative will. If it is to retain the positive backing of the generality of 'third' States, the security system may need to speak, not merely to the self-interest and instinct of self-preservation of the peoples, but in some measure to their conscience also. The absence of any true possibility of reasonable change, by peaceful means, in a given status quo may make for hesitation on the part of those whose guarantee is needed against changes to be brought about by war.

3. And just as domestic order is in danger if too many of the public are out of sympathy with the existing system of law, so, for the success of a collective security programme, it is important that not too many especially of the powerful States be possessed, at one and the same time, of an unappeased resentment against the legal status quo. The frame of mind, in this respect, of a particular nation may moreover deteriorate. The local war-party may presently achieve power. In this it may well be helped by any obvious inadequacy in the international provisions for peaceful change. Once in the saddle such elements may indeed seek to sabotage any reasonable system belatedly introduced. The issues over which such elements will eventually go to war need not be identical with those the international neglect of which had helped them into power. The demands for change may, in their earlier form, have been moderate and indeed justified. Their very moderation may however have prevented their being considered important and created the impression that they could with safety be ignored.

4. Given a reasonable machinery of change it should, besides, be more difficult for the 'dictators' to hoodwink the more gullible sections in the peace-loving countries as to the justice of their belligerent cause.

5. It may be that collective security, in whatever form, is in any case a utopian ideal. But a world organised for peace does nevertheless seem, in theory, a 'possible' world. Given a

II. In What Sense a Problem?

6. As forming a 'problem', peaceful change is not a matter of introducing an element of movement into what would otherwise a stagnant world. Change, internationally, is almost as much an everyday matter as in ordinary human affairs. The problem, for those who conceive it as such, is that of facilitating, by peaceful means, those changes in default of which a given system of collective security would fail as a barrier against war.

7. The need for any institutional provision for this purpose is, indeed, a controversial point. Peace, it may be argued, is not so much a matter of procedural forms as of psychological attitudes. If it were found possible to root out the spirit of national irresponsibility and enlighten peoples as to their interdependence, the fundamentals of peace would already have been supplied. In matters not vitally affecting the peace problem there already exists, it is said, a process of peaceful change which works on the whole 'fairly well'. The world owes no little peaceful progress - and therefore change - to the working of international bodies of a kind whose activities are generally classed as 'non-contentious'. The Universal Postal Union has thus for the best part of a century been 'a modest and unassuming agent of peaceful change'. The difficulty of getting such a document as the Lytton Report, except when a major crisis has already occurred, is said to arise not from defective machinery but from traditional habits of dealing with international difficulties: it is, in a word, psychological. To some students, moreover, the far-reaching changes in the balance of social and political forces which have been brought about, between peoples and governments of broadly similar outlook, without the compulsion of machinery of the type favoured by revisionists, have suggested that the emphasis laid, in the years before 1939, on the need for such machinery to avert a breakdown of civilization, requires re-consideration in the light of the events of the last three years.

8. Amongst those, on the other hand, who have seen peaceful change as an institutional problem there is Lord Cecil, who, speaking on the morrow of the Armistice in 1918 foreshadowed, as one of the functions of the future League of Nations, a quasi-legislative activity of which little or nothing seems after all to have been said in the actual framing of the Peace. Articles 11, 15 and 19 of the Covenant do indeed have each a certain relation to the problem, but there is no sign in the records of the 1919 discussions of anything comparable with the interest which has come to be shown in it since. Nevertheless it was afterwards possible for Lord Lothian to say that, as understood by him at the time, the Covenant drawn up had been as an instrument permitting 'some pressure whereby changes could be made'. That President Wilson conceived rather similarly its intended function has lately been attested by Mr. Sumner Welles.

9. Though the Allies had, at the instance of the President and his advisers, accepted the incorporation of Article 19 in the Covenant, it was, writes Mr. Dulles, 'a formal acceptance without intellectual understanding'. Those nations which 'dominated the League' genuinely misconceived, according to him, the true nature of 'peace'. The League's failure was thus due not so much

to structural defects as to the 'failure of its members to utilize the instrumentalities which the Covenant put into their hands'. Behind this lay, he thinks, 'a fundamental failure of public opinion to understand the true nature of peace'.

10. The basic concept, says Dulles, of Article 19 must sooner or later be given practical application. Without it 'we cannot have a peace which is other than an armed and precarious truce'. Those who 'sincerely and intelligently seek the renunciation of force and the abolition of armament will concentrate upon the development of some international mechanism for effecting peaceful change'. It is, in his judgment, 'regrettable' that the Atlantic Charter 'fails to make any proposal to this end'.

III. The Conditions of the Problem

11. What then is the nature and method of that peaceful change for which some new provision is thought to be needed? 'The expression "peaceful change"', wrote Cruttwell, 'may seem at first sight to be plain and straightforward. This, however, is far from being the case'. Reviewing the phenomena to which it could, as he judged, be conveniently applied in the past, he found them to include 'a gradation of peacefulness from amicable settlement to arrangements made under the shadow of or as the indirect consequence of war'. That all such transactions should be in the nature of bargains was, to him, evident, since the state was primarily an instrument of egoism not of altruism. 'Most alterations', says Dunn, 'of the status quo require some kind of pressure to bring them about'. Those who assert that change effected under a threat of armed force is not 'peaceful change' are, says Carr, at liberty to define their terms how they please. 'But it should', he goes on, 'be noted that a definition thus restricted would equally exclude changes effected by a legislative or judicial process if these required enforcement'. Cruttwell even finds it convenient to include within the category of peaceful changes the kind brought about by the unilateral denunciation of a treaty without previous negotiation.

12. For the future, some have, to be sure, hoped that peaceful change might be purged of this element of constraint. 'When we say "peaceful", said one authority, 'I think we mean something more than merely change which takes place without war. We probably mean peaceful and voluntary change'. Dunn agrees, but only in a sense: 'The "voluntary" character of the acquiescence by the small Power may be in the form of a choice between evils'.

13. One obstacle to the liberal-spirited examination of claims for international change is the natural objection of governments to anything that would seem to improve the strategic situation of a possible adversary in war. The term 'power politics', remarks Dunn, 'has a sinister sound, and there is a widespread tendency to regard governments which practise it as bad governments and to explain their preoccupation with it as due to "militarism" or some other moral defect. Actually it seems an inevitable accompaniment of the kind of organisation that exists in the international community today'. Hence power becomes itself a major objective of policy. There results a great confusion of values and attitudes. All proposals for changes in the status quo, regardless of the grounds on which they are based, are bound, he says, to be assessed first and foremost in terms of their effect upon the power relationships of the

nations concerned. Hence it is idle to try to devise procedures for bringing about such changes peacefully, unless these procedures frankly embody the notion of coercion by marshalling an overwhelming force behind the proposed change.

14. Discussion of peaceful change is apt to be further clouded by failure to distinguish two ends, justice and peace, for the service of which some new international machinery may be held desirable. Not every change demanded by justice is immediately necessary for peace, and not every change suggested by the interests of peace will necessarily accord with abstract justice. The appeal to righteousness does indeed influence mankind. But, as a social force, concern for justice has, in the working of political machinery, to take its chance, in more or less open competition, with other less respectable social forces. Consider any parliamentary regime. On what principle does it move in effecting peaceful changes in the law? Not equity, as such. 'The doctrine that by taking a vote we can discover the truth, in philosophy, science, or history, is', writes Michael Roberts, 'plainly fantastic; it is equally ridiculous in ethics... and to make it plausible we have to cheat... Counting noses is not a system of measuring value, but of measuring effective demand'. A realistic study of the parliamentary legislative process should state itself in terms not of ethical priorities but of pressure-groups and social forces. Even could we have, internationally, an equity tribunal, safely to be trusted to look at equity alone, are we certain that this would meet the need? Do we expect to achieve, internationally, what would amount in moral principle, to an improvement on the sort of thing that happens in the domestic sphere?

15. In the sense in which peaceful change is here discussed, it is designed to serve as alternative to an otherwise anticipated warlike process of change. Peaceful change in the interests of justice, as such, is an independent problem. Eventually, says Dunn, it may be possible to build up a general community of interest in the welfare of individual members of the international family. But at the present time the only motivating interest of the community in the needs of individual states is the general desire to avoid war. It is, says Carr, rather unprofitable to enquire whether the purpose of any change should be to establish 'justice' or to maintain 'peace'; but it is dangerous to suppose that the two purposes are identical, and that no sacrifice of one or the other is required.

IV. Sundry Suggested Devices

16. Grounds could be given, did space permit, for dismissing with no more than a passing reference three relatively simple, if not doctrinaire, contributions to the dossier marked 'suggested solutions of the problem of peaceful change'. Neither by means of an equity tribunal, nor by an international legislature, nor again by any imaginable improvement in the formal techniques for the revision of treaties does the problem seem likely, in the present phase of history, to be 'solved'. There is indeed, as Dulles has put it, 'a strong presumption against the validity of any solution which seems novel, or quick and easy'.

17. Nor will more than a mention be made of the now fairly abundant material on the possible application of Article 19.

'Feeble as it is, there might', says Dulles, have been evolved, on the basis of this Article, 'some instrumentality other than force for effecting international change and affording a timely outlet to dynamic forces which, if repressed, are bound to become, first pathological, then violent. Such instrumentality could have given moral, if not legal, sanctity to part at least, of the existing treaty structure. It could, by advising reconsideration, have withdrawn the appearance of moral sanction from that part of the treaty structure which was or became inequitable or outmoded'. This idea, of undermining the moral, as distinct from the legal, authority of treaty provisions, has some interesting possibilities, even if it be judged unlikely, in the light of experience, that a body so composed as the League Assembly would ever have set about it with zest. The interest in the preservation of ancient monuments was there too strong.

18. More recently Mr. Dulles has put forward the idea that 'as a beginning of world government, there should be organised an international federation for peace' - not, it would seem, a true federation, for the 'member states' would merely undertake 'to accept the judgments and proposals of the executive organ as of high moral authority, recognising that the failure of any member to follow them would place upon it a clear responsibility before the world'. This so-called 'executive organ', which would be made up of 'outstanding personalities who would be solemnly pledged to place the peace and welfare of humanity as a whole above the advantage of any particular nation, race or class', would 'keep the international situation constantly under review in order to detect, at their incipiency, any conditions the continuance of which might endanger the peace of the world'. It would 'report to the members on any such conditions and would propose measures which in its judgment would be calculated to prevent such conditions ripening into international violence'.

19. This conception, of taking account, somehow, of 'the general welfare', is the keynote also of the constructive suggestion with which Dunn concludes his study. 'Small unofficial standing committees', he says, might be set up in each country 'for the preliminary consideration of proposals of change in the status quo'. Without publicity, and with a special procedure 'as unofficial and informal as possible' - and acting 'in a purely advisory capacity' - they would 'explore the proposals from all possible angles, including both power relationships and the general welfare', and 'make' recommendations privately to their respective governments'. They would have the right 'to communicate directly with the committees in the other countries concerned' and to 'seek agreement, if possible, on some common recommendation'. The personnel of these committees should be 'people of some eminence in their communities', preferably not diplomatists by profession, and should not be the holders of any public office. A plan of this sort would 'provide an opportunity for investigation and the consideration of possible solutions in a calmer atmosphere than that which has usually prevailed in such cases in the past', and would 'greatly facilitate the marshalling of support for solutions favourable to the general welfare and also the unifying of opposition to projects that threaten the peace.

20. Carr, on the other hand, lays stress on the analogy from the process of peaceful change in the mutual relations of employers and employed. Whether this analogy is in fact valid can, he admits, hardly be settled except by the test of experience.

But he records 'with some confidence' the view that 'this is the only line of advance which affords any prospect at all of the establishment of any international procedure, however imperfect, of peaceful change'. And, in the bargaining between employers and employed, the relative strengths of the parties are an ever-present influence.

21. In international conferences of what Dunn calls the 'bargaining' type, the situation is, he says, much the same as in conciliation, except that, the third party being a group of states instead of a single mediator a multiplicity of interests and pressures is introduced. Here again presumably no solution is arrived at except by the voluntary agreement of the parties concerned. The manner in which the interests and powers are distributed among the participating states will, however, have a profound influence on the outcome. Thus if enough of the larger powers are in agreement on a particular solution there will be overwhelming force behind it and pressure can be applied to compel acceptance of the recommended change. The action is still regarded as voluntary and the change as peaceful.

V. Peaceful Change in the Perspective of History

22. 'It is', wrote Cruttwell, 'only by studying and realizing how much was done by a very informal and imperfect system of collective action in one continent before the war that it is possible to foresee what might be done in the future by a League of Nations securely based on the foundations of universality and impartiality. Doubtless the arrangements made were often based rather on expediency than on justice, and involved the exercise of coercion more or less veiled. Yet it is obviously preferable that pressure, if it must come, should be collective rather than individual in its origin'. The Great Powers, while by no means a disinterested or impartial body, aimed, he says, at preserving the peace of Europe by methods which were far from being exclusively cynical. It was clear to him that the 20th century possessed, over the 19th, a great advantage in having a collective organisation'which contains the promise of being converted into an instrument of international conciliation and revision more permanent, more impartial, and more universal than the old Concert of Europe'.

23. A weakness of the old Concert, viewed as a working substitute for an international legislature, was that it did not always 'work'. For an efficient organ of institutional peaceful change the practice was not sufficiently regularised, 'organ-ized'. Article 15 of the Covenant went, at least on paper, a certain distance towards supplying the defect. Nothing precluded, in the appropriate case, the recommending, by the Council or Assembly, of territorial or other vital changes. Its operation was, indeed, limited in several ways, and in a world which respected the Kellogg Pact, it seems as if passive resistance to the recommendations in question might have been offered with impunity. On this it may be remarked that in a world which sufficiently respected the Kellogg Pact neither collective security nor peaceful change would, so far as peace-keeping was concerned, be needed.

24. The sort of peaceful change which, to the prejudice of Czechoslovakia, was 'negotiated' at Munich in 1938, might, it seems, equally have been effected, and in somewhat the same manner, under the provisions of Article 15. The negotiations which

led up to the Munich Agreement, says Carr, were 'the nearest approach in recent years to the settlement of a major international issue by a procedure of peaceful change'. (It was not an edifying example; but the reason for that was plain. Just as collective security requires to be supported by peaceful change, so peaceful change, if not to be shocking to men of good will, may need to be supported by collective security.) There may no doubt be many to whom such an old-fashioned expedient as that must appear dishonourable, even if it did help to preserve peace. But one does not really avoid responsibility for the events of one's day by a simple washing of hands. Platonic indignation is no effective substitute for resolute diplomacy. The measure in which equity or any other noble cause may have to be waived, as a modern variety of danegeld, will in part depend on the balance of effective power as between the 'collectivist' and the 'expansionist' states. Given the requisite standard of physical, and moral, preparedness, and the willingness to make sacrifices for a principle, the proposals of even the most dynamic 'dictator' could have been treated more strictly on their general merits.

25. This does not however exhaust the subject. Some may feel that, in the face of the differences of motive and outlook as among the statesmen involved - rendering mutual confidence impossible - it is useless, perhaps worse than useless, to set up machinery to deal with important issues of policy and that they would best be dealt with as occasion arises by ad hoc arrangements. It is asked whether there is any advantage to be gained by settling up machinery to be used for registering political successes obtained through the pressure of superior power. If it were merely a question of registering, as it were automatically, results which would in either event be identical, this question might be pertinently put. Whether correctly or not, however, the advocates of institutionalised procedures assume that, with a systematised method of marshalling and evaluating the forces for or against a proposed arrangement, the results would be other, and, they hope, less 'dishonourable' than those to be obtained by an ad hoc procedure from which high-minded neutrals could more readily be excluded. It is moreover apt to be forgotten that an occasion for saying yes is, unless it be a pure formality, equally an opportunity for saying no. It is too lightly assumed that those who would give what has been termed a cloak of constitutional respectability to 'the Munichs of the future' do so because they would wish to see more, rather than fewer Munichs. It is assumed, without warrant, that the role of third states in an institutionalised 'Munich' would of necessity be limited to endorsing every demand put forward with sufficient determination by the strong. It may be surmised that the real objection to the proposal for institutionalisation springs from a sentimental desire to keep internationalsim unspotted from the world. National institutions do have to function in some sort of intimacy with the facts of life. It needs to be explained why diplomatic realities should be left to produce their grim effects uninfluenced by any institutional mitigation.

VI. The Practical Aspect of the Matter

26. Notwithstanding Lord Lothian's reminiscence quoted above, there is, in the accounts of what happened in 1919, very little to suggest that the statesmen of that time were alert to the need for flexibility in their framework of peace. Whether their inattention on this subject be put down to political cynicism or to idealistic thinking, there has, by now, been so much said about its dangers that avoidance on another such occasion could hardly be excused except by some sort of conspiracy of official silence. Nor could that avoidance be expected to pass unnoted by the world.

27. While there is of course no certainty that, in the context of the coming peace negotiations, any Government will, in its attitude, reflect the Dulles view that 'we should' in international affairs 'seek to abolish any sense of finality', and that 'never' and 'forever' are words which should be eliminated from the vocabulary of statesmen, the possibility can hardly be excluded that the United States, in contemplating participation in some 'association of States', might take up formally the point made, in July, by Mr. Welles. Were the United States to propose joining the still existent League, it might become necessary for Britain to choose between supporting the retention of Article 19 for what it might yet prove worth, moving its suppression as dilapidated camouflage, making specific proposals for giving it reality, suggesting the fuller use of other Articles as channels of peaceful change, and, advocating some additional mechanism, whether as a serious advance or as a means of shelving the issue. In the alternative event of a 'new League' being planned, the question might be yet more delicate, for, while it is difficult to imagine the terms of Article 19 being taken over simply as they stand, it is equally hard to conceive the new 'Covenant' as including nothing at all on the point. Britain may thus, in either event, require to decide whether to discount the urgency of the problem, to accord it a bare courtesy recognition, or to offer some contribution to its more effective treatment.

28. That international order cannot be static and that there should be a legal or constitutional method whereby law can be adjusted to changes in circumstances, is an axiomatic-looking proposition to which assent may be anticipated even from some who appreciate neither its possible implications on the one hand nor its imprecision on the other. In particular, it leaves open the question whether, collective resistance to aggression becoming institutionalized, the adaptation of the status quo should be left to ad hoc processes, or should be institutionalized as well.

29. Any project of collective security presupposes that the 'peace-loving' Powers are to retain the necessary preponderance of effective strength, and the constancy of purpose, to render aggression by one or more of the 'dynamic' States a hopeless enterprise. If America relapses into isolationism the scheme seems in any case only too certain to break down. Given, on the other hand full American backing, her fellow-victors could perhaps afford to strike a liberal pose, if only in principle, on strategically non-essential points. The virtue in having all demands for change remitted to an institutionalized process of sifting would be that the diplomatic support of the 'peace-loving' Great Powers might presumably be marshalled in resistance to all except the most innocuous proposals.

30. A main obstacle to the study of the principle of the institutionalized 'Munich' is, perhaps, a failure to formulate, and to face, the practical alternatives. Given, however, that there is bound to be change, if only because the 'ideal' of a rigidly crystallised dispensation is assumed to be utopian, the question is whether 'third-party' influence should be left aloof, and, if not, under what forms its participation shall be provided for - and whether it must be withheld until there is 'a dispute which is likely to lead to a rupture'. It is also for consideration whether publicity should always be thought of as the most beneficient instrument of pressure, or whether, by keeping confidential the detailed course of negotiation, the Government from which some concession has been elicited might not be left free to choose whether its concurrence shall be presented,

publicly, as a diplomatic success, a magnanimous gesture, or a submission to force majeure. So long as world society remains constituted as it is, the formal assent - however obtained - of a sovereign State will continue to form an indispensable element in any process of peaceful change. The aim should no doubt be to secure that it be readily forthcoming where expedient, and safely refused where not called for by the essential interest either of justice or of peace.

31. If there is a temptation to hope, or believe, that the problem of peaceful change, just because it has no known solution, may after all be largely a chimera, so also there is a converse idea that, since the problem evidently exists, some solution to it must be discoverable in the end. It has not yet been solved, and it may be incapable of solution. But this generation can at least seek to keep open the road to its eventual solution in conditions not yet foreseen.

32. As was observed by C.K. Webster, five years ago, the democratic States 'should determine their attitude towards peaceful change, even if they believe that a successful issue is impossible'.

C.A.W.M.

12th February, 1942.

Balliol College,
Oxford.