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Even had it not been accompanied by so suggestive a commentary from M. Bourquin, the agenda prepared at the 1934 session of the International Studies Conference might of itself have provoked a fuller memorandum than this. What follows is in no sense an exhaustive examination of all the intricate problems covered in the scheme of study circulated to the member institutions of the Conference.

The first topic we are invited to consider is the definition of our subject. The term "Security", in its most general sense, will hardly give us very much trouble. In defiance as it were of etymology the term will be taken here to be sufficiently defined as "freedom from insecurity". Only when the adjective "collective" is attached to the noun "security" does there begin to be room for debate. Leaving aside for the moment the various particularised and conventional meanings of the term and seeking simply to define "collective security" in its most general sense, one may find oneself asking, ("Collective" in terms of what collectivity? And in what sense collective?

In the final analysis, no doubt, the collectivity of which we should think is the universal collectivity of mankind. It is concrete human beings who are to be, and possibly also to feel, secure. For the purposes of this inquiry, however, it will be perhaps more conveniently

assumed that the road to this result will be found through the creation or development of security for that less numerous collectivity known as the "family of nations". It is often urged, indeed, that the organisation of the world in a number of sovereign states is the true cause of its present lack of security, but, legitimate though such a surmise may be, it is not here proposed to argue from that standpoint.¹⁾

In what sense "collective"? When speaking of collective security do we mean security collectively enjoyed, or collectively engendered, or both? The matter is not really in doubt; we shall surely be at one in directing our minds to the security of the individual States, to be catered for by the collectivity of States.

Even, however, when uniformly thinking in terms of ^acollectivity of States, rather than of individuals, students may still be found to differ in the meanings they will attach to the term "collective security". For so strenuously has it been bandied about in post-War political discussion that at any rate in the mouths of some controversialists the word security has come to have something of a conventional, specialised signification. In the minutes of the Committee on Arbitration and Security there is the record of an exchange of views between M. Politis and Dr. Riddell, of Canada. The latter

(1) Nor shall we here adopt the equally possible opinion that security would only be achieved if armaments were abolished; or if in every important country there existed a strong trade-union organisation dedicated to the policy of preventing war by means of a general strike; or if and when there everywhere came simultaneously into power governments of the Left, or of the Right, or, indeed, of the Centre - according to the point of view.

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having demurred to the use of the term "security" as seeming necessarily and exclusively to denote a condition achieved through treaties of mutual assistance, M. Politis, after reflection, assured him that that was indeed just what, in Geneva parlance, the term had in fact come to mean. In the interests of intellectual freedom - and incidentally of scientific truth - it is good that in the International Studies Conference there is no a priori need to treat what we may call the "Greek" view of international life as in any sense more respectable than the "Canadian" view.

The present memorandum will therefore avoid begging any question as to the manner in which the collectivity of States might eventually come to relieve its members of the ultimate responsibility for their own security.

On other points, however, it will return a definite answer. In reply, for instance, to the first question submitted by the British Coordinating Committee, the view here adopted is that security for present purposes is not strictly speaking either a "state of mind" or a "form of political organisation". To identify it with the former would be to confound it with its possible consequence; to equate it with the latter would be to confuse it with its probable cause. Collective security will here be assumed to consist in a condition of "social" relationships in the "society" of States - such that each member of the society is, by the society as a whole, kept practically immune from attack by any other State or coalition of States.¹⁾

(1) Immune from "attack" for presumably our concern is with security against war itself - not simply security against defeat in war.

Having attempted a definition we are asked next to discuss the "value" of the idea of collective security. This, though they may doubtless discuss it, is not, at bottom, a question that a gathering of scientists can, as a matter of science, determine.

Strictly, the question is one of political and ethical, partly perhaps of aesthetic, appreciation. One enquirer, alive to all the bearings of the matter, may see in collective security an absolute good, worth while on no matter what basis, in no matter what circumstances, at no matter what price. Another while conceding the sentimental attractiveness of the abstract ideal may have noticed that the security of which statesman dream, even if it have itself no special concrete form, is apt to be conceived of with particular concrete implications. The vision may have different features for different minds. The security scheme dear to State "A" may have demerits in the eyes of State "B", if not of the world as a whole.

Proposals for dealing with the security problem may be classed roughly into two principal categories; those which do, and those which do not, postulate a centralised political authority - some form, that is, of "super-State". But in this paper it will be assumed that our task is to study means to collective security in the world as we know it to-day, with the decentralisation of political authority about as stubborn a fact as ever in history before.

The concentration of authority may, of course, de jure but it may also come about merely, as it were, de facto. Even though there be no kind of constitutional federation and the several States retain intact their formal sovereignty, nevertheless, through the military

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ascendancy of some single country, the others may be in effect denied the beneficial enjoyment of their status. Once the position arrives in which the will of one State is virtually law, the security of all is also in a sense achieved. The policy of the "Balance of Power", so long relied on by England, is commonly put as having consisted in siding against whatever continental Power seemed at any given moment to be aiming at a European hegemony. It may be that, in thus denying to others an ascendancy to which she did not herself aspire, England will have had the main responsibility for Europe's not having heretofore arrived at a collective security régime. The student, therefore, may notice that security of a sort, and the diplomatic ascendancy of a particular Power or coalition of Powers, are not mutually incompatible aims. Still, in the present paper, the prospects will be examined of improving collective security while the decentralisation of political authority persists in actual fact.

If it was necessary that we should pause for the definition of our subject, it is hardly less important that we should seek common ground as to the angle from which our inquiry is to proceed. Our institution, of course, has little in common with a diplomatic conference; our constitution and our task are different, and it follows that our technique should be different too. We are to work not as negotiators, but as students, mere unofficial lookers-on; and whether or not we be privileged, as onlookers, to "see most of the game", it is clear that in this capacity we can have no formal influence on the play.

While it is important for this to be recognised

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it is not therefore necessary to regret it. Indeed our position may even have certain advantages. If denied the power of statesmen we are, happily, by the same token left free of their inhibitions. Where diplomacy must take refuge in euphemism, science can, and often should, be brutally frank. Our opportunity as students may be put to worthy, or to unworthy, uses. To brush aside difficulties which statesmen are not able to ignore would be to abuse our opportunity. To break free of the conventionalism by which official discourse and possible also official reasoning, are commonly hampered will be to turn our opportunity to good account.

On the other hand, collective security, even if examined by non-official students, is not a purely scientific problem. It is, essentially, like disarmament, or the codifying of international law, a political, that is, a practical problem. And even for students the taking up of a practical problem means an inquiry into possible means for its solution. Unofficial though our thinking is to be, there is nothing to prevent our adopting, by a species of make-believe, the standpoint of official circles. So, were the problem a matter of domestic politics, we could try our hands at framing imaginary draft legislation, as though for submission to the competent legislative organ. For simplicity's sake we might postulate a government having for a time the unquestioning support of the mass of the people, and - ignoring those political factors which governments have so often to bear in mind - we might shape our proposals with a single eye to the technical needs of the case. In the present instance, however, the student's task should, for excellent reasons, be otherwise conceived. It might indeed be of interest, if not intellectually satisfying, for our conference to imagine itself as the secretary of an international law-giver having absolute powers. But after all, there exists no international legislature, and it is submitted that our work will be worth more if we take full

account of the forms and conditions under which they can
alone be seen to occur in the international sphere. Let us not resort to the facile expedient of denying the world and its political structure as we find them, to enrich the too crowded museum of Utopian projects evolved by idealistic pens.

Like a skilled physician we should start, not by painting for ourselves a picture of perfect health, but by observing the symptoms of the patient. We shall appreciate that if the ultimate purpose is to make the sick man well, the immediate problem is merely to make him better - less unwell in fact. Or, to use a different analogy, we shall know that as, when commending the steadiness of a liner, we imply no more than a relative degree of freedom from the unsteadiness universal among ships, so, when working for security, the statesman's immediate aim is to render his country relatively less insecure.

Assuming then that it is on quasi-official lines that we are to think, there will yet remain a choice between the standpoints of national, and international, officials. If we are to be national officials we had better agree to attack the problem from the point of view of some one selected country, or some group of countries known as sharing, in this matter, a single common policy. The simpler part of our task will be to draw up a scheme embodying those features of which the agreed group of countries are known to be in favour. The more perplexing business will be to hit on some argument for getting our ideas accepted by those governments whose views, in preparing our scheme, we shall have left out of account.

A more useful course surely will be, instead of taking the standpoint of the single country, or homogeneous group of countries, to assume, in imagination, the functions of international experts, charged to prepare an annotated agenda for the convenience of a forthcoming World Conference on Collective Security. The nature and scope of our discretion will on this hypothesis be plainly perceived. The assumptions upon which we

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base our schemes will be such as, in our belief, would win assent from the governments of at least those countries whose full cooperation may appear necessary to their realisation. For instance, the notion that peace is the greatest of all possible "goods", and worthy to be purchased at no matter how heavy a price, is one which for his own purposes some individual member of our Conference may with perfect propriety entertain; and yet, unless we can ascribe this belief to the statesmen of the day, we had better deal shortly with projects which essentially require its effective official acceptance. For we shall want to discard any ideas that important governments are unlikely to entertain. After all, it would not be hard to devise a whole series of plans any one of which, if accepted and sincerely applied, should result in all the security we could want. The showman who proposes to "put on" a turn with elephants flying in formation will have realised only a part of his purpose when he has planned the formation in which he wishes the animals to fly. It is difficult to teach elephants to fly. It is hardly less difficult to get statesmen to sign, or peoples to ratify, commitments which they judge contrary to their interests. One professor, we may discover, can furnish the States with a water-tight programme of collective security, whereas twenty may not be able to get them to accept it.

The difficulty of getting new proposals put into effect may be too readily overlooked in this kind of discussion. Even some of the most modest attempted amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations have awaited indefinitely the ratifications requisite for

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bringing them into force. The Covenant itself, after all, was launched only in the rarest of diplomatic circumstances.

It is not enough that governments, given freedom to fix the terms of the instrument, should be agreeable to having a general arbitration convention, or disarmament convention, or security convention. Almost any commitment is acceptable if large enough reservations be in order. The States renounce war as an instrument of their policy, while reserving its use for the defence of their national interests. They advocate "arbitration" of all disputes, but insist that it be in a form such as almost automatically to result in their own favour. The peoples believing that disarmament should make for peace, the States, in zealous deference to the popular will, struggle, in Mr. Madariaga's neat phrase, to "disarm without loss of military strength". All this, if not as it ought to be, is probably as it is bound to be. It is encouraging, so far as it goes, to be told that among scientists there is unanimity in regard to the compulsory judicial settlement of "legal" disputes, but with the United States not yet even a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the relevance of such a finding to the problem of our Conference is, to say the least, not direct.

The Rapporteur, M. Bourquin, has assumed, for the purpose of these discussions, that, as the indispensable foundation of any system of collective security, we shall agree in positing some sort of "prohibition" of force. Some of us, perhaps, may be unwilling to put the point quite so strongly as that. There are pairs of

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States as between whom the likelihood of violence is, even in the absence of legal "prohibition", so remote as to be in effect negligible. Could the causes and occasions of conflict be universally eliminated one may doubt if any States would wish for war. Yet probably we shall agree to focus these discussions specifically on schemes of the kind that do in fact have as their starting-point the unlawfulness of force, in some forms at any rate. It will, however, be more realistic and hence should be more productive of useful thought, to speak in this context not of "prohibition" but of "renunciation". States may, as it were, "contract out of" their primordial and traditional liberty to use violence, but to imagine that sovereign States can technically be "prohibited" from doing so, would be as false as to suppose that, if the civilised citizen is not free to slay his next door neighbour, it is because he and his neighbour must be taken to have "renounced" the use of murder in their relations inter se.

Actually, at the present day, these thoughts should cause us no serious trouble; for not only have most States already renounced almost all recourse to violence, but the enlargement of this their self-denying ordinance has of late become a subject of purposeful diplomatic examination. Were it as easy to induce governments to proceed as far in certain other directions as they have even now progressed on this particular road, collective security might be less difficult of attainment than as yet it appears to be. Ignoring for the moment the possible advantages of a reduction and limitation of armaments, and deferring discussion of means for repressing

~~the peace-broker; we may at this point go on to consider~~
the prospects of progress through the development of
peaceful procedures for the settlement of international
disputes.

To this enthralling theme an entire conference might well be devoted. It is to be hoped that its various technicalities will not now be permitted to take up too much of our time. Its treatment in this paper will touch only on one or two points.

We are sometimes told that, war being not an end in itself but a means to an end, its disuse connotes logically the providing of some substitute, some alternative means to the end that is served, or thought to be served, by war. That end, it is assumed, is the reaching of a solution to an international dispute. War is a method of reaching such a solution. So too is "arbitration". Therefore States have only to accept a system of compulsory arbitration of all disputes and they will be able to attain the objectives of war without its expense. The weakness of this theory lies, of course, in the fact that the State which goes to war does so in pursuit not merely of a solution, but of a solution of a particular kind, such that arbitration could hardly be counted upon to act as an effective alternative means. When an international dispute proves intractable the mischief is not that the parties are not all of them seeking a solution, but that they are not all of them seeking the same one.

Moreover, the real causes which nations fight for need not always be shown in the issues over which officially they go to war. If a Conrad von Hoetzendorf

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is convinced that a struggle with Russia ~~must~~ come later or sooner, and better sooner than later, it can matter but little to him whether the crisis be brought on by the annexation of a pair of provinces or by the assassination of an archduke.

Convention encourages us to say that the belligerent's object is to obtain "justice" for himself, but this is only an euphemistic alternative for the statement that his desire is not simply "justice" as such, but his own rather subjective conception of justice in relation to a particular situation of fact. In non-official discourse we are free, nay rather, bound, to admit that a country may go to war in order to win specific material advantages, and not simply in service to justice, or in supposed fulfilment of its "manifest destiny". There are cogent arguments for persuading governments to prefer "arbitration", conciliation, or direct negotiations to bloodshed, but it is unimpressive to recommend these procedures as surely affording them means of "obtaining justice for themselves".

There are in current discussion two further tendencies which a student does well to resist.

The first is the disposition to reason as if almost all, if not all, disputed issues were open to settlement by reference to legal rules. What shall be the future ratio of naval strengths as between Japan and the United States, or as between Italy and France, is a political, that is, a practical, and not just a legal, that is a doctrinal, issue. Another example of a question to which law affords no genuine answer is - Has

the time come when provision "X" of treaty "Y" had better be revised? On these issues States may easily get involved in bitter controversy, yet, to contend that legal answers can in such cases be given to the point in dispute is to obscure the precise nature of that point. The parties in such instances are not in dispute "as to their respective rights". They are very likely in complete agreement on the legal position, so far as it goes. Their conflict represents, at bottom, a clash not simply of opinions but of policies, desires, aspirations. Whether or no "all-in arbitration" will adequately meet such cases, arbitration stricto sensu will certainly not.

It remains, all the same, a question whether even "all-in arbitration" will really suit these cases. On what principle could arbitrators, before 1914, have settled upon the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France? On what principle could Germany have even been urged to refer such a question to arbitrators? Surely not on the simple ground that France was sorry for the loss of that territory? It is perhaps not impossible that appropriate machinery should some day be devised, and applied, for "handling" such a case, but the process will be of a legislative rather than of an arbitral or judicial nature.

Still, this would not warrant us in adopting the conventional expedient of denying, by implication, that a dispute on such a point as this is, strictly, a dispute at all. M. Bourquin, in his report to the First Study Meeting at the 1934 session stated -

"We have thought it appropriate to divide them (i.e. procedures) into two main classes: on the one hand, those which presuppose the existence of a "dispute" (mediation, conciliation, enquiry, arbitration, judicial settlement); on the other, those which tend to modify the positive law in force,

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this be only hypothetical".

It is reassuring that in his commentary on the agenda for the 1935 session M. Bourquin would in this respect appear to have shifted his position.

A word may now be said of the "principle" of respect for treaties. As a fundamental norm of international law this principle will surely not be called in question by anyone. Even in a debate on international ethics it might be affirmed with a certain measure of emphasis. Constructive statemanship, however, must attend not only to how matters stand in the worlds of law and ethics but also to how things are liable to happen in the world of fact. Scientific students will properly take note that men and governments, while often they do what is right, also occasionally do what is generally judged to be wrong. Hence the problem - or a great part of it - of collective security. To declare that our plans should conform to the principle of respect for treaties is rather like saying that a well-conceived national constitution should start off with the proposition that violent revolution is unlawful, unconstitutional, unrighteous, and wrong. The lawyer may be content to inquire, What kind of conduct does the constitution authorise? The statesman will sometimes have to ask himself, How much strain will the constitution bear? Dissatisfied elements will hardly be appeased by the citing of legal texts. Desperate men will only be further exasperated by assurances that constitutionally they have no case. Mutatis mutandis it may be the same in international affairs. It is possible that a too rigid insistence on the sanctity of treaties is one of

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realist knows that if treaties are not always respected this sometimes is partly because they have stopped being respectable.

To improve security not merely must we seek means to promote a greater respect for treaties, but we must see to it that treaties are not relied on beyond the limit of what is reasonable. Better at any rate to seek ways of averting the disregard of treaties than, superfluously, to proclaim our assent to the proposition that, legally and morally, treaties ought to be acknowledged as sacred.

The problem, however, with which "revisionism" confronts us has rather different aspects according as we approach it in the interests of justice, or merely in those of peace and security. From this latter standpoint "revisionist" situations become interesting only when actually, or at least potentially, dangerous. From an objective point of view it is probably a mistake to suppose that every legitimate grievance must be redressed if stable peace is to result. This assumes too readily that continuing injustice is necessarily fatal to peace. Though sentimentalists are wont to make some such assumption it is probably as ill-founded as it would be in reference to social situations at home. For unredressed grievances to imperil social stability they must be not merely deep, or even legitimate: more depends on the strategic position and numerical importance of the persons aggrieved. So too a small country may have indefinitely to put up with conditions for which there is no moral justification whatever.