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closely connected, in some minds, with the subject of sanctions is the question of the enforcement of the awards resulting from compulsory arbitration proceedings. This is clearly a difficult and serious problem and is one to which this memorandum will offer no solution. The comment occasionally heard, to the effect that in the past there have been few instances of arbitral awards not being loyally accepted, is really beside the point, for the cases invoked will have been examples of voluntary, not of compulsory, arbitration. The fact, however, remains that it is a little curious to find proposals for forcible "execution" of awards being advanced in the name of "security". Conceivably we shall, in the interests of justice, be led to condone the exceptional employment of force by the winning against the losing party; but to describe such proceedings otherwise than as a form of "lawful", i.e. "legitimate" aggression, would seem like the clouding of an issue which deserves to be appreciated in its true light. Let us hope that the resources of international statesmanship will not be so poor that forcible execution becomes faute de mieux the recognised way of escape from this kind of regrettable situation.

One or two further points, raised in the agenda for the 1935 session of the Conference, require to be touched on in this paper.

The question has been put, "Faut-il prohiber measures of force not amounting to acts of war". In other words, what kind of security will States enjoy if at any moment they are apt to be violently assailed, perhaps invaded, on the plea of "pacific reprisals"? Two remarks will here be made in comment on this query. The first, naturally, is that it

is probably on the whole desirable that the States, particularly the more powerful States should be prevailed upon to forgo entirely the liberty to use force as an instrument of their national policy. If they can be got to do this, well and good.¹⁾ Failing this, however, the theoretical position is perhaps less serious than at first it might appear. Supposing State 'A' is in a position to make war upon State 'B' with impunity (e.g. because the use of sanctions against State 'A' is judged not to be a practical proposition), then whether pacific reprisals taken by State 'A' are lawful or not is a somewhat academic issue - at any rate from the standpoint of State 'B's' ultimate security. If, on the other hand, third States are disposed to assist State 'B', the simple course is open to the latter of refusing to suffer violence unresistingly. The moment State 'B' begins resisting the measures taken by her assailant cease to be technically "pacific" and acquire, as from the outset, the character of "acts of war", so that sanctions become applicable against State 'A' precisely as if the latter had in the first instance openly resorted to war.

Another question which, as being an aspect of the security problem, we are invited to consider is that of the relation of neutrality to the sanctions system. Presumably we are not expected to treat the problem as a question of morals. We are not considering whether it would be quite "fair" that some given State, happy to profit by the security furnished through an organisation of peace, should elect itself to keep clear of burdensome responsibilities. The

1) The process, or step, will however of course be in the nature of a renunciation, not a prohibition.

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in presence of such an attitude on the part of some of the States. The answer surely is that circumstances alter cases. Certain States there probably are without whose active co-operation peace in a given region could in no circumstances be secured and certain other States could in no circumstances be effectively restrained from aggression. Others, however, there may very well be with whose active aid the security club might dispense without fatally compromising the efficacy of the measures to be taken by the other members of the club. The essential thing would be that it should be known, in those situations where the knowledge would be crucial, that the States whose active aid was not to be looked for would at any rate not take officially, or allow their nationals to take unofficially, any action calculated to hamper or defeat the action of other peace-protecting States.

In conclusion it may be convenient to consider how good is the chance that within a foreseeable future some more dependable régime of collective security may come to be set up. What precisely is the problem to be faced? Sometimes it is suggested that the success of any such system would presuppose in the world at large a measure of social solidarity such as does not yet exist among the nations. If by social solidarity is meant a condition dependent upon a widespread feeling of community, a recognition on the part of the average individual that all mankind are in a sense a single family, then this seems a mistaken idea. In the international, that is to say the diplomatic sphere, developments are immediately determined not by the instinctive, irrational habit of mind of the unreflecting masses, but by the considered standpoint of the governments. What will be needed is not that the

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average man should feel that the foreigner is his brother and that he himself is his brother's keeper, but simply that the governments should judge it to be both possible, and in their own interest, to cooperate in upholding peace. The "society" whose solidarity, or rather whose quasi-solidarity, would seem to be in question is the society, not of human individuals but of institutional States, and the mental processes relevant to this inquiry are a more calculating, logical, rational, even if a more subtle and complex kind of psychological function. In 1914 the British Government, coming to the aid of France and Belgium, presumably did so because believing it to be in England's ultimate interests - not that is because there prevailed in the milieu of international policy any effective sense of social solidarity. Nor did the average individual Englishman who enlisted and went to fight, do so from any spirit of brotherly duty towards the individual foreigner, but rather because he was given to understand that his "country," England, was in honour bound to come to the aid of Belgium.

Nor is the problem that of leading the peoples to "forget" war, or the statesmen to dislike the thought of it. The difficulty is not that individuals or governments favour war, or take war for granted, but that governments pursue, and individuals support, policies which put peace in jeopardy. A sanctions system seems remote, not ultimately because certain States are too eager to go to war but rather because most of the others are too anxious to keep out of it. It is, moreover, not necessary that all the States, without exception, should come to be satisfied with the status quo. For security it will suffice if those who are disposed to defend the existing political order be strong enough to deter those who desire to see a change. At a given juncture

anxious countries to get together and agree to defend the status quo against all comers. The Little Entente might in effect be enlarged to embrace all who genuinely desired to come in - "genuinely desired", because it will be better to limit the membership of the security club to those countries safely to be trusted to "be there" on the day, rather than, by coaxing in the hesitant States, to achieve a quasi-universality valid only on paper.

The essence of the matter, however, is that the States members of the security club will need to have in common not merely an identical interest, viz. peace, but some sufficiently similar assumptions on sundry other matters as well. It is hard, for example, to imagine a flourishing security club, some of whose members were convinced revisionists, others equally convinced anti-revisionists. Again, assuming, as perhaps we shall have to do, that the United States will in no circumstances consider a scheme which expects of all its adherents active "automatic" participation in the use of sanctions, a choice will fall to be made between a system from which that country would hold complacently aloof and some theoretically less perfect scheme with which it might in time be brought to sympathise. One wonders what sort of world we might not get if, Articles 10 and 16 being interpreted away, or formally suppressed, the United States could be persuaded to accept League membership for the purposes of Article 11. After all, unless and until the important governments have perceived a common interest in and cultivated a sense of collective responsibility for the conservation of peace it is unlikely that any paper system of sanctions will survive a serious test. Granted such perceived common interest and such sense of collective

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responsibility the exact form and technical authority of the duty to take a strong line with the peace-breaker will not greatly matter. If all the other important countries were earnestly associating in an effort to make Article 11 a success, what government would lightly resort to war? Better a system of moral obligations taken seriously than a pretentious structure of legal commitments which could be counted upon to break down. Better a small but consolidated approach to the moral super-State than the immediate inauguration of a juridicial super-State known to be nothing but a fiction.

Even then if a perfectly water-tight test of aggression has yet to be accepted; even if satisfactory procedures for settling some of the most dangerous disputes are still to be found; even if certain States seem unlikely to accept obligations necessary to making automatic the action of a sanctions system, it is perhaps not beyond the bounds of possibility that peace should come to be organised on a firmer foundation than heretofore.

Much has been made of the distinction between the aggressor and his victim. There is another distinction which might, it seems, be more usefully canvassed. Half-jokingly, perhaps, it has been claimed for Canada that she is a "producer" rather than a "consumer" of security. Whatever be the merits of this claim as made on behalf of Canada, there are interesting possibilities in the idea. Let every statesman, or at any rate every statesman who preaches "collective security", honestly ask himself, Is my country producing security for the world market? If not, why not? If yes, then is it by the most efficient processes and on a large enough scale? In the production of this commodity different methods are available to different countries. Some, it may be, can contribute but little. Others, already assisting

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in one way, may have it in their power to help in more ways than one. Collective security has justly been declared synonymous with the organisation of peace. While "peace" is wont to be extolled in the abstract, the peace that falls to be secured is necessarily the particular peace existent at any given time. Many governments, indeed, in pleading for peace at Geneva, have plainly admitted that their concern was not so much for peace in general as for the particular sample of the species now open to inspection on the Continent of Europe. Could all the States be led simultaneously to feel enthusiasm for one and the same peace, what need would there be of automatic sanctions? If the world is to have such a peace as will enlist the sufficient degree of sympathy, concessions will perhaps have to be made to some of those in whose eyes the existing peace is not well worthy of defence. The "sated" country which ardently affirms that treaty revision is altogether out of the question does little to engage the interest of "neutral" opinion. The "bystander" States, whose cooperation on something like the Article 11 basis might make all the difference, must first be convinced that, in the philosophy of those who most loudly sing the praises of collective security, that commodity is conceived of as an article of export and not merely as something to be imported, or, in so far as produced at home, produced for the home market only.

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