THE PROPER STUDY— AND THE U.G.C.

PROFESSOR C. A. W. MANNING

The culturally "dysfunctional" aspect of overspecialisation is not a new complaint, even if never till now so inelegantly described. The difficulty lies, not in the inventing of new ways to describe it, but in the finding of ways whether old or new to obviate it in the individual case. In theory there may be many preventive measures, not all with dysfunctional aspects of their own. But in practice the problem seems almost that of eating one's cake and having it, or getting the best of two worlds at a time. If a specialist, one is generally not, also, a generalist. And conversely. Yet are there not within the world of medicine those who, though specialists in something, are equal to being general practitioners as well? Even so, the general practitioner is still a medico, and not necessarily a man of parts. His degree of de-specialisation is a matter of degree. He is merely not so deplorably overspecialised as he might be.

But even that of course is something to be thankful for. And perhaps it points the way toward an answer to the problem. For general medicine, while less general than things in general, may be general enough to reduce the ill effects of specialisation virtually to nil. And the point is that, though relatively general, the interest in general medicine is still unitary and coherent, and not just a juxtaposition of miscellaneous concerns. Medicine as such is a single "field", within which to have established a foothold distinguishes the specialiser in some single ailment from him who knows ever more and more of less and less. As contrasted with one who, as though on a cafeteria tray, has, as a student, collected a range of subjects having no more in common than the fact of being purveyed beneath a single roof, our physician is one whose background is so to say the middle-brow awareness of a single subject too wide for any single person completely to command. A middle-brow awareness of a widely-ranging single subject, rather than just a nodding acquaintance with a multiplicity of things: this perhaps is what, along with his specialisation, our specialist may propitiously hope, as authentically a form of education, perennially to cultivate and ever-increasingly to enjoy. Instead of either having too many irons in the fire, or alternatively only one, your medical specialist may thus have two, the one the corrective to the inconveniences of the other. The question however is whether what thus seems to be true for the field of medicine is capable of application in other fields than the medical. If it were so, it seems unlikely that this would not have long been known: whereas even now the key to the problem is still to seek.

Or so it is importantly assumed. In a section headed "Educational Problems" in their report on "University Development 1952-

1957 " Cmmd. 534, the University Grants Committee have drawn attention to the issue in pages which it should for all affected by a duty to read. No apology can here be necessary for quoting from what they have said. It is worth while, they hold, " to cause to consider what are the qualities of mind which distinguish a person of education ". And " first and foremost " they " would place a capacity to think ", with important words as to what they would mean by that. The student's information, they go on, " cannot of course be both wide and deep over more than a limited field of knowledge. Depth is attainable only on a narrow sector, and this is the educational justification for the special subject ". But, by way of teaching the student " how to think ", he must " be given not only competence in one field of knowledge, but access to related fields and a general appreciation of the art of learning. He must therefore be helped to acquire interests outside his special subject. . . . If he can be taught to think, he will have the capacity to go on being educated throughout his life. If his university fails to teach him to think, he is not very likely to learn it afterwards, and his capacity for development will be limited ".

" We shall no doubt be told ", they continue, " that if the universities are to take seriously the general education of the university student, time will be needed; that if the length of the university course is not to be increased this time can only be obtained at the expense of the various specialised courses; and that this will result in a lowering of standards ". But of this they are not altogether convinced. And they conclude the section by " asking universities to consider yet again in a fundamental way what it is that they are trying to do with the students entrusted to them. If they are to be turned into well educated people as well as good specialists, what are the qualities of mind which they should develop? . . . Is there a necessary conflict between the production of a specialist and the production of an educated person? . . . We are . . . certain that thinking on this subject, and fundamental thinking, was never more necessary than it is today ".

A call to the universities. for thinking, and fundamental thinking at that! To such a challenge what votary of what newfangled discipline must not feel it incumbent upon him to consider attempting a reply? At least there will be no serious teacher, even among the social scientists—poor relations though sometimes they may feel beside the proprietors of those old unassailables, mathematics, the classics, and the like—who need suppose that in voicing an opinion he can, without impertinence, be charged with being impertinent. For the question put by the Grants Committee will hardly be dismissed as purely rhetorical, or even as if qualified with the warning " No peddlers of the unfamiliar! " Now at last, in telling about his " leather " and of how there is nothing like it, he will not be talking out of his turn. And to an audience of the academically most exalted. A question of course remains

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as to whether even they, were they to find his submissions convincing, might not in practice discover that there was little that they could do. That however is not his immediate concern.

Fundamental thinking. There has been time now for some of that. But thinking, however fundamental, is not a noisy process, and the scarcity of evidence of it is no proof that it has not been going on. Nor has the evidence of it been wholly absent. Before concluding his oration at the London School of Economics on 11th December last, Sir Alexander Carr Saunders[1] paused to touch upon "plans" for "orientation courses preparatory to special study and compulsory courses in other subjects during special study". "Such plans are bound", he believed, "to fail; students hurry over the first to reach the subject of their choice and neglect the second as a tiresome diversion from it". This was the voice of great experience, and who would discount it? But does it say all that might be said? Orientation as such may well have been found a failure. Yet a subject might well have a value of its own even if incidentally it should make for orientation. The "solution" still widely, though not universally, favoured, namely, the "foundation" year or "general" course, combines within a single programme an assortment of courses often on fairly disparate themes. Even could all these themes have in common say an international element, it does not follow that together they would constitute a theme. For, if on a holiday a man takes with him the summer's six best books, he may be disappointed if he thinks to find them reading like the parts of a single book, or lending themselves to conflation or integration or synthesization into one.

Very different on the other hand would be the effect of a single book covering in a unitary treatment a single wider theme. Very different the optional—repeat optional—inclusion, within an otherwise specialised course, of a further, congenial subject of relatively universal scope. What topic more universal than the universe, or even only the social universe, itself. Traditionally, education has offered the student many things. But where as yet has it been open to him to lay the groundwork for a lifelong familiarity with the fundamentals of what is happening, multidimensionally, in the global social life of mankind? "Social cosmology", might we call such a subject? "Semi-mystical language",[2] that was how someone lately dismissed the term "the social cosmos". But why not then equally dismiss "the national economy" and "the learned world"? Is it unscientific to think, holistically, of the economy as, in effect, of a single whole? If everywhere there were people enough who saw things political as happening within the institutional context of a structured social cosmos, we might already by so much have transcended the traps inherent in our

[1] *English Universities Today*, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1960, p. 13.

[2] Professor Gordon Greenwood in *The Australian Journal of Politics and History, August*, 1958, p. 19.

thinking too exclusively of monadic sovereign states. Whether rejected or not, such a subject could hardly be discounted as of necessity superficial. Indeed, as dealing in fundamentals, it is unlikely that it would be. And, as orientational, de-specialising, de-parochialising, mind-extending, thought-requiring, comprehensive of the many in the one, and incidentally responsive to an authentic interest initially there in those who opt to take it, what more prepossessing corrective to overspecialisation could one demand? And is not man, in society, and in global society at that, the proper study of mankind?

But, whether prepossessing or not as seen, or heard about, from afar, it is by its acceptability and its proven educative potency that this subject must finally be judged. And it is not as if it had nowhere yet been tried. That however, as Mr. Cobbler will assure us, is true also of leather. What else could a cobbler be expected to say? Never mind him!

And is there indeed nothing like this particular kind of leather? Has social cosmology no affinities with anything else at all? A point, this, certainly, which does merit clearing up. For one does not by calling it cosmology disguise the fact that its official name is Structure of International Society, being an elementary-level approach to sundry sorts of specialism, but in particular to International Relations, not offered as an offshoot either of history or of government, but as a subject in itself. And yet the title International Relations will indeed be found used in one setting or another of what in effect is but an offshoot of something else. Most commonly one finds it, especially in the United States, both housed and developed in the climate, and beneath the academic aegis, of a many-mansioned political science. And why not, given that the heaven in question has mansions, as it would seem, for all? Is it not written, not indeed in Scripture but in the Constitution of the International Political Science Association—and written there by those, the political scientists, who presumably ought to know—that, along with certain other things, international relations is a part of their subject, with the possible implication that it cannot be at the same time correctly seen as an independent subject on its own?

What may make it difficult to decide that international law, or international relations, or military studies, cannot count, so to say, as part of political science, is the fact that the latter is itself so virtually impossible to define. It is instructive to notice how Professors Morgenthau[3] and Quincy Wright[4] have reported upon this point. An assortment of specialists, in one thing and another, had discovered that, from their respective angles, they all were interested in the state. All having thus an interest in a common subject-matter, they all in a sense had thus an interest in common,

[3] *Dilemmas of Politics*, pp. 7-26.

[4] *The Study of International Relations*, p. 118.

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and could so be said to be members of a class. From that it had to follow that, sharing a single subject-matter, they shared presumably a single subject. *Ergo*, there must be a single subject for them to share. Hence the name political science. And, given that this title already thus included such a diversity of disciplines, so that its boundaries must of necessity be undefined, there need in consequence be little logical difficulty in including within it sundry other things as well, should personal considerations or arguments of administrative convenience point that way. And perhaps we may leave it at that, except to add that the foregoing is not derived verbatim from either of the aforesaid Professors and must not be imputed to them.

One thing, let us admit, seems fairly clear: namely, that, had not international relations, in whatever form, been provided for as within political science, the subject often might not have become available in any form at all. It was the political scientists who saw their need for it and so to speak went out to get it: and brilliant is much of the work they have put into this adoptive subdivision of their science. Brilliant, yes. But so too is patent leather. And how do we reply if Mr. Cobbler says that that was not what he had meant by leather? Suppose the Squirrel Lovers' Association should write into its charter a definition of squirrel so prehensile as to include the elephant, there is something we would learn from this, but it is not about the elephant. Nor does the nature of leather undergo change—as, from a lifetime's working experience, Mr. Cobbler knows it—no matter who may choose subjectively to define it, or how. To perceive what should be involved in the study of international relations, the best thing, says Mr. Cobbler, is to focus upon those relationships, the ones between states and nations, whose nature the subject is concerned to comprehend. Not enough, to know that here "international relations" is in fact a period of History, and to ask, What then is History? Or there an aspect of Political Science, and to inquire, What then is that? Let International Relations be seen as what *par excellence* it must be, the study of certain relationships, occurring in a certain social milieu, and inviting what is therefore, if anything, a sociological sort of approach.

Not that the accredited socioligists have as yet made much of it themselves. No doubt the particular milieu here in question is so obviously distinctive that sociology prefers, in its probity, to recognise international relations as properly a subject of its own. It studies not societies in general but a particular society. And with this society it is out to become familiar as by acquaintance. And as is characteristically the case with this sort of familiarity, it is acquired not by the reading of a book but progressively over a period—a period at least as long as life. And this acquaintance is with the social cosmos as a whole. The vision of this whole is no mere aggregate of impressions. It is holistic from the outset and owes as much to the imagination as to the eye.

He was indeed a wise old Scot[3] who, in his Inaugural as President of Princeton, in 1868, advised, "Let the student first be taken, as it were, to an eminence, whence he may behold the whole country, with its connected hills, vales and streams lying below him, and then be encouraged to dive down into some special place, seen and selected from the height, that he may linger in it, and explore it minutely and thoroughly". It is in the spirit of such advice that the subject of social cosmology is put so early into the programme. And it is in the same spirit that one resists the identification of the subject with anything ostensibly a science. For a science, in all too rigorous a sense, international relations, as developed currently in the United States, is tending, and endeavouring, to become. "C'est magnifique", Mr. Cobbler might say, did he know any French, "mais . . . it isn't what I still understand by leather!"

On the methodology of that modern research in the field of a scientific International Relations there is now a growing literature —on which those only who have paused to take it seriously are entitled themselves to be taken seriously in promulgating a view. There is no more ground, *a priori*, for rejecting, simply because it studies a reality touched by human choices, the purportedly scientific approach to the understanding of things international than there is, *a priori*, for rejecting any other subject—from Anthropology to Economics—which deals, scientifically, with the social coexistence of freely willing men. No ground *a priori*. And, as yet, no decisive reason *a posteriori* either. These exercises may not be everybody's cup of tea. But then neither is rigorous scientific investigation into anything else.

It remains, however, true to say, and it needs to be said as from the rooftops, that while the teacher of social cosmology may profit from his perusing of much that these conceptualisers publish, they, the specialisers in abstract analytics, and he, are engaged not in doing the same thing in different ways, but in doing different things: and that it would be inappropriate to misprize the activity to which he on his part is devoted out of a scepticism in regard to that other activity which occupies them. Whether United Kingdom universities should do more for the development of that scientific subject might presumably be discussed, but it is not considered here. For what is here being considered is not less important matter—a matter not of research but of teaching—the teaching of a new branch of study, the study by those entering upon adult life like babes in the wood, of the wood.

considering teaching not research

One thing all those transatlantic experiments in methodology have in common. They presuppose the availability of the scientific mind. This by contrast, the subject here in question does not assume. This subject, known officially as Structure of International Society, is offered for the nurture of precisely those who, albeit

[3] President McCosh quoted in Wertenbacher, *Princeton*, 1746-1896, p. 293.

accepted into the university, have typically the mind not of the scientific investigator but of the ordinary mortal, the average citizen, the common man. And, so far from being mainly concerned to fit them *ab initio* for future scientific research, or even to make them better informed than they otherwise might be, the subject is rather directed to a developing of their powers of thought. For education, it is here assumed, is indeed a conditioning of the mind. And, as such, it may take forms both good and bad. The subject here in question is recommended as being a good form of such conditioning. It is by its claim to be this that it must stand or fall. Let no one, pray, assume that it cannot be a good one without first having looked into what it is.

In what respects might the mind of the ordinary mortal be improved by a study of this subject? We are aware of what we mean by the mind of the lawyer, the economist, the historian or the mathematician. What, correspondingly, is the mind of one addicted to Structure? Is it merely that of one who, having studied economics, law and history, has set himself to make a synthesis of what they teach? It cannot be too emphatically insisted that it is not.

There are, it is true, those, among them Professor Quincy Wright[6], who do indeed speak of the International Relations " discipline " as a synthesis. And this, in their understanding of the subject, we must accordingly assume it to be. What this means, however, is not that with those who see " the subject " differently, the subject must be equally synthetic: what it does rather seem to mean is that when they on the one hand and the Quincy Wrights on the other speak of International Relations, it is of different subjects that they speak. There is no need for the exponents of social cosmology to quarrel with Quincy Wright's description of the subject envisaged by him. They personally will probably find that from it they have much to learn. Only, it does behove them to note that theirs is not an incorrect way of doing what Quincy Wright may be doing correctly: but a way, be it correct or not, of doing what Quincy Wright is not attempting to do.

Of Georges Burdeau, in his *Méthode de la Science Politique*. Stanley Hoffman[7] has observed that he wants political science to be " the intellectual synthesis of materials provided by other social sciences, and devotes most of his book to highly general and abstract speculation about key concepts, and to the wordy presentation of sweeping, untested hypotheses some of which would be hard to test and all of which are based on what is in fact a very elaborate political philosophy ". Of a synthetic subject so conceived Hoffman plainly does not approve. Nor need we. But Burdeau's is not the only understanding of what a synthesized subject could, and should be. There still will be those who think with Quincy Wright[8].

[6] Op. cit., pp. 32-33.
[7] *American Political Science Review*, December, 1959, pp. 1119-1121.
[8] Op. cit., p. 32.

"The discipline of International Relations", he writes, "has developed synthetically and this has militated against its unity. Other disciplines have developed through analysis and subdivision of older disciplines as did classical economics from normal philosophy. In International Relations on the other hand an effort is being made to synthesize numerous older disciplines, each with a specialized point of view, into a unity". How better could the contrast be exemplified between the synthetic, and the synoptic, conceptions of a field?

What the student of Structure begins, continues and ends, with is an image, his own private image of reality; upon which every new experience, every new "message" (as Kenneth Boulding[9] calls it) from outside, will make its impact. Look after the image and the impact will look after itself. No need to "synthesize" the messages if the image is ready there to receive them.

A fairy land of which he can, with his physical eyes, have had no experience at all, may to a child be just as real as is that social cosmos of which, while he cannot ever have experienced much, he will from the first have experienced something. In respect of the social cosmos, once he knows what the term refers to, no one's mind is a *tabula rasa*. Each beginner brings with him a private mind possessed of a private image of its own. To be studying the cosmos will for each one individually be a matter of the developing of his private image. And as Eric Voegelin[10] has put it, "Man's obligation is to understand his condition. Part of this condition is the social order in which he lives: and this order has today become world-wide".

What manner of mind then is this, this mind of the ordinary mortal. It is not, of course, concretely, the mind of any particular man. It is not a reality. It is merely a notion invented for the purpose of this argument. It is the ideal mind of an ideal type, the aforesaid ordinary mortal. Even so, what manner of mind? How mature is it, how politically literate, how sophisticated, how world-aware? Or conversely, how impressionable, how uncritically non-discriminating, how suggestible, how bamboozleable (to use a Keynesian idea)? To those questions the answer, submittedly, is that it all depends: it depends on the degree in which certain all-too-human characteristics predominate over that reality-thinking in which, though slowly and painfully, we should all be progressing from day to day. What characteristics? What kind of thinking, in matters international, do we know to expect of the average man? Is it independent, possibly eccentric, or is it not conventional, conformist, second-hand? Is it ethically uncommitted? Or is it moralistic, censorious and holier-than-thou? Is it put "not dogmatically" as in theology, but "tentatively," as in science?[11] Is it ideologically assured, or is it so politically self-

[9] *The Image* passim.
[10] *Order and History*, Vol. I, p. xiii.
[11] Lord Russell. *Unpopular Essays*, p. 27.

aware as to know its basic convictions for the unprovables that they are? Has it, in short, come to terms with its myths? And what of its perspective on affairs? How far has it made itself binocular, combining the parochial with the universalistic in its unified appreciation of a complex "given"? Does it deal in symbols, in simplifications, in stereotypes, or does it seek to see things as they are? And what is its holistic image, of the socially real, like? What is its conception of that cosmos which is the milieu, the setting, the matrix, within which each problem presents itself for study? Does it, that is, address itself to situations in their historical, diplomatic and sociological context, or does it conceive them as in abstraction from their circumstances, and arising as if in a cosmic void? Is it in short, an infant, an adolescent, or an adult mind?

Not as you might say adult, surely!

"Civilisation", wrote Ortega y Gasset[12] a generation ago, "is not 'just there', it is not self-supporting. It is artificial and requires the artist or the artizan. If you want to make use of the advantages of civilisation, but are not prepared to concern yourself with the upholding of civilization—you are done. . . . This disproportion between the complex subtlety of the problems and the minds that should study them, constitutes the basic tragedy of our civilisation". "All anyone can do", declared the Reverend Michael Scott[13] in elucidation of his position on nuclear disarmament, "is to think, and then take what action seems right to him or her". Thinking, one can but comment, is well enough, when done by those who have equipped themselves to do it independently, relevantly and to some purpose. It is some time now since y Gasset so warned the world about the difficulty of understanding, and so of serving, the world. Were he with us today, would he judge that his admonitions had been misplaced? It was in 1948, while at Utrecht a UNESCO Conference was urging[14] that universities should provide for the teaching of International Relations, that close by, at Amsterdam, Professor Hromadka[15] of Prague was echoing, from out of a very different background, the sentiments of the Spanish savant. Will anyone suggest that Hromadka was wrong? Is anyone satisfied that his own private image of the cosmos is fully adequate to his need? How do we personally conceive our social cosmos? Is it as in Newtonian, or in more modern categories? There was a Newtonian physical cosmology, which thought in terms of so many billiard-ball units, related externally and behaving as they did by virtue of an attraction

personal social cosmos — physical — Newtonian?

[12] *The Revolt of the Masses*, p. 97.
[13] *Our Aims at Swaffham*. The Observer, 11th January, 1959.
[14] Report of Preparatory Conference of Representatives of Universities, pp. 33-34.
[15] Report of World Council of Churches Assembly, 1948, Vol. iv, *The Church and the International Disorder*, pp. 114-142.

inter se, and there is now another, which sees the universe as a continuum, or field, throughout which there play, and interact, those forces which cause the units so to behave. Correspondingly, there is a difference between the international politics which deals in the behaviour of states, as of balls on a table, and a social cosmology which treats of a cosmos within which those states have contingently emerged, there to maintain themselves, for the time, in quasi-permanent being.

To see how much knowledge of social cosmology the citizen might hope eventually to accumulate is not to say how much, or how, or by whom, it should be given him in his freshman year. Nor is it to say how much of it his teacher, before attempting to teach him any of it, should wish for himself to have achieved. To reach the stratosphere and explore it independently may for the student be relatively easy when once he has got off the ground, but without a runway he may never be airborne at all. Let the universities provide the needed runway. The young man's interest and ambition will see to his further ascent. Without the runway, grounded in the open, he becomes, like some British intellectuals in the 1930's, a prey to simple ideas. What is paradoxical is not so much the way so many of those intellectuals at first succumbed to such ideas as their failure when their spell had ceased to bind them, to perceive what it was in their early development that had left them, for a season, so easy a prey. Strange that it should not have occurred to them that, if fortified from their freshman year with even the rudiments of a valid conception of the cosmos, they could never have come to entertain of it the image that they were given. For the fact was that they, though intellectuals, had encountered the breezes of manipulative influence with the minds just of ordinary men.[16]

"Those", wrote Marc Bloch,[17] who drew up our school curricular were obsessed by politics; they recoiled from any suggestion of sociological analysis and therefore failed to develop any taste for it in their pupils". One sometimes might wonder whether in Britain those who draw up curricula have ever got even so far as to encounter a suggestion of the kind from which Frenchmen so recoiled. Is there not indeed an un-English ring about the idea of encouraging in the schoolboy a taste for anything so spiritually desiccated as the kind of analytical exercise of which Bloch would seem to have been thinking? Yet time moves on. And with it the *Literary Supplement* of *The Times*.[18] "The sociological approach", it declared editorially, "whether we like it or not and by whatever name we choose to call it, has become an indispensable element in our understanding both of the past and of the present. A wider recognition of the function of sociology in its

[16] Neal Wood. *Communism and British Intellectuals* passim.
[17] *Strange Defeat*, p. 155.
[18] *Sociology*, 9th January, 1953.

application both to history and to the study of our current problems would remove a reproach from contemporary British scholarship". "Each member of society", MacIver and Page[19] had written, "is in his own eyes something of an authority on society. . . . Social science . . . faces the task of converting the looseness of popular usage into the precision of scientific reference". And it was, according to Noel Annan[20] "the treatment of politics as sociology" that, with its roots in utilitarianism and Fabianism, had begun quietly "to seed at a rapid rate in the 20's" and was today "perhaps the most evident part of the legacy bequeathed to us" by that period. But with what effect? "There are", even Quincy Wright[21] says, "very few social scientists in the world. The majority of so-called social scientists are in fact social philosophers who interpret the past not by careful observation but by discreet selection to justify ideals or aspirations acquired from introspection, early education or cultural tradition". Will it ever in fact be possible to treat say International Relations strictly in the temper of sociology? On those issues which by their very nature call for a severely scientific approach it of course behoves the student even of International Relations to be as scientific as he humanly can. The value of a scientific study lies in what it accomplishes for the deflating and domesticating of myths. As an example of this sort of service one may point to Lady Wootton's "Social Pathology and Social Science". But to call a subject a science will not of itself ensure that it can be consistently scientific even in its approach. There are, moreover, those who presumably would not ask that social cosmology be puristically scientific even in aspiration. As Sorokin[22] conceives it, "the integral study of the psychosocial world contains in itself all the main methods of investigating and understanding psychosocial reality: (1) the empirical, (2) the logico-mathematical, and (3) the intuitional. To each of these methods it assigns for study its proper aspect of the integral reality". Basically, he goes on, "for the integral cognition of the total 'three-dimensional' psychosocial reality, the unified system of the three main methods is to be used. In all these respects the integral approach to the understanding of the psychosocial universe is fuller and more adequate than any single method of cognition". So, as between those who with say Kenneth Waltz,[23] would direct our attention to the classics of political philosophy and those who point, with Kaplan,[24] to how, so far from relying on the literature, Aristotle had preferred for his political insights to make his own study of the facts —the student need make no choice. His personal picture of the cosmos may be filled in from both sources simultaneously. Nor,

not just empirical science but political philosophy

[19] MacIver & Page, *Society, an Introductory Analysis*, p. 3.
[20] *The Legacy of the 1920's*, The Listener, 22nd March, 1951.
[21] Op. cit., pp. vii-viii, passim.
[22] *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*, p. 317.
[23] See his contribution in *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* (Fox ed), pp. 51-67.
[24] *American Political Science Review*, December, 1959, pp. 1126-1127.

between those who read their Lasswell and those who prefer their Bagehot, need there be any quarrel either, so long as neither section treats the other as deluded. Nor again need there be any choice made between the two types—as differentiated by Professor Mace[25]—of sociology, the older and the new. The older was concerned with the larger issues, involving the interchange of opinions, and of opinions about others' opinions. For this there is ample scope, over and above, and not instead of, the collecting and analysis of empirical data. "Contemporary political scientists", complained Professor Cook,[26] "in the main do not accomplish what Tocqueville and Bagehot did so magnificently and Bryce or Graham Wallas more modestly, the achievement of penetrating and illuminating generalizations begotten out of respectful study of men living in a specific and going society. Consequently they do not, as these men did, give us methods whose strengths and limitations are alike revealed through their actual employment".

Some even of the political scientists are not enamoured of their label. "The ultimate task of political scientists", wrote Professors Harbold and Hitchener,[27] "is not 'objective' description, or even highly refined analysis, and certainly not the development of an esoteric jargon, but education: all else must be seen as instrumental to this end".

Education. The need of youth. We seem after all to be coming back to that. Each autumn an intake of hazy young minds. And each summer an output of degree-holders, neatly tabulated, and groomed, it might be supposed, for their service as leaders in the time to come. Oddly enough their universities, having passed them, cannot idiomatically be said to have failed them. Is nobody then failing anybody? Practically alone, is it not, among major institutions in this island, the universities are trusted, and supported, to know, and to do, their job. Perhaps they do after all know their Bloch, and have their answer to his reproach. But might we not then be given it? To the uninformed, it might have seemed as though, the distinction between political-creed-bound, and sociological-analytical, thinking having once been seized—as surely it must have been by now—the throwing open of the windows and the airing of the classrooms (Marc Bloch again[28]) could at most be but a matter of minutes. It might perhaps be fruitful if, taking the pro's of this matter as beyond debate, one tried to pinpoint the more intractable con's. Is it merely that what one once boorishly referred to as the "ivy-mantled syllabuses"[29] are now so hallowed by antiquity that no whisper of their possible adaptation could be endured? Or is it merely that people who

[25] *Sociological Review*, December, 1957, pp. 288-289.
[26] *Journal of Politics*, 25th October, 1951.
[27] *Western Political Quarterly*, December, 1958.
[28] Op. cit., p. 156.
[29] *The Teaching of International Relations*, The Listener, 27th May, 1954. In the interview on TV by John Freeman.